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Imagine a zebra in the African savannah. At each moment in time this zebra has to
weigh up alternative courses of action before deciding which will be most beneficial
to it. For instance, it may want to graze because it is short of food, or it may want
to head towards a water hole because it is short of water, or it may want to remain
motionless in order to avoid detection by the predator it can see lurking nearby. This is
an example of the problem of action selection: how to choose, at each moment in time,
the most appropriate out of a repertoire of possible actions.
This thesis investigates action selection in a novelway and makes threemain contribu¬
tions. Firstly, a description is given of a simulated environment which is an extensive
and detailed simulation of the problem of action selection for animals. Secondly, this
simulated environment is used to investigate the adequacy of several theories of ac¬
tion selection such as the drive model, Lorenz's hydraulic model and Maes' spreading
activation network. Thirdly, a new approach to action selection is developed which
determines themost appropriate action in a principled way, and which does not suffer
from the inherent shortcomings found in other methods.
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This thesis is an investigation of both the problem of action selection and the computa¬
tional mechanisms for providing solutions to that problem.
The problem of action selection is that of choosing at each moment in time the most
appropriate action out of a repertoire of possible actions (e.g. drinking, sleeping,
moving, grooming). The problem can also be thought of as one of time-allocation;
the animal has to decide how to apportion its available time so as to simultaneously
satisfy many needs. Action selection is separate from perception (calculation and
classification of stimuli) and motor control (execution of actions). The process of
making a decision as to which action ismost appropriate will need to take into account
many stimuli, some of which will be external (e.g. nearby predators, food sources,
mates) and some of whichwill be internal (e.g. blood sugar levels, body temperature).
An example situation in which several different stimuli are important is shown in
figure 0.1. Different action selection mechanisms take these stimuli and compute a
preferred action in different ways. The simulated environment to be described in the
first part of this thesis provides a method for testing and comparing these different
computational approaches to action selection.
The action selection mechanisms considered here are somewhat similar to planning sys¬
tems, in that they produce sequences of actions which achieve useful objectives. How¬
ever, the mechanisms considered here are more reactive (responding to the immediate
















PREDATOR from dirt/parasites in
fur/feathers
Figure 0.1: An example situation in which many different stimuli need to be taken into
account in order to decide what the best action is. In this case the animal has several
feasible actions to choose from: should it move south directly away from the hazard,
move north-east directly away from the predator, move west towards the high-valued
food source, move east towards the average-valued food and the average-valuedwater
source, or stay where it is and clean itself? The stimuli shown here are offsets from
optimal values, and the length of each bar is proportional to the seriousness of the
offset.
some time in the past). It is worth noting that while the mechanisms considered here
do not involve explicit plans, they are to some extent goal-driven, in that the behaviour
will tend to be oriented towards correcting disturbances in homeostatic variables or
rectifying undesirable external situations. They are, in the main, designed to account
for how animals can produce appropriate behaviour in natural environments, rather
than to explain how people can solve traditional planning problems such as how to
make coffee or how to stack blocks on top of one another in a certain way.
The mechanisms considered here do not incorporate learning. The aim here is to
examine the sorts of algorithms or computational methods which can be used to
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select actions, rather than to examine the ways in which the selection of actions can be
improved by experience. For this reason,methods such as temporal difference learning
[Sutton, 88] and Q-learning [Watkins, 89] are not covered in any depth here.
Terminology
Some terms which will be used extensively throughout this thesis are now defined in
conjunction with figures 0.2, 0.3 and 0.4:
1. internal stimuli (also known as endogenous stimuli)— these are perceptions of
the state of the animal's internal environment, such as perceived internal water
deficit, perceived body temperature, etc.
2. external stimuli (also known as exogenous stimuli)— these are perceptions of the
state of the externalworld, such as perceived food sources, perceived predators,
etc.
3. indeterminate stimuli— some stimuli which are relevant to the animal are nei¬
ther obviously internal nor obviously external. For instance, circadian rhythms
in many animals are based on an internal clock which gets continually reset by
the external day/night cycle [e.g. Marler & Hamilton, 66]. Similarly, in order for
the animal not to get lost, it must have access to some measurement of how well
it knows where it is. That is to say, the animal must respond to a stimulus which
is related to the variance of its estimate of its own position (see section 3.4). This
stimulus (the variance of the animal's estimate of its position) can not be directly
obtained from the current state of the external environment, and so it is not an
obvious external stimulus. However, it is dependent on the external environment
(encountering recognised features) rather than the internal environment. Any
stimuli, such as the two just described, which do not fall neatly into either of the
first two categories are classed here as indeterminate stimuli.
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4. action— this is the name given to an entity at the lowest level, such asmoving in
a certain direction, sleeping or freezing (remaining motionless to avoid detection
by predators). It is assumed that actions lie at the level of the 'behavioural final
common path' [e.g. McFarland & Sibly, 75]. That is to say, the animal is forced to
choose only one action to be executed at any moment in time. Different actions
are incompatible in terms of their demands on the motor system of the animal,
and are therefore mutually exclusive. Actions and fixed action patterns (rigid
sequences of actions) are shown on the right-hand side of figure 0.2 (e.g. 'looking
around', 'trampling' and 'pecking').
5. action selection (AS) — this is the process of choosing, at each moment in time,
the most appropriate action with regard to all types of stimuli.
6. action selection problem — this is the overall problem for an animal of how to
select its actions so as to maximise its future expected genetic fitness by surviving
and reproducing, and by helping close genetic relatives to do likewise.
7. action selection mechanism (ASM) -— this is a computational mechanism which
can produce a selected action as output when given different stimuli as inputs.
The problem of action selection is the problem of what action the animal should
choose at eachmoment in time; an action selection mechanism specifies hozo those
actions are chosen.
8. simulated environment (SE) — this is a computer program which models the
action selection problem for an animal and thereby allows the implementation
and evaluation of action selection mechanisms. The abbreviation SE will used to
refer to simulated environments in general. 'The SE' will be used to denote the
simulated environment proposed in part I of this thesis.
9. sub-problem — the overall action selection problem creates other subsidiary
problems. For instance, the need to survive creates subsidiary problems of
maintaining food, water and temperature levels within certain bounds, avoiding
predators, keeping fur/feathers in good condition, etc.
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10. system — each sub-problem of the overall action selection problem will have
a separate system of the action selection mechanism devoted to it. Systems
frequently overlap though. For instance, two systems might both make use of
the action 'rest'. System-level nodes are shown on the left-hand side of figure 0.2
(e.g. 'nesting', 'escape' and 'preening'). A system comprises not just the system-
level node, but also all other nodes 'beneath' it. It is equivalent to a 'sub-tree',
not a node in a tree.
11. sub-system — this is intermediate in size and abstraction between an action
and a system. Some sub-systems in figure 0.2 are 'settling', 'locomotion' and
'trimming'.
The terms system, sub-system and action, as used here to describe entities on the
'solution side', are similar to terms used by Baerends [1976], but rather dissimilar to
the terminology proposed in [McFarland & Sibly, 75]. These differences are discussed
further in section 5.4.
Overview
Part I of the thesis describes a simulated environment that was developed to enable
the experimental testing of action selection mechanisms. Part II considersmechanisms
for action selection and contains several contributions:
1. the simulated environment is used to test and compare several different action
selection mechanisms. Shortcomings of various mechanisms are described, and
theoretical analyses explaining each inadequacy are presented. Similarly, differ¬
ences in performance between mechanisms are described and explained.
5
Figure 0.2: Baerends' model to account tor incubation behaviour of the herring gull
[Baerends, 76]. Actions or fixed action patterns are in the far right column. "Superim¬
posed control systems" of higher order (sub-systems and systems) are to the middle
and left. N = incubation system, E = escape system and P = preening system. Taken
from [Baerends, 76].
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2. a list of requirements for action selectionmechanisms is given. Some examples of
these requirements are: mechanismsmust take account of the hierarchical nature
of action selection; decisions must only be made at the level of the behavioural
final common path; stimuli must be represented as real-valued variables; etc.















Figure 0.3: An example of the structure of a hierarchical action selection mechanism.
The terms system, sub-system and action are illustrated.
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Figure 0.4: Labels for different entities in the description of the problem for the animal,







Since the time of Charles Darwin it has been accepted that the physical characteristics
of animals are the result of evolution due to the processes of natural selection. It is
now accepted that the behaviour of animals has also been formed by natural selection.
The part of animals that is responsible for controlling behaviour is the central nervous
system. As Albus [81] stated "All brains, even those of the tiniest insects, generate and
control behaviour". Although brains can be responsible for other functions (e.g. control
of the autonomic system), their predominant function is the generation of appropriate
behaviour.
This basic task of animal brains has often been split into three sub-tasks as shown in
figure 1.1a. A slightly modified system has been assumed here with the addition of a
fourth sub-task, navigation, as shown in figure 1.1b. The four sub-tasks are therefore:
1. Sensing of the environment and interpretation of the sensory signals to provide a
high-level description of the internal and external environment at each moment
in time (perception).
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2. Keeping track of where the animal is in its environment, and remembering the
positions of important features in that environment (navigation).
3. Using the perceptual and navigational inputs to decide which of the animal's
repertoire of actions ismost appropriate at thatmoment in time (action selection).
4. Transforming the chosen action into a pattern of contractions and relaxations of
muscles so as to produce movements and rotations of parts of the body (motor
control).
Brooks [1986] has argued against a 'horizontal decomposition' of this sort (figure 1.2a),
in which there is a sequential, multi-step process in which all sensor information
gets fed to one global modelling unit, then on to one global planning unit, and so
on. Instead, he argues for a 'vertical decomposition' (figure 1.2b) in which each of a
number of task-achieving processes receive and process their own perceptual sensor
information, and then calculate their own independent commands for the actuators
(motor effectors) or for the lower-level processes.
This SE simulates the perceptual and navigational stimulus inputs to an ASM, and
models the effects of the motor commands that are required to execute individual
actions, but does not make any assumptions about whether the inputs are computed
globally or locally, or whether the motor commands are calculated by global or local
entities. That is to say, the SE does not assume either a horizontal or vertical decomposi¬
tion. There has to be some arbitration between different actions, since otherwise many
incompatible actions will be attempted simultaneously and the resultant set of motor
commands will be chaotic, but there is no assumption of any other communication
between, or global control over, the different systems.
Action selection, along with navigation, is perhaps the least well understood of the four
different parts portrayed in figure 1.1b due to the fact that the processes involved are
internal and further removed from the outside world than the processes of perception








Figure 1.1: Two decompositions of the function of an animal's brain: (a) the more
traditional decomposition, and (b) the decomposition used here.
andmeasuringneural firing rates, andmotor control can be studied by excitingneurons
and observingmotor responses, it is not so easy to apply either of these techniques to
the behavioural parts of the brain. Although areas of the brain governing behavioural
responses will respond to perceptual stimuli in certain cases, and produce motor
responses, the relationships are more complex because the inputs and outputs only
interact with the outside world via other interfacing systems [Halliday, 83].
Because of these difficulties in understanding the physiology of AS, theories of how AS
takes place in animals have generally existed 'in a vacuum'. Many theories have been
proposed, but, because there are no means of validating or invalidating them, little
progress has been made. The theories cannot be compared to what occurs in animals
because the physiology of the appropriate parts of animals' brains is little understood.
The theories have not been able to be implemented asmechanisms whose performance
can be observed (to see if they can reproduce the behavioural phenomena produced
by animals) because no satisfactory means of doing so has been available.
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Figure 1.2: Two possible decompositions of amobile robot control system, according to
Brooks, (a) shows a traditional, horizontal decomposition; (b) shows Brooks' preferred
vertical decomposition. Taken from [Brooks, 86].
1.1 Testing Theories of Action Selection Using Robots
One response to this problem of how to test the validity of ASMs has involved the
construction of robots which can 'behave' in (usually highly-constrained) artificial
environments [e.g. Peabody, 91 or Rosenblatt & Payton, 89]. A particular ASM can be
implemented and allowed to control the behaviour of a robot and the efficacy of the
resulting choices of actions can then be observed. While this approach does allow for
some testing and comparison between ASMs, there are some limitations to it.
It is now generally accepted that the problems of getting a robot to perceive and
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manipulate its world satisfactorily are enormously difficult [Brooks, 87 & 90]. It used
to be the case that AI researchers concentrated on the more 'intellectual' aspects of
thought, assuming that perception and motor control were trivial and could easily
be solved later. Nowadays, however, perception and motor control are recognised as
extremely hard problems. Little progress has been made in getting robots to achieve
them effectively, at least when compared to the abilities of higher animals.
Because robots are not very good at interpreting complex environments, they need
to be placed in environments where there are few features, each of which is easily
distinguishable. Because robots are generally rather bad (compared to animals) at
coordinating complex motor responses, they will usually possess only a limited reper¬
toire of possible actions, most of which revolve around locomotion. A typical research
robot can move effectively around a flat, fairly uncluttered environment but can do
little else in terms ofmanipulating its environment.
Because of these problems with robots, using them to investigate AS in complex AS
problems is difficult. While recognising this, it is also worth pointing out that the use
of robots has a methodological advantage in that they are grounded in the real world,
whereas simulations are not. This is a benefit because it means that people using
robots are less likely to make incorrect assumptions about the inputs and outputs of an
ASM. Roboticists know that perception of the environment is error-prone, that intended
actions are not always accomplished as desired, and so on.
In summary, while the use of robots to investigate ASMs is valid, they are at present
limited in their usefulness by the simplicity of the AS problems that they can be
presented with. This will become less of a drawback in the future as sensor and
effector mechanisms become more advanced. At the current time though it is hard to
present a robot with a complex AS problem composed ofmany different sub-problems
which vary in many different ways, and forwhich there is a large repertoire of possible
actions to choose from.
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1.2 The Value of Computer Simulations
The human brain has a limited ability to conceptualise complex dynamic processes
such as the interactions between a complicated ASM and the rapidly changing internal
and external environment provided by the complex simulated environment described
here. It is not possible for people to predict accurately how such processes will change
with time. Other examples of systems which are too complex to be fully predictable by
introspection alone are the patterns of flow of air over various shapes (e.g. aerofoils)
and the behaviour of complex industrial installations such as nuclear power stations
under varying conditions. In cases such as these there are a few techniques that
can be applied to help with the visualisation or calculation of the behaviour of the
system: (i) mathematical analysis - often intractable for more complex systems, (ii)
construction and observation of a simplified, smaller-scale physical model -not always
feasible or realistic enough, and (iii) design and observation of a computer simulation.
Mathematical analysis is not feasible for the interactionsbetween a reasonably complex
AS problem and a non-trivial action selection mechanism (see section 5.5). A simplified
physical model in this case corresponds to a robot.
Although there are drawbacks to the use of a simulation to investigate action selection
(see chapter 5), there are also three important benefits:
1. using an SE allows the 'bypassing' of the sensory perception and navigation
processes (the relevant information is calculated by the SE and passed to the
ASM), and also of themotor control process (the effects of the animal's actions on
the environment are calculated by the SE computer program without concern as
to how the actions are achieved). The perception, navigation and motor control
systems are all part of the SE. They only have to be programmed once, after which
it is possible to just slot in different ASMs without adjusting any of the rest of the
programming (see figure 1.3).
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2. In order to simulate an ASM, it must be implemented, which requires an explicit
and complete specification of the mechanism. The process of implementation
brings to the fore any vaguenesses, ambiguities and inconsistencies in the de¬
scription of the mechanism. Theories of action selection can be described at a
fairly high level, and may sound perfectly sensible on paper, but turn out in
practice to be rather vague and completely unimplementable as mechanisms.
3. The process of simulating an animal environment, and then simulating a mech¬
anism which selects actions in it, can, if the simulation captures the important
characteristics of real animal environments, give some idea ofhow the mechanism
could perform in the real world. Most importantly, gross defects in performance,
such as completely inappropriate selection of actions in this case, will show up
in the simulation.
With respect to point 3, it will be argued (section 5.3) that defects or differences in
the performances of ASMs in the SE are not important in themselves. They are only
useful as indicators of phenomena which require further investigation. The defective
performance of an ASM is only useful when it can be shown that it would also occur
in the real world, and is a product of a fault in the way the mechanism selects actions
rather than a product of some quirk of the programming of the SE. Similarly, differences
in performance between mechanisms are only useful when the reasons behind them
are understood.
1.3 OtherWork on Simulated Environments
Other simulated environments have beenwritten before, but up to now none with the
complexity of that presented here. A brief review of these other environments is now
given:
1. RAM [Taylor et al, 89]: this SE was designed for the purpose of examining pop¬
ulation behaviour and dynamics, such as the variation in population sizes of
17
SIMULATED ENVIRONMENT




Figure 1.3: Relationship between the simulated environment and the action selection
mechanisms. The environment (static and dynamic features, weather, day/night cycle,
etc) and perception, navigation and motor control are all calculated in the simulated
environment. Different action selection mechanisms can be slotted in to the simulated
environment.
predators and prey with different strategies, and the formation of 'leks' (are¬
nas/display grounds where males congregate and defend neighbouring patches
of territory on which to display to potential mates) by birds such as the sage
grouse (see figure 1.4). RAM was constructed with the intent of examining the
population effects of various AS strategies, rather than evaluating the efficacy of
an ASM for an individual animal. There are animals in RAM and it is possible to
add other features if desired. The squares of the grid can have different attributes
such as 'food value', or 'altitude', and there are global environment variables
such as 'time of day'. The perception of the animals is local and noise-free. The
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Figure 1.4: RAM. The numbers underneath the male and female birds indicate how
many of them are in the square. A Tek' has formed at (5,8). Taken from [Taylor et al,
89],
only possible actions are movements.
2. WOODS7 [Wilson, 85]: Wilson studied a simple method for associating percep¬
tual situations and actions that could easily be optimised using classifier systems.
The WOODS7 environment (see figure 1.5) does not provide a complex and inter¬
esting test ofASMs in general. There are only two types of feature (tree and food)
in the environment and perception of these is perfect if they lie in neighbouring
squares. There are 8 possible actions — a movement in each of 8 directions to
any of the neighbouring squares.
3. Petworld [Coderre, 89]: this SE (see figure 1.6) is a "system for modeling non-
species-specific behavior". It was designed partly with educational uses inmind,
and therefore needed to be of limited complexity. The intended function of
Petworld is similar to that of the SE in this thesis — the testing of ASMs. There
19
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Figure 1.5: Wilson's WOODS7 environment. T stands for tree, F stands for food. Taken
from [Wilson, 85].
are two types of feature (apart from the animals themselves): rocks (to be used
for building nests) and trees (food). The animals have a limited 'field of view',
although it is unstated whether or not perception is perfect within that. There are
13 different actions, 8 ofwhich aremovements. There are three internal variables,
hunger, fear and injury (damage).
4. SE to test Maes' mechanism [Maes, 91a]: this SE (see figure 1.7), written by
Jan Torreele, was used for testing Maes' ASM (see chapter 8). The space is
not quantised into squares, and so features exist as shapes in the environment
rather than being attached to squares. The only types of feature are obstacles,
food and water, apart from other animals. Perception is noisy and local. The
animals can can eat, drink, sleep and fight, as well as being able to move about

































Figure 1.6: Petworld. Individual animals are summarised on the right-hand side.
There are three types of feature and three types of internal variable. The 'v' shapes are
animals, the ellipses are rocks and the other shapes are trees. Taken from [Coderre, 89].
5. AL [Ackley & Liftman, 92]: this SE (see figure 1.8)was part of an experiment to ex¬
amine the interactions between short-term learning (during an animal's lifetime)
and long-term learning (over an evolutionary timescale). The evolutionary learn¬
ingwas provided by genetic algorithms which manipulated the initial weights of
a neural network. The neural network controlled the behaviour of the simulated
animal in AL. Some of the weights in the network could change with experience
(short-term learning). The space of AL is quantised into squares. There are 'car¬
nivores' (predators), plants (food), trees (protection from predators) and walls
(obstacles) in addition to other animals. Perception is local but perfect, and is
only of squares in the four compass directions N, E, S andW. The animal has the
two internal variables (health and energy) and four possible actions (movements
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Figure 1.7: SE to test Maes' ASM. Themainwindow on the right showsmotivations of
the creature over time. The main window on the left shows the environment. Taken
from [Maes, 91a].
Some generalisations can be made as to how the five SEs above address the important
issues involved in generating a simulated environment. All five of them quantise time
into a series of discrete 'ticks' or 'time-steps'. Four of the SEs are grid-based and have
features which are attached to squares in the grid. The other one has a continuous
representation of space. The first has variables for each square of the grid, whereas in
the others there is only the presence or absence of features, which can themselves be
variable. All of the SEs possess only a very few different types of feature (a maximum
of four in AL).
In all of these SEs except the fourth the animal receives perfect knowledge (has perfect
perception) of its local surroundings. The execution of actions is also infallible. If an
animal decides to execute an action then there is no question about whether or not it
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Figure 1.8: AL. The diagram contains a description of the SE, a close-up of part of the
SE, and the perception and internal state of the animal. Taken from [Ackley & Littman,
92],
environment, with the maximum number of actions being 13 in Petworld. There are
usually two or three internal variables but no more.
There is very little theory that is directly related to SEs. One relevant paper byWilson
[91] outlines a tentative taxonomy for SEs. Some ways in which he suggests SEs can
differ are (i) average length of time between the correct action in response to a stimulus,
and the associated reward, (ii) reliability of stimuli as an indicator of reward (e.g. will
certain stimuli always be followed by rewards if the correct actions are taken, or only
sometimes), (iii) regularity of environment characteristics (e.g. do features of the same
type vary, or are they always identical), (iv) amount of noise introduced to perception,
and (v) amount of noise introduced into reward.
The five SEs described above are all fairly simplistic and lie at the lower end of most
of the scales of measurement suggested by Wilson (for example, reward generally
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occurs instantaneously, stimulus is a reliable indicator of reward, and there is no noise
in either perception or reward signals). This is partly because the SEs haven't been
designed to test action selection itself, and also partly because the computing power
required for more complex simulations has only recently become widely available.
The SE to be presented in this first half of the thesis is more complex than any of
those so far outlined and is a more rigorous attempt to capture the nature of the action
selection problem for animals. There are more internal variables, more different types
of features (with variability between features of the same type) andmanymore actions.
Both perception and motor control are fallible and the model of perception is much
more sophisticated than any of those described here. In addition, a fairly sophisticated
model of error-prone navigation is included.
The relationship between stimulus and reward, which is stressed inWilson's taxonomy,
is not so pertinent for this SE since it is not designed to test learning; all the mechanisms
tested will be 'hard-wired', with no learning component.
1.4 Plan of Part I
Part I of the thesis focuses on the SE and contains five further chapters: Chapter
2 presents the theory and issues taken into consideration when designing the SE.
Chapter 3 describes the SE. Chapter 4 explains the testing procedure used to ensure
that the programming of the SE was 'bug-free' and shows that the SE presents an
interesting challenge to ASMs. Chapter 5 discusses some limitations to the usefulness
of the SE and considers the implications of some of the assumptions made during its





This chapter contains some theoretical considerations that were taken into account
during the design of the SE.
2.1 Prior Assumptions
In writing any simulation it is usually necessary to make simplifying assumptions, in
order to make the simulation computationally tractable. What can make or break the
value of the simulation is the validity of these assumptions. An attempt was made to
minimise the number of prior assumptions in this work, and to try and restrict those
that had to be made to safe and incontestable ones.
The SE in this thesis was designed as a 'testbed' for ASMs. It was important that during
the writing of the SE, no preconceptions about the form of the ASMs to be tested were
built in. In order to try and achieve this, the writing of the SE was carried out before
most of the literature on ASMs was studied. The result is, hopefully, a testbed with no
inherent biases towards any particular mechanism or solution.
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2.2 Complexity and Realism
When deciding how complex and realistic to make the SE, several factors had to be
taken into account. A large degree of complexity is desirable, as well as a range of
different types of sub-problem (see section 7.2), in order to make the challenge to the
ASM harder and more realistic. On the other hand, the dynamics of the SE need to be
to some degree comprehensible and transparent so that an observer can grasp what
is going on and have some idea of how appropriate different actions are. There was
also a limit on the amount of time that could be spent programming the SE, and this
also constrained the amount of complexity that was achievable. The SE was made as
complex and realistic as these two opposing constraints allowed.
2.3 Genetic Fitness
As explained in [Dawkins, 89], an animal is just a vehicle for the propagation of genes.
The genetic fitness of an animal is a measure of the number of copies of its genes it
manages to pass on to future generations. There are two ways in which an animal
can propagate its genes. Firstly, it can reproduce as often as possible so as to bring
about the creation ofmany new individuals which share a large proportion of its genes.
This goal implies a subsidiary one of surviving as long as possible so as to be able to
procreate many times. Secondly, the animal can help other animals which share many
of its genes ('close genetic relatives' such as siblings, parents, offspring) to survive and
reproduce as many times as possible.
The function of an ASM is to produce the most appropriate action at each moment
in time, where the 'most appropriate' is that which maximises the future expected
genetic fitness. Future expected genetic fitness is relevant here because it is not always
optimal for an animal to choose the action which it is expected will maximise genetic
fitness in the short term. For instance, if the animal perceives a predator and a mate
simultaneously then its higher priority should probably be to avoid the predator so
as to be able to survive and mate in the future. Maximising short term genetic fitness
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would lead the animal to try and copulate with the mate, even if that incurred a high
risk of death from predation. It is future expectedgenetic fitness because the interactions
between an animal and a real environment are not deterministic from the point of view
of the animal. The animal cannot calculate the exact effect of each potential course of
action on its future genetic fitness. It can only estimate the effects of different courses
of action.
How can the ability of an ASM to maximise the future expected genetic fitness be
measured in an SE? It is not possible to evaluate the suitability of each decision at each
moment in time (unless the suitability of each possible action in each possible state of
the SE is known in advance). It is only possible to measure the suitability of decisions
indirectly by measuring the final genetic fitness at the end of the animal's life. The
final genetic fitness will give an indication of the appropriateness of all the selections
of actions made during the animal's life.
In a realistic SE there will be an element of randomness, and it will be necessary to
determine the average genetic fitness (from many runs in the SE) in order to obtain an
accurate measure of how well the animalmaximises its future expected genetic fitness
at every moment in time in every run. In the SE described here it is possible for a
good ASM to obtain a low genetic fitness on a single occasion because, for example,
the particular instance of the SE has most of the water sources distributed a long way
from the animal's den. For this reason, an average measure is used here to give an
indication of the performance (ability to maximise future expected genetic fitness) of
an ASM.
However, there is a problem with the intended calculation of the performance of an
ASM in the SE: how is it possible to quantify the contribution an animal makes to
the number of copies of their genes its close genetic relatives manage to pass on to
future generations? Two possible options were available: (i) ignore the interactions
an animal makes with close genetic relatives and thereby make the measure of genetic
fitness a much simpler one (just the number of times the animal itself reproduces), or
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(ii) include close genetic relatives in the SE and include some rather arbitrary measure
of how much the animal helps close genetic relatives to pass on their genes (and also
take into account in each case their degree of genetic relatedness).
The first of the two options above was chosen. That is to say, individual fitness rather
than inclusive fitness was measured. One reason for this was so as to make the calcu¬
lation of the genetic fitness simpler and less arbitrary. If an animal cannot increase its
genetic fitness through altruism to close genetic relatives then there is no doubt that
the only way in which it can do so is through reproducing, and so the genetic fitness of
the animal is proportional to the number of times it mates. The second reason is linked
to the need to avoid building in preconceptions to the SE. If close genetic relatives of
the animal are to be a part of the SE then the SE will include assumptions about the
behaviour of conspecifics (members of the same species) of the animal to be tested,
which is very close to including assumptions about the behaviour of the animal itself.
The SE is a testbed for action selectionmechanisms, and as such it is not desirable for it
to include any assumptions about the behaviour (= selection of actions) of conspecifics.
Ignoring social interactions in the SE makes a fairly large simplifying assumption.
However, the assumption is necessary in order to obtain a principled calculation of
genetic fitness and in order to get around the problem of having to model the behaviour
of conspecifics in something being used to test the behaviour of the animal. Ignoring
social interactionsmeans that it is assumed that the animal in the SE does not come into
contact with close genetic relatives, and spends little time interactingwith others of its
kind (except whenmating). This assumption is not realistic formost animals, but in fact
holds fairly well for some. Many animals (e.g. snakes, hedgehogs, tigers) lead lives in
which they contact others of their kind only very infrequently. The assumption ismore
likely to be realistic for male animals since they mate but don't usually have to care
for the young. It is worth noting that even when an animal spends a lot of its time in
social interactions then itwill still require amechanism for choosing between different
actions at each moment in time, even though the repertoire of actions will include
some extra alternatives (e.g. mutual grooming, threatening, suckling, protection of
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offspring) and the likely benefits of actions will depend on other, less definite factors
such as the characters and emotional states of other animals.
2.4 Sub-Problems
What the animal has to do in order to increase its genetic fitness has now been defined.
It must try and mate as many times as possible during its lifetime. The problem of
survival though remains to be defined. Whatmust the animal do in order to stay alive?
The definition of genetic fitness has ensured that any ASM will need to have a system
for 'reproduction'; the definition of the problem of survivalwill determine what other
systems will be required.
What systems or behaviours are fairly common for animals? McFarland [85] mentions
aggression, alarm (signaling the presence of predators), camouflage (of the animals
themselves or of their nests), communication, courtship, drinking, feeding of self,
feeding of young, foraging, hibernation, incubation, migration, navigation, nesting,
predator avoidance, predation, reproduction, suckling, territorial defence and vigi¬
lance (i.e. scanning the environment for predators). The main behaviours covered in
[Morris, 90] are appeasing, caring for young, cleaning, courting, drinking, escaping
(by freezing, fleeing or fighting), food-finding (by foraging, hunting or scavenging),
grouping (combining into social groups),mating, nesting, playing, preparing food (e.g.
removing shells), sleeping, storing and relocating food, and tool-using. Dewsbury
[1978] lists locomotion, ingestion (including feeding, drinking, breathing), thermoreg¬
ulation, seeking of shelter, avoidance of predators (including concealment, warning
of conspecifics, escape and fighting), sleep, body maintenance (i.e. cleaning), elimina¬
tion (urination and defecation), exploration, play, use of tools, reproduction (including
courtship, mating, care of eggs and care of young) and social behaviour (including
dominance, territoriality, aggression and social facilitation). Kilmer et al, [69] list the
following "modes of vertebrate behaviour": building or locating the nest, defecating,
drinking, eating, fighting, fleeing, giving birth, grooming, hunting (for prey or fodder),
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mating, mothering the young (including suckling or hatching, retrieval, perineal lick¬
ing and so on), searching (or exploring), sleeping, urinating, and special innate forms
of behaviour such as migrating, hibernating, gnawing, hoarding, etc depending on
individual species.
Because it was decided to keep social interactions to a minimum and the animal was
assumed to be a male the following sub-problems were ignored: aggression to con-
specifics, appeasing, communication (e.g. alarm behaviour, language), dominance,
giving birth and care of young (including distracting, feeding of young, incubation,
nesting, suckling), grouping, playing, social facilitation and territorial defence. Some
others were discarded because they are fairly specialised behaviours that are relevant
only to a subset of animals: camouflage, death-feigning, hibernation, hoarding, migra¬
tion, mobbing, preparing food, startling, storing food and tool-using. This leaves a list
of fairly common, mostly non-social sub-problems which are:
cleaning (preening, grooming of self, washing, dust-baths, etc).
obtaining food (including foraging, eating).
obtaining water (including looking for water, drinking).
temperature regulation (including resting, finding shelter/shade).
predator avoidance (including running away, heading for protection, freezing).
vigilance (looking about for predators).
sleeping at night (including heading back to den, sleeping).
reproduction (including courting, copulating).
Another four sub-problems were considered to be relevant, although they do not
feature in any of the four lists above (perhaps because they are not such easily distin¬
guishable entities and do not have their own unique associated actions or fixed action
patterns). These are:
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hazard avoidance (e.g. most animals need to avoid certain areas of the environ¬
ment such as vertical drops, streams/rivers or dense undergrowth).
irrelevant animals avoidance (animals which are not predators but which might
injure the animal if it does not keep out of their way).
not getting lost (the animal needs to maintain an accurate estimate of where it is
so that it can find its den at night and can navigate successfully to remembered
places).
staying close to cover (so that the animal can escape from predators when they
appear).
These four sub-problems are not commonly included in lists of animals' behaviours
because they do not have specialised actions or fixed action patterns associated with
them — they just affect the direction the animal moves in. Nor do they produce any
distinct sequences of appetitive and consummatory actions. Nevertheless, they are
sub-problems animals must take into account when deciding the best action to select,
and there will need to be systems dedicated to them.
It should be noted that the three systems 'predator avoidance', 'vigilance', and 'stay¬
ing close to cover' are not collapsed into one anti-predator system because there are
different immediate causal factors in each case (the perception of predators, the time
since the last scan for predators and the distance from cover). This issue is discussed
further in section 5.4.
A further sub-problem, edge avoidance, was required to stop the animal from leaving
the finite SE.
This choice of sub-problems dictates the features present in the SE, the internal variables
of the animal and the factors that impinge on the animal's health (all described in
chapter 3). The exact choice of which sub-problems to include is rather arbitrary, but
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fortunately the exact choice is not overridingly important. It is important though to
have a complex SE with a large assortment of sub-problems in order to make the
action selection problem interesting. It is also important to have sub-problems with
different properties (see section 7.2). This has been achieved with the choice above.
For instance, some sub-problems are homeostatic, some are not; some are external
stimulus dependent, some are not; some are prescriptive, some are prescriptive; etc.
2.5 Modelling Perception, Navigation and Motor Control
In section 1.2 it was mentioned that one of the benefits of using a simulation was
that perception, navigation and motor control could be included in the SE, and the
ASM could be considered separatedly. The properties of perception, navigation and
motor control can all be modelled at a fairly abstract level with no need to worry about
the lower-level mechanics as long as the higher-level characteristics relevant to action
selection are realistic. A discussion of the models used in the SE is given here. More
details for each case are given in sections 3.3,3.4 and 3.5 respectively.
1. perception - this process transforms a large amount of low-level sensory data
(e.g. signals from numerous different smell receptors, signals from retinal rods
and cones) into a higher-level description of the environment in terms of features
and their positions. Animals use a wide variety of different senses to obtain
information about the environment (e.g. sight, sound, taste, smell, touch, echo-
location, heat-detection). The main assumption made here is that the animal,
using whatever senses, can only sense a fairly restricted area around it (i.e. a
local area of the environment). The model used here is of an error-prone process.
For every feature in the area of the SE local to the animal, a probability of incorrect
perception is calculated. If a randomly distributed number between 0.0 and 1.0
is less than this probability then the perception of the feature is distorted and the
animal will either perceive nothing there ormistakenly perceive a different type
of feature. In some cases the animal will also perceive features where none exist.
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The probability of incorrect perception is affected by intervening vegetation,
distance from the animal, the selected action of the animal, and the time of day.
The animal can also sense the values of its internal variables (e.g. food and
water deficits and body temperature), again with a degree of noise built into the
perception. Finally, the animal has access to the values of various indeterminate
stimuli.
2. navigation - the term navigation is used here to cover the creation and usage
of a 'map' (a collection of memories of the positions and attributes of various
features), as well as the estimation by the animal of its current position, and the
calculation of how to move towards a remembered feature. The animal forms
error-prone memories of features based on its perception of them and on the
animal's estimate of its own position when it encounters them. The variance
of the animal's estimate of its position increases each time it moves, but can
decrease when the animal encounters recognised features. The memories will
become more accurate as the animal visits the features more often.
It was stated in the Prologue that none of the mechanisms incorporate learning.
Navigation is not an exception to this rule. Although the navigational inputs to
an ASMwill change through the animal's lifetime as it becomesmore acquainted
with the layout of its environment, this does not mean that any learning takes
place within any of the ASMs.
There is a limit to how many features can be remembered at any one time. The
strength of a memory is dependent on the utility of the feature, the number of
times it has been visited and how long since it was last visited. Lower strength
memories can be be removed from the map (be 'forgotten') as newer, stronger
ones are added. The animal can use its memories of features to head towards a
remembered feature, though the likelihood of finding it depends on how well it
has remembered the feature's position and on howwell it knows its own position,
as well as on the existence of hazards between the animal and the feature.
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In summary, the map consists of error-prone memories which can be forgotten
over time and which can not always be used successfully to find the feature they
represent.
3. motor control - this process models the transformation from a chosen action into
a set of lower levelmotor commands that bring aboutmovements of the animal's
body. In the model used here the process is once again error-prone. There is a
fixed probability of an action not being successfully executed. This probability
only increases if the animal is incapacitated (has very bad health). The low-level
details ofmotor control are not simulated, only the end effects of each action (e.g.
an increase in the level of the animal's internal water and a decrease in level of a
water source after the animal drinks there, a change in the position of the animal




Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show two randomly generated instances of the SE (figure 3.3
explains the meanings of the different symbols). The SE consists of a 25 x 25 grid of
squares together with many different features which can occupy the different squares.
Random numbers of features are distributed randomly around the SE, so that any two
instances of the SE are likely to be very different. The SE has a fixed edge, formoving
over which the animal incurs a health penalty. The animal is able to perceive the edge
of the SE so as to be able to avoid it. The SE does not wrap around (e.g. the animal
does not appear at the right-hand edge after it leaves the left-hand one). The animal's
den is always placed somewhere near to the centre of the SE.
Time in the SE is split up into timesteps. Each day in the SE consists of 500 timesteps.
Each day is also sub-divided into 6 parts, which affect how well the animal is able to
perceive the local area of the SE. Night occupies the first ^ and the last ^ of the day
(| in all). Sunrise occupies the first ^ after night ends, morning the next midday
the subsequent afternoon the next and sunset the final before night.
Most variables in the SE (e.g. attributes of features, animal health, animal internal
variables) are scaled to lie in the range 0.0 - 1.0. Unless otherwise stated, a value of 0.0
will correspond to the minimum, and a value of 1.0 will be the maximum.
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Figure 3.1: A randomly generated instance of the simulated environment showing the
positions of features, the position of the animal, the current action of the animal, the
time, the day and the current part of the day.
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Figure 3.2: A different randomly generated instance of the simulated environment.
The rest of this chapter describes how the different aspects of the SE discussed in the
last chapter (genetic fitness, survival, different sub-problems, perception, navigation
and motor control) have been implemented in the SE. While a lot of the descriptions
here are fairly low-level, in most cases the precise forms of the equations and the exact
implementational details are not given, due to the amount of space this would take.
An exception to this is the section on navigation. Because it is probably the most
contentious of the three processes, and in order to give an example of how one of the
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Key to Feature Types
Lighter shades imply greater value to the animal
- water source




^ - dangerous place
- landmark
- cereal type food
- fruit type food
" den
- irrelevant animal (just needs avoiding)
(^m) - mate
- predator (type 1)
■5=0=? - predator (type 2)
- prey
- animal whose behaviour is being modelled
Figure 3.3: Key to features in the simulated environment.
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processes is implemented, a fuller description of navigation is given, includingmost of
the low-level equations used to implement it. The code for this simulated environment
can be obtained from the author upon request, in order to repeat the experiments
described in this thesis.
While reading this chapter it should be taken into account that although some of the
assumptions made here will probably seem rather dubious and arbitrary, the low-level
implementational details of the SE are not vitally important as long as the overall high-
level 'flavour' of the SE is fairly realistic and presents a challenging test for an ASM.
While wanting to keep the SE as realistic as possible in a general sort of way, the SE
will only ever be useful as an exploratory tool to give indications of where there are
shortcomings with mechanisms. It can never be claimed that it is completely realistic
and so it can never be used to prove the existence of shortcomings by itself. Therefore
it is not essential that each small, low-level detail be correct.
3.1 Animal's Health
In chapter 2 it was argued that the genetic fitness of a solitary, non-social animal is
equal to the number of times it reproduces. This leads to two requirements on the part
of the animal: (i) reproduction, and (ii) staying alive in order to reproduce. In the SE
the survival problem is mediated through the use of a variable animal-health which
can vary in the range 0.0 - 1.0. It starts at 1.0 (animal in perfect health) and the animal
will die when it falls to 0.0. Different facets are added to the survival problem in the SE
by allowing different factors to impinge upon the value of the variable animal-health.
The animal is given a maximum possible lifespan of 10 days = 5000 time steps. This
is achieved by imposing an age-dependent upper limit on the value of animal-health.
This upper limit stays at 1.0 until the animal has reached ~ of its maximum lifespan (=
5 days), after which the upper limit is decreased linearly with age until it falls to 0.0 at
the maximum lifespan. In practice, even a near-optimal animal will never be able to
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live quite as long as the maximum lifespan because other factors will always decrease
animalJiealth some way beneath the upper limit.
As well as 'old age' affecting the upper limit on health, the animal can also suffer
permanent injury (e.g. from attacks by predators or from hazards). The size of this
variable permanently reduces the upper limit of health some amount below the value
determined by old age, whereas normal decrements to health can be recovered from
over time. If the animal's health is depressed due to normal, recoverable, decrements
then it is allowed to recover up to 0.005 (= 0.5%) every timestep, dependent on its
currently selected action. Any action other than sleeping will reduce the amount it
is able to recover in that timestep. The value of animalJiealth is therefore determined
by whichever of the two following calculations produces the smaller result at each
timestep
animalJiealtht = 1.0 - O - I - S
or
animal-health t = animalJiealtht_± -f R
where O = decrement due to old age, I = non-recoverable decrement due to permanent
injury, 5 = recoverable decrement from sub-systems (e.g. from shortage of food, lack
of cleanliness, recent attack by a predator orwhatever) and R = recovery in health since
previous timestep. As an example, consider an animal for which (i) age = 6.5 days,
(ii) permanent injury = 0.13, (iii) recoverable decrements total 0.21, (iv) previous health
= 0.355, and (v) current action = CLEAN (see below). In this case the new value of
animal-health is calculated as the lesser of (1.0 - ((0.65-0.50)/0.50) -0.13- 0.21) = 0.36
and (0.355 + (0.7 x 0.005)) = 0.3585, i.e. is calculated to be 0.3585.
If the animal's health is greater than 0.1 then there is a l%i chance of executing each
action incorrectly. When the an:mal's health falls below 0.1 then the chance of it failing
to carry out each action correctly increases, and it becomes unable to carry out certain
strenuous actions such as mating (it becomes partially incapacitated).
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3.2 Implementation of Sub-Problems
In section 2.4 a list of relevant sub-problems that should be included in the SE was
developed. The way in which they have been implemented is now explained. Any
environmental features necessary to model the sub-problems are introduced, together
with any relevant indeterminate or internal variables, and their dynamics. The rela¬
tionships between the sub-problems and animal-health are described, and any actions
that need to be incorporated into the animal's repertoire are presented.
3.2.1 Cleaning
This sub-problem models the need of animals in the wild to maintain their feathers, fur
or skin in a clean and parasite-free state. Lack of preening or cleaning or grooming can
lead to difficulties caused by less effective insulation, infection of wounds, infestation
with parasites, etc.
The animal is provided with a low-level action CLEAN, and an internal variable
cleanliness which can vary in the range 0.0 (maximally dirty/dishevelled/parasite-
ridden) to 1.0 (maximally clean). At every timestep cleanliness is decreased by an
average of 0.001. On every occasion that the animal selects the action CLEAN then the
difference between the current value of cleanliness and 1.0 is reduced by a factor of 0.15
(i.e. new cleanliness = old cleanliness + ((1.0 - old cleanliness) x 0.15)). So if cleanliness =
0.2, then successive cleaning actionswill increase it to 0.32,0.422,0.509,0.583, etc. The
animal's health is reduced by one half of the difference between 1.0 and cleanliness (so,
for example, a cleanliness value of 0.75 means a health decrement of 0.125). Therefore,
the maximum possible effect on the animal's health due to lack of cleaning is 0.5.
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3.2.2 Obtaining Food
Instead of assuming one unitary food variable, three different internal food variables
-fat, carbohydrate and protein - are assumed. In real life the need for food is likely
to be even more 'multi-dimensional', with needs for different minerals, vitamins, etc.
However, for simplicity, food is considered in this case to consist of only the three
components mentioned above.
Each of the three variables can lie in the range 0.0 (death through lack) to 1.0 (death
through surfeit). In practice the values of those food variables are not allowed to reach
1.0, but rather when any of them exceed a value of 0.75, then vomiting is assumed
to occur, i.e. the value returns to 0.75 and the animal incurs a recoverable health
penalty. When the value of any of the food variables falls below 0.25 then the animal's
health is decreased by ((0.25 - value)/0.2b)2 and so the decrement to health increases
in proportion to the square of the deficit in the value of the food variable. The value of
each of the three variables decreases slowly over time when the animal is not eating.
At each timestep the amount of decrease is dependent on the action of the animal, with
actions such as moving fast causing higher decrease.
Three separate features are included in the SE for the purpose of modelling this sub-
problem: cereal type food, fruit type food and prey. Each of these three types of food
differ in their respective contents of fat, carbohydrate and protein, and so different types
of food will be more or less useful at different levels of the animal's fat, carbohydrate
and protein internal variables. There are also other differences between the three types
of food. Fruit type food and cereal type food instances are both static, with fruit type
food instances usually having higher values (i.e. there is more to eat there). The SE
has a primitive model ofweather, and the values of the cereal type food instances vary
in relation to the amount of rain that has occurred in the SE over the last few days.
The fruit type food is not related to weather, but is cyclic in nature. Each instance
has a ripening-decaying cycle so that the animal will not always find food at a good
value fruit food source. Fruit food sources are usually of a higher value than cereal
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type food sources (averaged over fat, carbohydrate and protein), and are slightly more
numerous. Fruit food sources are more likely to occur near water sources, whereas
cereal food sources are positioned completely randomly. Prey type food instances
appear at random times on the boundary of the SE and move in an unpredictable
fashion across it. If intercepted by the animal then they can be eaten to provide food.
They provide a large, instantaneous amount of food.
When the animal eats from fruit food or cereal food sources then their values are
decremented by the amount the animal eats. They then 'recuperate' at rates of 0.3 per
day and 0.2 per day respectively until they return to their normal values. Instances of
prey die when the animal catches and eats them.
Instances of fruit food (10% chance) and cereal food (5% chance) can be toxic. That is,
they can induce a decrement in health which will take effect some time after the animal
has eaten. The damage to the animal's health will be randomly in the range 0.0 - 0.15
(cereal type food) and 0.0 - 0.40 (fruit type food) and can occur up to several hundreds
of timesteps later. The risk of dying from toxicity is not so high as to make the likely
penalty of eating greater than the likely reward. The location of food sources can be
remembered, and ones that are probably toxic can in future be avoided (see section
3.4).
Three low-level actions are needed in the animal's repertoire: EAT_CF, EAT_FF and
POUNCE (on prey).
3.2.3 Obtaining Water
Unlike food, the need forwater is assumed to be uni-dimensional. There is one internal
variable, water, which can lie in the range 0.0 (death through lack) to 1.0 (death through
surfeit). As with food variables, values greater than 0.75 lead to vomiting and values
less than 0.25 lead to a decrement in health of ((0.25 — value)/Q.2b)2. Again, the amount
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that the value of water decreases each timestep depends on how strenuous an action
has been selected.
An additional feature water source is required for the animal to be able to drink from.
The value of each water source is dependent on an inherent capacity (set randomly
when the water source is initialised) and also on the amount of rain that has occurred
in the SE in the last few days.
When an animal drinks from a water source then the water source's value is decreased
by however much the animal drank, after which it can recuperate at the rate of 0.03
every 10 timesteps, until it returns to what its value would have been otherwise. Each
water source has a 5% chance of being toxic, in which case itwill cause a decrement in
the animal's health of 0.0 - 0.2 some time later. Water sources can be remembered in
the same way as food sources (see section 3.4).
An extra action of DRINK is added to the animal's repertoire.
3.2.4 Temperature Regulation
The animal is given an internal variable temperature, which can vary in the range 0.0
(death due to cold) to 1.0 (death due to heat). If temperature is less than 0.25 then the
animal's health is decremented by ((0.25 - temperature)/0.25)2. If temperature is greater
than 0.75 then the animal's health is decremented by ((temperature - 0.75)/0.25)2. The
value of the internal variable temperature is dependent on (i) the external temperature
(derived from the primitive weather model and the current part of the day), (ii) the
location of the animal (certain features will ameliorate the effects of external tempera¬
ture), and (iii) the action of the animal (the more strenuous the action, the higher the
animal's internal temperature).
Another feature shade is used in the SE. This has the effect of protecting the animal
against severe external temperatures (either too hot or too cold). The features fruit type
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food , cover and den all reduce the effects of external temperature as well. A further
action REST is made available to the animal. This action leads to a lower than average
body temperature. Other actions such as MATE and MOVE_FAST lead to higher than
average body temperature.
3.2.5 Predator Avoidance
Two types of predator features with slightly different characteristics are included in
the SE. Predatorls move semi-randomly about the SE, and represent ground-based
predators. Their movement is determined by balancing four factors: (i) a tendency to
move in an initially chosen random direction across the SE, (ii) an attraction towards
water sources, (iii) a random component, and (iv) an overriding tendency to chase the
animal if it is caught sight of, and if the predatorl is hungry (90% chance). A predatorl
can catch sight of the animal from up to 2.5 squares away, whichever part of the day it
is. The chance of a predatorl spotting the animal is affected by whether the animal is
in vegetation, how conspicuous an action it is executing, and how far away from the
predator it is. The predatorl will continue to chase the animal until it catches and kills
it or until it gives up. It gives up if it hasn't caught the animal after chasing it for 6-13
timesteps. A predatorl can move between 1 and 3 squares per timestep.
If a predatorl catches the animal (gets in the same square and the animal doesn't
escape) then the animal's health will be decremented by a random number between
0.0 and 0.3 (65% chance) or between 0.3 and 1.0 (35% chance). The animal also has a
25% chance of suffering 0.0 - 0.5 permanent injury. In short, if the animal is caught
by a predatorl then it has a good chance of being killed outright, whatever its current
state of health.
Predator2s are similar to a predatorls, but represent avian rather than ground-based
predators (e.g. owls or hawks). There are several differences: (i) there are fewer of
them during the day and more of them during the night, (ii) they are not attracted
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towards water sources, (iii) they move more rapidly (1-4 squares per timestep), (iv)
they can catch sight of the animal from up to 3.0 squares away, (v) they give up chasing
after 4-8 timesteps, and (vi) they inflict even more damage, on average, to the animal's
health if they catch it.
Apart from these two dynamic features, a third feature cover is introduced because of
this sub-problem. This feature represents thick vegetation and provides protection for
the animal against predators. Aswell as the animal having a better chance of escaping
from a predator when in cover, the predator is less likely to spot the animal there.
Instances of cover occur in clusters and are more likely to be positioned in the vicinity
ofwater than otherwise. Similarly benefits are given by other vegetation-type features
(fruit type food and shade), but to a lesser degree. The animal is completely safe from
predators whilst in its den.
Two new types of animal action are added for this sub-problem: (i) MOVEJAST in
a direction enables the animal to try and run away from a predator, and (ii) FREEZE
(become motionless) makes the animal inconspicuous and, especially when the animal
is in vegetation, less likely to be spotted or kept sight of by the predator. The animal's
choice of action and the presence or absence of vegetation combine to affect the like¬
lihood of the animal being detected by a predator. So, for instance, the probability of
the animal being perceived by a predator is on average 16 times less when the animal
is motionless (has chosen the action FREEZE) in cover, than when the animal ismating
in the open.
When modelling predator-animal interactions, care was taken that predators could
not always catch the animal, and also that the animal was not always able to escape
predators. The following ordering of events occurs during each timestep:
1. the animal's perception is calculated (including that of any nearby predators).
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2. an action is selected by the animal (e.g. moving away from a nearby predator
towards cover), and that action is then executed (i.e. any effects on the animal's
internal state, or on the features in the simulated environment, are calculated).
3. the perception and movement of predators is calculated (e.g. a predator may
catch sight of the animal and move towards it).
4. if any predators have reached the same square as the animal then a check is
made to see if the animal is able to escape (dependent on amount of vegetation
in square and the action of the animal).
5. if the animal does not escape then it is assumed to have been successfully attacked
and its health is decremented by an appropriate, random amount. At this time
the animal may also incur permanent injury.
This sequence of events means that the animal can usually escape predators if it per¬
ceives them at a distance and takes appropriate action (e.g. moving towards vegetation
and freezing there), but that on occasion the animal will be attacked before it has per¬
ceived the predator, orwill be caught out in the open and will be attacked before it can
reach cover.
3.2.6 Vigilance
The animal needs to scan the environment for predators every so often, especially when
it has perceived one or more predators recently. Two new actions LOOK_AROUND
and LOOK (in a particular direction) allow the animal to perceive its environment to
a greater distance and with improved accuracy. Two new indeterminate stimuli (see




When the animal is near the edge of the SE then it will start to try and perceive areas
that are outside of it. In this case it perceives a normal type of square, containing only
the feature outside edge. If the animal tries to move into a square with this feature in,
then it is not allowed to and its health is decremented by 0.01.
3.2.8 Hazard Avoidance
A new feature of dangerous place is used to represent cliffs or streams or bogs, i.e.
areas which it is dangerous for the animal to visit. They only have an effect on the
animal if it moves into a square containing one of them, in which case the animal has
a 40% chance of suffering 0.0 - 0.6 damage to its health, and a 10% chance of suffering
0.6 - 1.0 damage. There is also a 30% chance of 0.0 - 0.5 permanent injury, a 5% chance
of 0.5 - 1.0 injury, and a 15% chance of 1.0 injury. In short, there is a very high chance
of death or at least very serious injury if the animal enters a square with a dangerous
place feature in it.
3.2.9 Irrelevant Animal Avoidance
An irrelevant animal is one which does not actively chase the animal but which might
injure the animal if the animal doesn't get out of its way. It can be thought of as similar
to a moving hazard, needing only to be avoided. If the animal is in the same square
as an irrelevant animal and does not manage to escape (the probability of which is
dependent on the action of the animal and on the thickness of vegetation) then it will
incur 0.0 - 0.4 damage to its health and 0.0 - 0.4 permanent injury.
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3.2.10 Sleeping at Night
As described in the previous section, predators are able to perceive their surroundings
normally at night, whereas the animal's perception becomes progressively worse as
night approaches, until the animal can perceive nothing at all outside of its own
square. Because of this severely reduced perception at night the animal is also liable
to be injured or killed by encounters with dangerous places or irrelevant animals if it
moves about, because it cannot see them so as to avoid them. It is therefore highly
advantageous for the animal to spend nights in a protected place and engage in actions
which do not deplete its resources too rapidly. The feature den represents the animal's
lair or burrow. The animal is completely safe from predation there. The animal is
also protected from extremes of temperature in its den but has limited perception from
inside it. There is only one den, near the centre of the SE, and it will be advantageous
for the animal to return there every night.
Another action, SLEEP, is introduced. This brings about the lowest reduction of food
and water per timestep. Two new indeterminate stimuli, proximity of night and
distance from den are included.
3.2.11 Staying Close To Cover
It is advantageous for the animal to stay in fairly close proximity to cover (or rather,
any sort of protection from predators — fruit type food, shade, the animal's den and
cover all offer varying degrees of protection from perception or attack by predators)
so that it can head there if a predator is perceived. A new indeterminate stimulus of
distance from cover is required. There are no new internal variables, features or actions
for this sub-problem.
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3.2.12 Not Getting Lost
This sub-problem depends on another indeterminate stimulus, which is the variance
of the animal's estimate of its current position. The variance is a measure of how large
an error there is likely to be between where the animal is and where it thinks it is. The
animal's variance is always set to zero when it is in its den, but then increases as the
animalmoves further and further away from its den and away from well-known areas
(see section 3.4). It is indirectly important for the animal to keep its variance low so that
it can find its way to remembered features and back to the den at night. A feature that
is added to the SE for this sub-problem is landmark, which is an easily recognisable
feature which will help the animal to know where it is and to map its environment
successfully.
3.2.13 Reproduction
This sub-problem is the only one that does not concern survival, as well as the only one
involving conspecifics, although of the opposite sex. The feature mate moves about
the SE and has a 50% chance of being receptive (i.e. 'in heat') at any time (it is assumed
to be a female and the animal to be a male). Two new actions COURT and MATE are
added to the animal's repertoire. If the animal enters the same square as a mate and
performs the action COURT then if the mate is receptive then it will respond to the
courting to show that it is ready to mate. If the animal then performs the further action
MATE then reproduction will be assumed to have occurred and the animal's genetic
fitness will increase by 1.0.
If the animal tries to matewith a mate that is not receptive or not courted then the mate
will attack the animal. If the animal does not manage to escape then it will suffer 0.0 -
0.25 decrement to health and have a 5% chance of 0.0 - 0.2 permanent injury.
The implementation of all 13 of the different sub-problems has now been described. It
can be seen that the whole problem for an ASM in the SE is a complex one. There are 13
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different sub-problems involving 14 different features (cereal type food, fruit type food,
prey, water, shade, predatorl, predator2, cover, den, outside edge, dangerous place,
irrelevant animal, landmark, and mate), 6 different internal variables (cleanliness, fat,
carbohydrate, protein, water and temperature), 6 different indeterminate stimuli (time
since last scan, time since predator perceived, proximity of night, distance from den, distance
from cover and variance) and 35 different actions (8 MOVE actions, 8 MOVE_FAST
actions, 8 LOOK actions, CLEAN, EAT_CF, EAT_FF, POUNCE, DRINK, REST, FREEZE,
LOOK_AROUND, SLEEP, COURT and MATE).
3.3 Perception
A high-level description of perception was given in section 2.5, the implementation of
which will now be explained.
When calculating the animal's perception of the squares around it, 6 factors are taken
into account:
1. how far away from the animal the 'target' square is. The maximum distance at
which the animal can ever correctly perceive the contents of a square is 3 squares
away.
2. the time of day. At night the animal's perception is nil, at sunrise and sunset the
effectiveness is reduced by one half.
3. the animal's action. If the animal is purposefully looking around, or purposefully
looking directly at the target, then it is more likely to perceive correctly.
4. the presence or absence of vegetation in the animal's square.
5. the presence or absence of vegetation in any of the squares between the animal
and the target.
51
6. the presence or absence of vegetation in the target square (this will not affect
perception of the vegetation features themselves, but will affect perception of
anything else that is in the same square).
These 6 factors are all taken into account to give a figure in the range 0.0 (0% chance
of correct perception) to 1.0 (100% chance of correct perception) that represents the
probability that the animal will correctly perceive the given feature. So, for example,
the square shown in figure 3.4 might have a probability of being correctly recognised
of ((1.0 - 0.13 - 0.29 - 0.06) x 0.50) x 1.0 = a total of 0.26 = 26%, where 0.13 is for
the vegetation in the animal's square, 0.29 for blocking vegetation in square X, 0.06
for blocking vegetation in square Y, 0.5 because of the distance of the square, and 1.0
because the animal is purposefully looking in that particular direction.
Once the probability of correctly perceiving the square has been calculated then a
random number in the range 0.0 - 1.0 is generated and compared to the probability.
If the random number is smaller then the square is correctly perceived (the ASM will
receive a faithful representation ofwhat is actually in the square). If it is larger then the
ASM receives a corrupted version ofwhat is in the square (i.e. itmay not perceive some
features which are actually there, and/or it may perceive some features which are not
actually there). Incorrect perceptionwill frequently have no effect on the action that the
animal would select (e.g. if the animal fails to perceive a fairly sparse instance of cover
that is several squares away), but will on occasion have serious consequences (e.g. if
the animal mistakenly perceives a predator in an adjacent square and interrupts its
approach towards a food source in order to run away from the predator). If the feature
has associated perceivable properties (e.g. the 'value' of a water source) then these
are corrupted in proportion to the probability of incorrect perception. The perception
of internal variables is calculated by taking the actual values and adding gaussian
random numbers with mean 0.0 and standard deviation 0.002.
Using the techniques just described, the perception of the animal is made to be local
and error-prone.
target square
square Y - fruit type
food reduces perception
square X - cover
reduces perception
animal square - cover
reduces perception
Figure 3.4: Perception example: the chance of the animal correctly perceiving the
predator in the target square is reduced by the distance of the square from the animal,
vegetation in the animal's square and vegetation in the intervening square X and the
partially intervening square Y.
3.4 Navigation
The second of the three parts of an animal brain that need to be modelled in the
SE is navigation. This is described in more detail than either perception or motor
control. A high level description of navigation was given in section 2.4. A description
of how a limited-capacity, error-prone navigation system with realistic properties of
remembering and forgetting has been implemented is given below. It must be stressed
that the details of how navigation is implemented (along with other aspects) do not
need to be completely realistic in every respect as long as the gross effect is a fairly
realistic model of the process. Most of this process had to be designed from scratch,








Figure 3.5: Error in animal's estimate of its movement: each time the animal moves
(from start point to end point), its estimate of the distance and direction it has moved
is slightly inaccurate.
3.4.1 Increasing Expected Error with Increasing Movement
The first navigational phenomenon to implement is that of the animal being able to
get lost. The animal's knowledge of where it is becomes increasingly inaccurate as it
moves further and further away from the den. At each timestep, if the animal moves a
distance 6X in the x-direction and 6y in the y-direction then it is assumed to incur errors
in its estimates of how far it moved of ex and ey (i.e. it assumes it has moved (Sx + ex)
in the x-direction and (6y + ey) in the ^-direction, as shown in figure 3.5). ex and ey are
both random numbers drawn from a gaussian distribution withmean 0.0 and variance
a2 (= 0.05). Therefore after one movement the expected variance of the estimates of
the x and y coordinates will be a2, and after N movements the variance will be Na2.
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3.4.2 Deciding Whether to Recognise a Feature
So far the animal will move about the environment, gradually accumulatingmore and
more error in its estimate ofwhere it is, and only reducing the variance of this estimate
when it manages to return to its den. In order to create a more realistic model of
navigation, in which the animal will not tend to get lost in areas it is well acquainted
with, it is necessary to allow the animal to recognise features. When it encounters a
recognised feature (one it realises it has perceived before) then the memory of where
it thought the feature was before will be used to improve its estimate of where it
currently is. The way in which it is decided whether or not a feature is recognised is
now described. The animal can only recognise a feature in the same square as itself.
In order for a perceived feature to be 'matched' to a remembered one (i.e. to be
recognised, whether correctly or not), the following conditions must be true:
1. The perceived and remembered feature must be of the same type (e.g. both water
sources).
2. The values of any properties of the features should be similar except for food and
water source values which can be cyclic or dependent on the weather or changed
by the animal consuming them.
3. The difference in the estimated positions should be small compared to the sum of
the variances of the animal's position and the remembered position of the feature.
4. The sum of the two variances should not be excessive.
The third and fourth conditions are achieved by thresholding a term known as the
Mahalanobis distance added to the logarithm of the combined variance. That is to
say, a match is only possible if
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where (xA,yA) = estimated animal coordinates, (xF, yF) = estimated feature coordi¬
nates, <742 = variance of estimate of animal's own position, and aN2 = variance of
estimate of feature's position (before this encounter). The figure of 5.0 was determined
empirically. It gives a good balance between (i) not rejecting too many true matches
and (ii) not accepting too many false matches.
When deciding which remembered feature, if any, is matched with the perceived one,
the map is scanned in order of memory strengths (described below), with highest
memory strengths being considered first. The first entry to satisfy all of the conditions
above is matched with the perceived one, otherwise the perceived feature is not recog¬
nised and a newmemory entrywill be added to the map. This scheme allows a single
feature to be represented in the memory more than once, and also allows two similar
and adjacent features to be represented by the same memory. Recognition is distinctly
error-prone.
Landmarks are easily distinguishable features which are not confused with one an¬
other. Because of this they are likely to have more reliable coordinates, and thus to
make it easier for the animal to navigate successfully around the environment.
3.4.3 Updating the Animal and the Feature after an Encounter
This section describes what happens when an animal encounters a feature. The feature
can be recognised or can be treated as being perceived for the first time. The changes
in the animal's estimate of where it is and in the variance of that estimate will be
considered, aswell as the changes that aremade to the estimate of the feature's position,
and the variance of that estimate. Finally, the changes in the estimates of the values of
the feature's properties are described.
Estimating feature positions — the animal remembers the positions of features it
encounters. The estimate of a feature'sposition is likely to become increasingly accurate
as the animal visits it more andmore often. This is implemented in the following way:
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1. when an animal first encounters a feature then the remembered position of the
feature is set to the animal's estimate of its own position.
2. similarly, the variance of the estimate of the feature'sposition is set to the variance
of the estimate of the animal's own position.
3. when an encountered feature is matched to a remembered one (i.e. is recognised)





















where (xN,yN) and (xN+1,yN+i) are estimates of the feature's position after N
and N + 1 encounters, (xA, yA) is the estimate of the animal's position, aN2 is the
variance of the Nth estimate of the feature's position and aA2 is the variance of
the animal's estimate of its own position. This equation is known to produce a
minimum-variance estimate of the new position, as long as (xN, yN) and (xA,yA)
are independent.
4. when a previously encountered feature is recognised then the new variance of
its estimated position is calculated according to the equation:
1
aN+1
— + —"N2 <rA2
(3.2)
Equation 3.1 above is structured so that if the animal's variance is small (its
position is accurately known), but the feature's is high (inaccurately known),
then a big change will be made to the estimated position of the feature, whereas
if the opposite is true then the change in the estimated position of the feature will
be negligible. Equation 3.2 is the correct way of calculating the variance of the
new estimate of the feature's position when the new position is estimated as in
equation 3.1.
Estimating the animal's position— a choice needs to be made as to how the animal's




Figure 3.6: Travelling to one feature by way of another: square Y is usually visited by
the animal just after it has visited square X, and so successive estimates of the position
of the feature in square Y are not independent.
feature. The simplest and 'purest' choice is to set the animal's coordinates and variance
to that of the feature it has just recognised, since those have alreadybeen changed to take
account of the animal's estimated position in a principled way. This option also appears
optimal in that it results in the minimum variance. There are two hidden difficulties
with this though: (i) The animalwill occasionally match thewrong remembered feature
to the perceived one, and this will badly upset the animal's estimate of its own position,
(ii) If the animal usually tends to travel to one feature by way of another (see figure 3.6),
then the different estimates of the second feature's position will not be independent
since they will always be affected by an error in the estimates of the first feature's
position. If there is a large error in the initial calculation of the first feature's position
then this will gradually die away with subsequent visits. If the animal simply sets its
own position to that of the first feature each time it passes it, then the second feature's












For these two reasons it is better to strike a balance between (i) not changing the
animal's coordinates at all (and thus ensuring independent estimates) and (ii) changing
directly to the feature's coordinates (thus taking full advantage of the visit to the feature
and reducing the variance as much as possible). A tradeoff is made by setting the
coordinates as follows:
XN+1 = + xF)i VN+1 — 2^N
where (xN, yN), {xN+u yw+i) are the animal's estimates of its own position before
and after taking the feature into account, and (xF, yF) is the animal's estimate of the
feature's position after the encounter. This tradeoff has been tested in the SE and shown
to work well. Although it results in theoretically larger variances than simply adopting
the features' coordinates (as in equation 3.1), in practice, because successive estimates
are not usually independent, it results in more reliable navigation.
The variance of the animal's position is therefore calculated according to the equation:
&N+1~ = tjC'TV" + TF2)
where aN2, aN+f are the variances of the animal's estimate of its own position before
and after taking the feature's position into account, and aF2 is the variance of the
estimate of the feature's position.
Estimating values of feature properties — as with a feature's position, the animal is
likely to get increasingly accurate estimates of a feature's properties the more times
that it visits it. This is implemented as follows:
1. on the first encounter the estimates of the feature's property values are set to the
perceived values.
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2. on subsequent encounters they are set according to the following formula:
where VN and Vjv+i are estimates of the value of the feature property before and
after the current encounter, VA is the animal's currently perceived value of the
feature property and MN and MN+1 are the strengths of thememory of the feature
before and after the current encounter.
As explained below, the memory strength of a feature will decay with time if the
feature is not re-visited, but will increase if the feature is visited and recognised
frequently. The above formula makes successive estimates likely to be more
and more accurate by weighting each new contribution by smaller and smaller
amounts.
3.4.4 Memory Strengths and Forgetting
1. when a feature is encountered for the first time, or a previously encountered
feature is not recognised as such, then the strength of the newmemory (M) is set
where U = a measure of the 'utility' of the feature (e.g. its food value).
2. on subsequent recognitions the memory's strength is updated according to the
equation
3. at every timestep each memory strength is slightly decreased. This is imple¬
mented by multiplying by a number slightly less than 1.0 (0.987). This makes
the strength of each memory decay slowly over time if it is not encountered and
recognised by the animal.




4. in addition, when the animal tries to use the map to find a feature, but does
not find it where it expects to, then the strength of the feature's memory is
decremented if the animal's position variance is small.
The high-level effect of these four rules is that those features which are frequently
recognised, have been recently recognised, and have a high utility will have a high
memory strength. Conversely, those featurememorieswhich have notbeen recognised
for a long time, or which are only very infrequently encountered or which have a low
utility will have lowermemory strengths.
The 'map' has a finite size (100 feature memories), and is ordered according to memory
strength, with the highest at the top. When a feature is encountered but not recognised
(is treated as novel) then its memory strength is calculated and it is slotted into the
appropriate place in the map. If the map is already full then a new memory will result
in the bottom one 'dropping out'. Over time old, redundant memories fall out of the
map. This is important since (i) features can disappear from the SE, (ii) features a long
way from the den can be visited just once, and (iii) multiple memory entries can initially
be generated for the same feature (because it was not recognised on subsequent visits)
of which one will eventually come to dominate.
3.4.5 Using the Map
When deciding which of the various remembered features of a particular type to visit
(e.g. which remembered food source to head to), or whether to head to any of them
at all, the animal calculates an 'attractiveness' for each remembered feature. This
attractiveness takes into account the following factors: (i) distance of remembered
position from animal, (ii) remembered utility of feature, (iii) strength of memory, (iv)
variance of remembered position and (v) probability of the feature being toxic.
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Navigating successfully towards a remembered feature is not automatically accom¬
plished, once the animal has decided to try and do so. The animal may not find the
feature where it expects to, due to inaccuracies in its estimates of its position and of
the feature's position. There are also competing sub-problems whose demands may
interrupt the animal's passage to the remembered feature and 'knock it off course'
(e.g. avoiding predators, avoiding hazards). It is also possible for the animal to get
caught in a cul-de-sac (e.g. formed by dangerous place features). A record of how
long the animal has been trying to get to a feature is kept, and the attractiveness of the
remembered feature is reduced if the animal has not reached it after a reasonable time.
Eventually this will make it give up looking for that feature.
If the animal reaches a remembered feature but finds that its utility is very low (e.g. if
a fruit type food feature is in the wrong part of its cycle) then the attractiveness of that
feature will be reduced for a time, so as to stop the animal heading back to it in the
near future.
A final use of themap is to record which food and water features might be toxic. When
an animal becomes sick because of toxic food or water then it looks through the map
at all the food and water features that have been consumed recently and increases the
estimated 'toxicity' of each of the memories according to (i) how much toxicity it is
now suffering from, and (ii) how recently the food or water source was visited. Those
food or water sources which are assigned a high toxicity in the map are unlikely to be
visited again.
3.5 Motor Control
The third of the processes to be modelled (after perception and navigation) is motor
control. In section 3.2 a list of 14 low-level actions was given (CLEAN, EAT_CF,
EAT_FF, POUNCE, DRINK, REST, FREEZE, MOVE_FAST, LOOK, LOOK_AROUND,
SLEEP, COURT, MATE and MOVE). MOVE_FAST, LOOK and MOVE can all occur
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in any one of 8 different directions and so there are actually 35 alternative actions
available to the animal.
The model of motor control is fairly simple. The execution of actions by the animal is
error-prone. It will usually execute the action properly, but not always. The probability
of the animal carrying out an action incorrectly is 1%, unless its health is below 0.1, In
which case the chance is (100 x ((0.1—animal.health)/0.1))%. In addition, if animalJiecilth
is less than 0.1 then the animal is incapacitated and is unable to move fast, mate or
pounce (the most strenuous actions).
The choice of action by the animal has several effects: (i) the amount of health the
animal can recover in a single timestep is dependent on the action it is undertaking.
Actions such as sleeping and resting allow a lot of recovery while actions such as
mating, pouncing and moving fast allow hardly any recovery, (ii) the action of the
animal effects how conspicuous it is (how likely to be perceived by predators). Actions
such as sleeping, resting and especially freezing are very inconspicuous, whereas
actions such as pouncing and moving fast are not. (iii) the animal's food, water and
temperature internal variables are linked to the animal's action. The animal's food and
water levels are decreased to a greater degree by strenuous actions such asmoving fast,
mating and pouncing. These also increase the animal's internal temperature. Other
actions which require a lower level of exertion, such as sleeping, resting and looking
in a direction, will reduce fat, carbohydrate, protein and water levels by less, and will
also lead to a smaller increase in body temperature.
Taken together, the effect of the three points above is to assign different costs to the
different actions the animal can undertake.
3.6 Analytical Tools
In order to be able to examine the performance of different ASMs in the SE, and to be
able to diagnose what is wrong with them, various analytical tools are required. The
components of the SE that help in the analysis and comparison of ASMs are:
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Animal Statistics
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Figure 3.7: Display showing the values of the animal's internal variables and genetic
fitness.
1. graphical displays: there is a full graphical display of the whole of the SE,
together with displays showing the states of the animal's internal variables, what
the animal perceives and the animal's navigational 'map'. These are shown in
figures 3.7-3.10. These graphical displays allow the observer to see where in the
environment the animal is, what perceptual inputs (internal and external) it is
receiving, what navigational inputs it is receiving, and what actions the animal
is choosing. Another display plots activations of different system-level entities
through time, together with an indicator every time the animal performs an
action relevant to that system (figure 3.11). By examining these different displays
while an ASM is operating in the SE, any gross deficiencies in action selection
can easily be detected.
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Figure 3.8: Display showing two instances of the animal's perception of its local
environment. White boxes around squares indicate that the contents of the square
have been incorrectly perceived. The perception on the left occurred when the animal
was not in vegetation and chose the action LOOK_AROUND. The instance on the right
occurred when the animal chose the action EAT_FF while in a square containing fruit
type food.
2. speed of SE: The SE can be paused, stepped through successive timesteps, or
made quicker or slower so as to give a clearer impression of what is going on.
3. health file: all events that affect the animal's health are written to a file. This
file can then be examined at a later date to see what factors were most influential
in the animal's death (e.g. to see if the main causes of death were lack of food,
attacks by predators, old age or whatever).
4. SE log file: the initial setup of the SE, and all events (e.g. appearances of
predators, changes in weather) that occurred during the animal's life are copied
to a log file. The animal's perceptual and navigational inputs, choice of action
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Navi gati ori
Figure 3.9: Display showing accrued error in estimate of position. The two lines
represent the actual and estimated position of the animal. As the animalmoves further
away from known territory (the centre of the diagram), the animal's estimate of its
position becomes progressively more and more inaccurate and the two lines diverge.
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Figure 3.10: Display showing the animal's map of the environment after several hun¬
dred timesteps. Some features are not recognised on subsequent visits and so are
represented more than once. The estimated position of some of the remembered fea¬
tures is not very accurate.
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Longitudinal Profiles
Figure 3.11: Display showing activation levels over time for each system in the drives
ASM (after [Maes, 91]). The solid blobs beneath the axis of a system denote the selection
of actions relevant to that system.
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and success in executing that action are allwritten to the log file at each timestep.
This allows a more detailed 'post-mortem' ofwhat happened during the animal's
life. This file can also be used to re-create the same SE for a different ASM, and
to re-run it so that the same random events occur. This can be used to discover
at what points different ASMs will select different actions if they are running in
an identical SE.
5. dbx: the SE can be run within dbx (a debugging tool which allows all the
variables, arrays, etc in a program to be examined during a program's execution)
to give a more detailed step-by-step analysis of arbitrarily fine details of the
operation of an ASM. For instance, dbx can be used to examine the excitations
flowing along the links of a distributed ASM, and therefore can be used to discover




Most of this chapter is devoted to describing the testing that was carried out on the
SE. Low-level testing had the aim of ensuring that the mechanics of the SE worked
as they were supposed to (e.g. a water source decreases in value when the animal
drinks from it, predators perceive the animal less frequently when it is in vegetation).
High-level testing had the aim of ensuring that the sub-problems were all individually
manageable, and that the problem as awhole (satisfying all of the sub-problems simul¬
taneously) was useful, i.e. that it produced measurably different levels of performance
from ASMs of varying suitability. Even after all of the low-level mechanics of the SE
were verified, the overall problem posed by the SE would not be interesting if either
(i) the animal does not have enough time to keep the effects of all the sub-problems in
check simultaneously, and is therefore going to die quickly whichever ASM is used,
or (ii) the animal has so much time that it can deal with all of the sub-problems and
still have lots of time to spare. In this case the choice of ASM will not lead to a large
difference in performance.
The final part of this section derives equations to calculate the degrees of statistical
certainty provided by different results.
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4.1 Low-Level Tests
The low-level tests on each feature in the SE checked the following: (i) the initial
number of features generated, (ii) the spatial distribution of the initial features, (iii) the
generation of the feature property values, (iv) the disappearance of feature instances
over time, and the appearance of new ones, (v) the dynamics of feature instances (e.g.
how they move about the SE, how their property values change over time), and (vi)
the interactions of the feature instances with the animal (how the instances affect the
animal, and how the animal affects them).
The low-level tests also checked the effects of every animal action, both on the features
of the SE, and on the animal's internal variables. Other dynamics of the internal
variables were also examined. All the details of the models of perception, navigation
and motor control were checked. Finally, the effects, or costs, of different animal
actions in terms of conspicuousness, health recovery, efficacy ofperception and internal
variables were also verified.
It would be laborious and of little value to describe all the low-level tests carried out.
Instead, two representative sets of tests are described. Other aspects of the SE were
tested in an equally rigorous manner.
4.1.1 Example 1: Fruit Food Sources
The different low-level tests carried out on fruit food features were as follows:
1. there should be between 50 and 80 instances generated initially.
2. over 70% of these should be positioned randomly within 2 squares of a water
source, and the rest should be positioned randomly anywhere in the SE.
71
3. the instances should be given random initial property values, within certain
pre-specified ranges and with certain means.
4. about 10% of the initial instances should be toxic.
5. the value of the food at a fruit food source should change in a ripening-decaying
cycle.
6. very occasionally an instance should disappear from the environment.
7. very occasionally a new instance should appear in the environment.
8. when the animal eats from an instance, the food value of that fruit food source
should decrease appropriately, and the fat, carbohydrate and protein internal
variables of the animal should increase appropriately.
9. after being eaten by the animal, the food value of a fruit food source should
recuperate slowly.
10. an instance of fruit food should provide shelter to the animal (protection against
attack and perception by predators and amelioration of extreme temperatures).
11. when the animal eats a toxic instance of fruit type food then it should suffer
0.0-0.4 decrement to health within the next 500 timesteps.
This is an example of themany low-level tests that had to be carried out on each feature
of the SE.
4.1.2 Example 2: Motor Control
The low-level tests carried out on the model ofmotor control were:
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1. the effects of the animal's actions on the SE were mostly covered in the tests on
the interactions between features and the animal, but the animal's actions also
affect the animal's internal variables and these interactions were checked (e.g.
between the action CLEANING and the internal variable 'cleanliness').
2. the animal should normally execute about 99% of actions correctly.
3. when the animal's health is below 0.1 then this percentage should decrease.
4. when the animal's health is below 0.1 then the animal should not be able to mate,
move fast or pounce.
This is an example of the low-level tests carried out on one of the three processes
modelled. Perception and navigation are more complex and therefore required more
extensive testing in the SE.
4.2 High-Level Tests
Whereas the low-level tests were carried out mainly to check the detailed workings
of the SE, the high-level tests described in this section had the purpose of (i) checking
that the individual sub-problems were achievable, and (ii) checking that the overall
problem (dealing with all the sub-problems simultaneously) was set at a suitable level
of difficulty. 'Achievable' is used in this case to imply that the effect of a sub-problem
on the animal's health can be kept to a small amount with the allocation of sufficient
time, at least for themajority of random set-ups of the SE (some SEs will be generated
with, for instance, water instances which are all positioned a long way from the den,
and so it will be impossible for the animal to get enough water). A 'suitable level of
difficulty' above is such that different ASMs will give different performance results in
the SE. The amount of time available to the animal, in comparison to the sum of the
amounts of time required by each of the sub-problems, must be neither too great (AS
problem too easy) or too small (AS problem too hard).
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4.2.1 Sub-Problems
Each sub-problem is now examined in turn, and graphs are presented to verify that
each one is solvable. In order to test that each sub-problem is individually solvable or
manageable (if enough time is allocated to it), it is necessary to use an altered version
of the SE and an altered ASM. The SE needs to be altered so that the only factors that
impinge on the animal's health are those due to the sub-problem in question. The
ASM needs to be altered because the amount of time being spent on the particular
sub-problem needs to be able to be manipulated in some way.
The tests on the manageability of each sub-problem were therefore carried out by
looking at the performance of an altered version of a simple but reasonably competent
ASM (the 'drives' ASM) in a version of the SE in which the factors affecting health
are all removed, except for old age and the factors relevant to the particular sub-
problem being studied (e.g. decrement due to lack of cleanliness for the 'cleaning'
sub-problem). In a drives mechanism (see section 8.1) a number between 0.0 and 1.0
(a drive strength) is calculated for each sub-problem. In theory each drive strength
will represent how beneficial it would be to the animal to attend to that sub-problem,
although in practice the drive strength will only be an approximation of this. The
sub-problem with the highest drive strength is then selected, and the most appropriate
action for that sub-problem is then calculated and executed. In the drives mechanism
there is a competition between the sub-problems to capture the animal's attention and
the closer the drive strength of any sub-problem to 1.0, the more likely it is to win the
competition and get to choose the executed action.
The two graphs for each sub-problem are both derived using an artificially altered
drive-type ASM in which the 'competition amongst drive strengths' is tampered with
so that the particular sub-problem being studied will always be made to win the com¬
petition if its drive strength has a value > T, butwill be excluded from the competition
otherwise (see figure 4.1). The threshold T is given a random value between 0.0




















Figure 4.1: Artificial drive selection: (a) the drive for the sub-problem being investi¬
gated (the first bar in both graphs) wins the competition if it is greater than T (regardless
of the values of the other drives), otherwise (b) a normal competition amongst drives
(with the exclusion of that which is being investigated) takes place when the drive for
the sub-problem being investigated is less than T.
test. Altering the value of T affects how much of the animal's time is spent on that
sub-problem. If a sub-problem is achievable, then with T = 0.0 the animal will die,
on average, at an age very close to its maximum lifespan (since it will devote all its
time to dealing with the only factors that can shorten its lifespan). There will be some
reduction in average lifespan as T increases from 0.0 to 1.0 (when it is not devoting any
time to ameliorating the factors reducing its health).
The first graph in the pair for each sub-problem plots the animal's lifespan against the
value of T. 600 tests are carried out and each result is plotted as a point in the graph.
In addition to plotting each result, averages are also plotted to give an idea of the trend
as T changes from 0.0 to 1.0. To obtain these averages, results for different parts of the
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range of T were grouped together. Each sub-division is of size 0.1, and so there are 10
sub-divisions, each with an average of 60 results. For instance, to get the first point
in each curve, all the results for which T is in the range 0.0-0.1 are grouped together,
and the average and standard deviation of the group of about 60 results is calculated.
The solid circles on the graphs represent the average lifespan for that sub-division, and
the asterisks are placed at one standard deviation above and below the average. The
second graph in each pair uses the same set of 600 tests, but plots instead the animal
health after 500 timesteps. Again, the circles and asterisks are used to plot means and
standard deviations for each part of the range of T.
The "%time" figures above each average in the lifespan graphs show the average
proportion of its time that the animal spent on the sub-problem in question for that
range of values of T. The animal typically spends less and less of its time on the
particular sub-problem as T increases from 0.0 to 1.0, as is to be expected.
Cleaning : every time the animal cleans itself it reduces the difference between current
and maximum cleanliness by a factor of 0.15. Its cleanliness decreases by a small
amount (about 0.001) each timestep. Even at cleanliness = 0.0, the decrement to health
is only 0.5.
The graphs in figure 4.2 show that the cleaning sub-problem is easily manageable
(partly because uncleanliness can never reduce the animal's health by more than 0.5),
and that the average effect on health varies with the amount of time spent on the sub-
problem. Figure 4.2a in particular shows that if the animal spends about 2% of its time
cleaning then the average health decrement is about 0.2, whereas if it spends about 5%
of its time cleaning then the average health decrement is about 0.1. The drive strength
for the cleaning sub-problem has a maximum value of 0.75, and so the sub-problem
is never attended to when T is greater than 0.75. This explains the kink in the two
graphs. The gradual decrease in health due to old age means that the animal always
dies at about age 7.5 days if it spends no time on cleaning (when T is greater than 0.75).
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Figure 4.2: Test on cleaning sub-problem — variation in lifespan and health after 500
timesteps for an artificially altered drive-type ASM. Further explanation in text.
Obtaining Food : at every timestep the animal's fat, carbohydrate and protein levels
decrease by averages of about 0.0008, 0.0010 and 0.0005 (dependent on the animal's
chosen action). The animal can eat a maximum of 0.4 and 0.2 units of food per
timestep respectively from fruit type or cereal type food sources. This corresponds
to a maximum of 0.05 fat, 0.11 carbohydrate and 0.04 protein per timestep from a
cereal food source and a maximum of 0.14 fat, 0.19 carbohydrate and 0.07 protein per
timestep from a fruit food source. Prey instances vary randomly between 0.0 and 0.25
in food value (= 0.0-0.10 fat, 0.0-0.07 carbohydrate and 0.0-0.07 protein), which can all
be eaten in a single timestep.
An average of 60 cereal food sources, 65 fruit food sources and 20 prey instances will
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Figure 4.3: Test on obtaining food sub-problem— variation in lifespan and health after
500 timesteps for an artificially altered drive-type ASM. Further explanation in text.
the SE on a semi-random path.
The graphs in figure 4.3 show that obtaining food is easily manageable if the animal is
able to allocate about 10-13% of its time to the sub-problem. It should be noted that the
time being spent on the sub-problem does not change significantly as the threshold T
increases from 0.1 to 0.9. This is because it takes as much food (and therefore time) to
keep the food deficit constant at a lower level as it does to keep it constant at a higher
level.
Obtaining Water : at every timestep the animal's water level decreases by an average
of about 0.0012 (dependent on the animal's chosen action). The animal can drink a
maximum of 0.06 units of water per timestep from a water source, which will contain
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Figure 4.4: Test on obtaining water sub-problem — variation in lifespan and health
after 500 timesteps for an artificially altered drive-type ASM. Further explanation in
text.
an average of about 0.7 units of water. An average of 30 water sources are placed in
the SE at the beginning.
The graphs in figure 4.4 show that the obtaining water sub-problem is to some extent
manageable with the allocation of sufficient time, although there are always some
early deaths whatever the value of T. This is due to the fact that certain random
setups of the SE will contain a relatively small number of water sources, most of which
are positioned far from the den. This will make it very difficult for the animal to get
enough water. This phenomena is not so common with food because there are more
instances of the three different types of food. This sub-problem requires an average of
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Figure 4.5: Test on temperature regulation sub-problem — variation in lifespan and
health after 500 timesteps for an artificially altered drive-type ASM. Furtherexplanation
in text.
the external temperature, the animal's actions and the presence or absence of vegeta¬
tion. The animal can take behaviouralmeasures to reduce the effects of too high or too
low temperatures by choosing a strenuous or non-strenuous action or by positioning
itself in shelter or shade.
The graphs in figure 4.5 show that the temperature regulation sub-problem is manage¬
able and that the effect on the animal's health varies according to how much time the
animal devotes to the sub-problem. The animal needs to allocate about 5% of its time
to this sub-problem.
Predator Avoidance : an average of 2 predator Is and 2 predator2s are placed in the SE
at the beginning, and an average of 4 predatorls and 5 predator2s enter the SE every
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Figure 4.6: Test on predator avoidance, vigilance and staying close to cover sub-
problems — variation in lifespan and health after 500 timesteps for an artificially
altered drive-type ASM. Further explanation in text.
day. If the animal perceives one in time it can try and run away or it can try and hide
in vegetation. It can also try and freeze if it is in vegetation (this will reduce the chance
of the predator seeing it and/or attacking it successfully).
The three different sub-problems of avoiding predators, vigilance and staying close
to cover are all linked by a single type of decrement to the animal's health, that from
attacks by predators. For this reason, the three sub-problems are examined together
using a single test. In this case the only decrement to health comes from predator
attacks during the day (any part of the day except night, when the animal cannot see
predators to avoid them). The reason for excluding predator attacks during the night
is that the probability of these attacks is not greatly affected by the time spent on these
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three sub-problems (since the animal cannot perceive anything at night). The artificial
drive selection is altered so that if any of the drives for the three sub-problems is greater
than T, then the largest of the three is made to win the competition, regardless of the
values of any other drives. If all three drives strengths are less than T, then the largest
other drive wins the competition.
The animal is always prone to being attacked and killed by predators whatever its
selection of actions (i.e. the task is not completely manageable even if 100% of the
animal's time is spent on the three sub-problems), but the probability of health decre¬
ments due to predators can be reduced by allocating more time to avoiding predators,
to vigilance behaviour, and to staying close to cover (as shown in the graphs in figure
4.6). Note that the animal does not benefit greatly from spending more than 30% or so
of its time on these three sub-problems, unless it progresses to spending over 75% of
its time, which it would be unable to afford.
Vigilance : the animal can see one square further and has a much better chance of
perceiving squares correctly when it chooses the action LOOKING-AROUND. Decid¬
ing to LOOK in a certain direction means that the animal has an even better chance of
perceiving squares correctly in that direction. This sub-problem was tested together
with predator avoidance and staying close to cover. The results are shown in figure
4.6.
Staying Close To Cover : the animal can reduce the risk of predation by staying close
to its den or instances of cover, shade or fruit-type food (which all decrease the chance
of a predator perceiving the animal and successfully attacking it). This sub-problem
was tested together with predator avoidance and scanning for predators. The results
are shown in figure 4.6.
Edge Avoidance : The animal just needs to avoid the edges of the SE. The graphs
in figure 4.7 show that this sub-problem is hardly ever a factor affecting the animal's
health. When it is then it is easily manageable with the allocation of a small amount of
the animal's time (0-5%).
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Figure 4.7: Test on edge avoidance sub-problem — variation in lifespan and health
after 500 timesteps for an artificially altered drive-type ASM. Further explanation in
text.
Hazard Avoidance : an average of 13 dangerous place features are placed in the SE
when it is set up. The animal needs only to avoid these. This sub-problem is fairly
manageable if the animal is able to spend 5-6% of its time on it (as shown in figure 4.8).
In this test decrements to health were only considered if they occurred during the day
since the animal cannot see dangerous places at night and so cannot avoid them.
Irrelevant Animal Avoidance : An average of 7.5 of these features traverse the SE
every day. An average of 13 are placed in the SE when it is set up. The animal only
needs to avoid them.
The graphs for this sub-problem (figure 4.9) were also produced by considering only
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Figure 4.8: Test on hazard avoidance sub-problem — variation in lifespan and health
after 500 timesteps for an artificially altered drive-type ASM. Further explanation in
text.
decrements to health which occurred during the day. The graphs show that the sub-
problem is manageable with about 5% of the animal's time.
Sleeping at Night: at night (which occupies 1 of the total time in the SE) the animal
needs to remain in its den in order to avoid attack by the predators (the animal cannot
perceive anything at night, whereas the predators can). Since the animal is unable to
perceive dangerous places and irrelevant animals at night, it is also prone to injury
from encountering them, should it decide to move about at night.
To produce the graphs in figure 4.10, the only decrements to health were from old age,
predators attacking at night and from encounterswith dangerous places and irrelevant
animals at night. The graphs show that the problem ismanageable as long as the animal
84




J I l L l J I L
ICi).0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0^ 1.0
T (threshold)
Figure 4.9: Test on irrelevant animalavoidance sub-problem—variation in lifespan and
health after 500 timesteps for an artificially altered drive-type ASM. Further explanation
in text.
does indeed spend the whole night (i.e. one third of its time) sleeping, as well as a
short amount of time to get back to the den from wherever it is before nightfall.
Not Getting Lost: this sub-problem is only indirectly important in relation to being
able to find the den at night and heading to remembered food and water. When this
sub-problem is chosen then the animal heads back towards the den. It will either
encounter remembered features on its way back towards the den (and so probably
improve the accuracy of where it thinks it is) or else it will eventually get back to the
den, where its variance is reduced to zero.
For the purposes of producing the graphs in figure 4.11, the only decrements to health
considered were those used for testing the sleeping sub-problem (predators, dangerous
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Figure 4.10: Test on sleeping at night sub-problem— variation in lifespan and health
after 500 timesteps for an artificially altered drive-type ASM. Further explanation in
text.
places and irrelevant animals at night), and also decrements due to shortages of food
and water. The results show that it is very important for the animal to spend some time
on this activity (4% or more), although not too much. Unlike other graphs, average
health and lifespan decrease as a lot of time is spent on this sub-problem. This is
because spending a lot of time on this sub-problem inhibits exploration and hence
makes it harder for the animal to find enough food and water (as well as reducing the
time available for getting food and water).
Reproduction : An average of 30 potential mates traverse the SE every day. The
animal needs to court a receptive mate and then mate with it in order to increase its
genetic fitness by 1. Attention to this sub-problem does not usually affect health and
86
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 a6 0.7 03 03 13
T (threshold)
Figure 4.11: Test on not getting lost sub-problem — variation in lifespan and health
after 500 timesteps for an artificially altered drive-type ASM. Further explanation in
text.
survival (although the animal can be attacked by a mate). There is only an indirect
effect on health, because time spent trying to reproduce detracts from time available
to concentrate on survival.
To produce the graphs in figure 4.12, all decrements to animal health were allowed.
1500 tests were used instead of the usual 600. The ASM was altered in a similar manner
to that of other tests. The sub-problem 'reproduction' won the competition if its drive
strength was greater than T, and was removed from the competition otherwise. The
left hand graph of figure 4.12 plots lifespan against T as normal. The right hand graph
plots genetic fitness against T (instead of health after 500 timesteps). The graphs show
that the animal has to strike a balance between spending time on survival and spending
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Figure 4.12: Test on reproduction sub-problem — variation in lifespan and genetic
fitness for an artificially altered drive-type ASM. Further explanation in text.
time looking for and copulating with mates. In the SE, with this particular ASM, the
optimal trade-off occurs when approximately 14% of the animal's time is spent trying
to reproduce. More than this and the animal dies at a young age (and hence has none,
or only a few chances to increase its genetic fitness). Less than this and the animal
survives for a longer time but doesn't attach enough importance to reproduction and
hence mates only very infrequently, if at all.
The left-hand graph shows that most animals die during the day time (the animal
is started off in the SE at the beginning of the day, i.e. at sunrise). This is why the
likelihood of death varies periodically. More animals die during the daylight part of
the day because the animal will usually sleep in its den during the whole of the night.
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4.2.2 Tests on Combined Problem
An indication of how difficult it is to survive in the SE can be obtained by summing
up the average amounts of time that each sub-problem, apart from reproduction,
requires. So for instance, itwas noted that 'cleaning' required at least 2% of the animal's
time to keep the effect on the animal's health to a sufficiently small decrement, and
'getting food' required at least 10%. Summing all of these amounts gives a total of
(2 + 10 + 15 + 5 + 30 + 0 + 5 + 5 + 33 + 4) = 109%. Since figure 4.12 indicates that it
is optimal to spend about 14% of the animal's time reproducing, the drive-type ASM
will only have about 86% or so of time to distribute among sub-problems collectively
requiring 109% or more.
A second test on the whole problem for an ASM is to check that most instances of a
competent ASM do not just die off immediately. The graph in figure 4.13 shows the
distribution of survival times for instances of the unaltered drive ASM (unaltered ex¬
cept that reproduction is prohibited from winning the competition and so the animal's
only concern is survival), and shows that the problem is reasonable since a significant
proportion of instances manage to survive for more than one day. The graph was
calculated from the results of 1200 tests.
The third and most important test is to see if the SE will give different performance
results for ASMs which obviously vary in the inherent plausibility of their action
selection. The whole purpose of the SE is to provide a means of evaluating action
selection mechanisms, and so the performance measurements that are produced need
to reflect the difference between good and bad action selection mechanisms.
Eleven drive-type ASMs were tested (this time with reproduction not prohibited). The
first ASM was a completely normal drive-type ASMwith straightforward 'competition
between drive strengths' to decide which sub-problemwasmost appropriate for paying
attention to. The other ten drive-type ASMs also contained competition between all
drive strengths, but the drive strengths were interfered with by adding noise to them
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Figure 4.13: Survival times for the drive-type ASM. Many instances survive for a
reasonable time, i.e. longer than a day.
just before performing the competition. In each case the equation below was used to
calculate the noisy drive strength (Dn) for each sub-problem:
Dn = Do + G(0.0, Ii)
where D0 is the undistorted value of the drive strength and G(0.0,/F) is a gaussian
random variable with mean 0.0 and standard deviation K. For the second ASM K
was given the value 0.05, and for the other nine ASMs K was given the values 0.1,
0.15, 0.20, 0.25, 0.30, 0.35, 0.40, 0.45 and 0.50. Increasing values of K interfered more
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Figure 4.14: Performance (as measured by the SE) of drive-type ASMs distorted by
varying amounts of noise added to the drive strengths. Further explanation in text.
and more with the selection of the most appropriate sub-problem and so it was to be
expected that the first test would give the best result, followed by the second, third,
fourth and so on. The resulting average performances are shown in figure 4.14, and
it can be seen that the SE is indeed able to pick up differences in the suitability of the
choices of actions made by these different variants of the drives ASM. Each point in
the graph was obtained by averaging the results of 300 tests with that value of K.
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4.3 Obtaining Statistically Significant Results
The first value to calculate is the approximate number of tests that need to be carried
out in order to get a reliable measure of the performance of an ASM. A reliable measure
will in this case be defined as a 95% certainty that the population average genetic fitness
lies within ±5% of the measured average from a sample. That is to say, the number
of tests to be carried out (n) will be enough to provide a 95% probability of the real
average lying in the range (x - 0.05x) to (i + 0.05z), where x is the measured average
from a sample of size n.
In order to obtain this degree of accuracy, the true variance of the sample averages cr^1
needs to satisfy the inequality
1.96 X cr^ < 0.05fx, or a^ < 0.0255/r
where /r is the mean of the population. The true variance of averages from samples of
n measurements (cq,2) is related to the variance of individual measurements from the




and so the number of tests needing to be carried out in order to obtain the required
accuracy is such that
-^< 0.0255ft or n > (4.1)
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//and cr2 can be estimated by calculating x (themeasured average) and s2 (themeasured
variance) for a large sample. In this case (for the drives ASM) //. and a2 were estimated
over 10000 tests to be equal to 6.44 and 41.19, thereby giving the required number of
tests as (41.19/(0.0255 x 6.44)2) ss 1500 for the drives ASM. Experience with tests on
other ASMs in the SE has shown that similar numbers of tests are also sufficient in
those cases.
This result was tested by taking a population of 10000 individuals (i.e. 10000 measure¬
ments of the performance of the drives ASM), calculating the mean // and variance
cr2 of the population and then calculating sample means x for 5000 subsets of 1500
individuals. In 97.9% of the cases the values of x were within ±5% of the true mean
[i, which indicates that 1500 tests are sufficient to obtain a measurement of the average
genetic fitness to the desired accuracy. The figure of 97.9% is somewhat greater than
95% because the individual measurements (genetic fitnesses) are forced into discrete
values, whereas the measured averages (x) are not. This means that crM2 is actually
somewhat less than (a2/n).
The second characteristic to examine is the degree of certainty with which it can
be stated that two ASMs truly differ in their performance in the SE, based on the
average performance of each. If the two ASMs are tested nj and n2 times respectively
producing averages and variances of xir x2r Sx2 and s22 then there is a significant
difference between the two averages at the 95% level if
That is to say, if the inequality 4.2 holds then the observed difference between xx and x2
is, with 95% probability, due to an underlying difference in performance rather than a
random fluctuation between the results from two essentially similar ASMs. Similarly,
there is a 99% certainty of a real difference if the LHS of 4.2 is > 2.576, and a 99.9%
certainty if the LHS is > 3.291.
(4.2)
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So, for instance, if S!2 and s22 = 14.0, and n1 and n2 = 1500 then there would have to be
a difference between the two means of at least 0.268 for it to be significant at the 95%
level. Similarly, a difference of at least 0.352 would be required for it to be significant






The major assumptions that were made during the construction of the SE, together
with their implications, are now discussed:
1. set of sub-problems chosen: a particular set of 13 sub-problems was chosen to be
representative of those faced by animals in general. While it is possible that the
particular set chosen here is unbalanced in some way (in addition to the fact that
there are no social sub-problems apart from mating), efforts were made to avoid
this by including a large set of sub-problems and by considering the different
ways in which sub-problems could vary (this is discussed in section 7.2).
2. excluding social interactions: the main simplification that has been made in the
design of the SE is to keep social interactions to a minimum by including only
one social sub-problem, that of mating. Although this is necessary in order to
produce a manageable genetic fitness function, and in order to keep assumptions
about the tested entity out of the testing procedure or 'testbed', it does make
the SE somewhat less realistic of animal environments in general. While this
drawback is noted, it should also be kept inmind thatmany animals (e.g. snakes,
hedgehogs, tigers) do lead lives which are mostly solitary.
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3. discretising space and time: in line with most other SEs, the environment was
split up into a grid of squares. Although itwould have been possible to represent
the environment as a continuous space, this was decided against because of
the complications that would have been added to the programming of the SE.
Calculating the animal's perception and the interactions between the animal and
predators, for example, would have become much more difficult. It was decided
that the small amount of added realism was not worth the large amount of extra
time it would have taken to include.
As with all other SEs, time in the SE is not treated as continuous but rather
is split up into a series of timesteps. As with space it is possible, but much
more complicated, to use a continuous representation of time, but it was decided
against in this case.
4. longer time-scale decisions: the SE is only concerned with the moment-to-
moment decisions an animal has to make. Changes in behaviour are often re¬
quired due to maturation of the animal (e.g. sexual behaviour appearing after
an animal becomes sexually mature) or occur in response to the time of year
(e.g. migration). These longer-term 'decisions', usually mediated by hormones,
will often have a very significant effect on the animal's behaviour, but are not
considered here.
5. adding edges: a rather artificial assumption added to the SE was that of imposing
fixed edges. Again, this is not strictly necessary in that the SE can be made big
enough so that there is only a minute chance of the animal ever reaching the
edge of it, but this would slow down the time it takes the program to run by a
considerable amount, and would not add greatly to the realism. The graph in
figure 4.7 shows that, with the drive-type ASM, the animal only reaches the edges
of the SE infrequently, and so the addition of the artificial sub-problem 'avoid
edges' does not interfere to any great extent with the action selection problem.
6. splitting action selection off from other processes: A more fundamental as¬
sumption made in this project is that it is possible to consider action selection
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independently of perception, navigation and motor control. Could it be that the
different processes are inter-linked so closely that the solution to any one process
determines the form of the other processes? Does the way in which an animal
perceives the environment (e.g. mainly by smell or vision, with varying ability
to classify or generalise correctly, etc) crucially influence the form of the ASM?
Or, similarly, does the way in which the animal executes its actions crucially
influence the nature of the ASM?
While it is obviously the case that there will be some interdependency between
different processes (at the interfaces if nowhere else), the essential nature of the
problem of AS exists independently of the nature of the perceptual, navigational
and motor control systems. However the animal perceives the SE, or executes its
actions, it still needs to weigh up the needs of different sub-problems, assess their
relevance to the perceived state of the environment, and to decide how to allocate
its time. The form of the perceptual processwill only affect the type of information
coming into the ASM. The efficacy of perception might affect, for example, how
often the animal should scan for predators, but it would not affect the need to do
so at fairly regular intervals, and the need to fit scanning for predators in between
other actions in a proper fashion. How the animal executes its actions (e.g. if it
picks up food with its hands and then passes it into its mouth, or whether it just
picks it up with its mouth directly) is relatively unimportant. The form of the
navigational system may affect how far from the den the animal wants to stray,
or how worthwhile it is for it to head to remembered food or water, but will not
affect the overall nature of the problem of action selection. Different perceptual,
navigational and motor control processes will lead to different instantiations of
the same type of problem.
This argument for the independence of the nature of the action selection or
time-allocation problem is supported to some extent by observations of animal
behaviour. To quote from [Marler & Hamilton, 66]:
Perhaps the most remarkable characteristic of the principles of behav¬
ioral organisation is the variety ofphysiologicalmechanisms associated
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with them. In breathing, feeding, and drinking, different mechanisms
achieve similar ends. The temporal patterning of the feeding behaviour
of flies and mammals is much the same, but the patterns are brought
about by quite different physiological mechanisms.
If behaviour tends to be temporally arranged in similar ways in very dissimilar
animals, ones which have very different perceptual, navigational and motor
control processes, then it would seem likely that this is because the underlying
nature of the problem is similar for these different animals. Just as the underlying
constraints on vision have produced very similar, but separately evolved eyes in
octupuses and mammals [Bruce & Green, 85], so the underlying constraints on
action selection/time-allocation have produced mechanisms with similar effect
in flies and mammals.
5.2 Using the Simulated Environment
Some considerations to keep in mind when testing ASMs with the SE are:
1. checking for effects of particular models of perception, navigation and motor
control: although it was argued in the previous section that it is valid to to look
at AS as a separate process, different forms of the perceptual, navigational and
motor control processes may lead to slightly different results for individual tests.
If, for instance, ASM1 is better at dealing with the need to stay close to the den
than ASM2, but worse in other aspects, then altering a2 (the increase in variance
of the animal's estimate of its position each time it moves) may alter the relative
performances of ASM1 and ASM2. To check for effects of this sort it is a good
idea to repeat tests in the SE with differing models of perception, navigation and
motor control to see if the results are maintained.
Perception can be changed, for instance, by altering the way in which efficacy of
perception changes with distance from the animal. Navigation can be changed,
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for instance, by altering the value of cr2 or by altering the number of memories
that can be remembered (the size of the map). Motor control can be changed, for
instance, by altering the likelihood of actions being incorrectly executed.
2. determining optimal parameter values: any ASM will have its structure or
underlying architecture specified with some degree of precision. However, all
ASMs have parameter values which will be specific to the individual problem
(e.g. parameters used to determine the importance variables in the drive ASM
— each importance variable or drive strength will be a function of some internal,
external and indeterminate stimuli and this function will contain parameters
whose values are not specified, and which need to be tuned to the particular
problem being faced).
The parameters can be set in one of two ways: either by hand (by using common
sense and then observing the resulting performance and fine-tuning), or by using
some search technique to optimise the parameter values with respect to the
resulting genetic fitness. An attempt was made during this research to use
genetic algorithms [e.g. Goldberg, 89] to optimise the parameters for each ASM.
Despite the application of a lot of time and of extensive computing power this
proved infeasible. Three reasonswhy it proved difficult to use genetic algorithms
for this problem are:
(a) Low signal to noise ratio : the variance of the performance measurements
of the same ASM in the SE is fairly high in comparison to the differences in
average performance for two different ASMs. This means that the rate of
convergence towards a solution has to be slow to protect against the rejection
of good solutions on the basis of a few 'unlucky' (i.e. below average) results.
(b) Number of parameters : Many parameters have to be evaluated simultane¬
ously (several hundred for some mechanisms).
(c) Interdependency of optimal parameter values : genetic algorithms work
best when individual parts can be optimised independently. This causes a
problem for this application. The very nature of the action selection problem
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is one of different needs competing for control or influence over the actions
of the animal. For instance, in the drive mechanism an optimal solution
will consist of the right balance of drives strengths of different systems in
different situations. The optimal drive strength for 'get food' when the
internal food deficit is very high depends partly on what drive strength
occurs for 'clean' when uncleanliness is very high, on what drive strength
occurs for 'avoid predators' when a predator is near, etc. The optimal values
of each drive strength in each stimulus situation are all interdependent. If
the drive strengths are doubled for ten of the sub-problems (in all stimulus
situations), then the values of the remaining drive strengths will also need
to be doubled in all situations to become optimal again. It is the relative
rather than the absolute values of the drives strengths that are important.
The difficulties with using an automatic search method meant that parameter
values had to be set by hand and fine-tuned using trial and error, although this
was less preferable.
3. number of tests to be carried out: as argued in section 4.3, each test should
involve at least 1500 trials in the SE in order to produce an average genetic fitness
which is 95% certain to be accurate to within ±5%.
5.3 The Fallibility of Results from the Simulated Environment
One issue arising out of the previous two sections is the 'level of proof' that should
be attached to results from the SE. Several factors mean that the results from the SE
should be treated somewhat sceptically: (i) the choice of the sub-problems in the SE is
biased away from social interactions, (ii) the authenticity of the models of perception,
navigation and motor control (as well as of the sub-problems themselves) cannot be
guaranteed, even though they have been carefully constructed, (iii) the parameter
values in each action selection mechanism have to be set by hand and so cannot be
guaranteed to be optimal.
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Because of these three factors, results in the SE by themselves should not be considered
as proof that an ASM would not be able to select actions appropriately in the real
world, or that one ASM is better than another. Instead, the SE should be used as a
tool with which to look for shortcomings with mechanisms and to get an approximate
idea as to the relative performances of different mechanisms. Once a deficiency in the
performance of a mechanism is highlighted by the SE then the underlying reasons for
that deficit can be investigated, and it can be shown to be either due to an inherent
deficit in the ability of the mechanism to select actions appropriately or else due to
a peculiarity of the SE (or a peculiarity of the dynamics of the interactions between
the ASM and the SE). An analogy can be made with the old practice of keeping a
canary down a coalmine. If the canary became unconscious then this did not infallibly
prove the existence of dangerous gasses in the mine, but gave a strong indication of
them. Even though canaries were rather unreliable detectors, this did not rule out their
usefulness before more accurate and infallible measuring devices were available.
In the same way, the SE can be used to pin-point potential inadequacies with ASMs
(and it will be shown in the second half of the thesis that it is able to do this), but it
cannot by itself prove the existence of those inadequacies. When twomechanisms show
different results in the SE then, similarly, that by itself cannot be used as proof that one
is better or worse than the other. Only if the difference in performances can be traced
to a fundamental difference between the two mechanisms (one that it can be shown is
relevant to action selection in general, rather than just in the SE) is it proven that one
mechanism is better than another at selecting actions.
5.4 Terminology
The terminology described in the Prologue, and used throughout this thesis, is partially
taken from that used by Baerends [1976]. The terms system, sub-system and action are
different from those proposed by McFarland & Sibly [1975].
McFarland proposes three terms, all of which are for entities on the 'solution side' (see
figure 0.4): (i) A characteristic is an atomic movement such as pecking or swallowing.
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(ii) An action is a regularly occurring, distinguishable, sequence of characteristics such
as 'eating grain', which in the henmight consist of pecking followed bymandibulation
(moving grain from beak to back of throat) followed by swallowing. There is a further
stipulation that actions must bemutually exclusive, i.e. no two actions can be assigned
such that they can occur simultaneously, (iii) An activity is a grouping of actions which
is only valid if it is composed of actions that belong solely to that activity. Therefore
activities are also mutually exclusive because they are composed of non-overlapping
sets of mutually exclusive actions. Activities are not necessarily functionally-related
sets of actions (i.e. they will not necessarily be conveniently labelled groups such as
'feeding').
McFarland & Sibly's terminology has not been used here partly because of its com¬
plexity. This terminology was intended mainly for the use of ethologists classifying
the observed behaviour of animals. Baerends' grouping together of functionally-related
entities into systems and sub-systems is more suitable for referring to ASMs and their
components.
'Functionally-related' is not a specific enough term for deciding what should and
should not be included in the same system. The term has been interpreted here to
mean (?) the entities in a system are relevant to the same function, and (ii) the entities
in a system share a common causal factor (i.e. stimulus). This means, for instance, that
vigilance and predator avoidance are two separate systems. The first system has two
common causal factors, affecting all entities in the system, which are the time since
the animal last scanned its environment for predators and the time since a predator
was last perceived. The second system has a different common causal factor related
to the degree of proximity of a predator. Although the two systems can be thought
of as subserving a common higher-level goal (not getting eaten by predators), they do
not share causal stimuli and so are classified as separate systems here. [Hinde, 66]
contains a good discussion of the distinction between functional classifications and
causal factors.
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5.5 Theoretically Optimal Actions
In simple, deterministic simulated environments it is possible to calculate the optimal
action for the animal at each moment in time. Even when the transitions between
states (dependent on selected actions) are only specified probabilistically, then the
optimal action at each point in time can still be determined, if the animal has a fixed
life-span. Some techniques that are applicable to this problem are Markov processes,
dynamic programming, finite state automata and Pontryagin's Maximum Principle
[e.g. McFarland & Houston, 81].
If the state of the environment (both the external environment and the animal's internal
variables) is currently S{ and the animal performs an action Aj then let the probability
of the state of the environment changing to Sk be
Pijk = PUSi,Aj)=> Sk)
Also, let the future expected genetic fitness of each state Si be Rir the optimal action
be calculated for time t0/ and the time the animal dies be tD (a fixed length lifespan is
assumed). Given that the actual genetic fitness is known for each state at time tD, it is
originally possible to calculate the optimal action only for each state at tD_x. This will




where Ns is the number of different states (the size of the state space) and Rk is the
actual genetic fitness of each state Sk at time tD. It is assumed that the animal will
always choose the optimal action (i.e. will follow what is known as an optimal policy).
If this is true then the maximum value of J2kZ'x'(PiikRk) becomes the future expected
genetic fitness (R{) for each state S, at time tD_x.
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As an example, imagine a state SA and two possible actions in that state Ax and Av-
Performing Ax in SA has a 0.7 probability of changing the state to SB, which has a
genetic fitness of 12.0, and a 0.3 probability of changing the state to Sc, which has a
genetic fitness of 3.0. Performing Ar iri SA has a 0.4 probability of changing the state to
Sb, and a 0.6 probability of changing the state to Sc • In this example the future expected
genetic fitness of the two actions would therefore be ((0.7 x 12.0) + (0.3 x 3.0)) = 9.3
for Ax and ((0.4 x 12.0) + (0.6 x 3.0)) = 6.6 for AY, and so action Ax is optimal for
state SA. Assuming the animal follows an optimal policy then RA/ the future expected
genetic fitness of state SA at that time, has a value of 9.3.
In the same way that the future expected genetic fitness of each state at to-i can be
calculated from those at tD, so it is possible to continue stepping back through time
calculating the optimal actions for each state at times tD_2rtD-3, ■ ■ ■ (choosing the action
which maximises 5Z!t=i * (PijkRk) at each timestep), until t0 is reached, and the optimal
action for the current state at the current moment in time can be calculated.
Itwould be useful if some technique along the lines of that just described could be used
to calculate optimal actions in the SE. These optimal choices could then be compared
against the actual actions chosen by ASMs. However, there are several properties of
complex and realistic environments which make it difficult or impossible to calculate
the optimal actions for them:
1. the size of the state space is enormous. Even if those stimuli which are continuous
variables are discretised, then the state space is completely unmanageable. For
instance, the size of the state space for this SE is of the order of 10lo°, even
assuming that all of the real-valued stimuli are discretised fairly coarsely. For
a more realistic and more detailed simulation the state space would be many
orders of magnitude larger.
2. the animal's lifespan is not of a fixed length.
3. the transition probabilities Pi} k cannot be accurately calculated.
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Some work has been done on looking at how the effects of an unmanageably large
state space can be reduced (for example, [Moore, 90]) and on how optimal policies can
be calculated for animals with lifespans that are not fixed in length, but even so these
difficulties, especially the first and third, mean that it is not feasible to use a purely
mathematical approach to calculate optimal actions for the SE.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions to Part I
This first part of this thesis has described currently existing simulated environments
and explained why a simulated environment is a sensible and valid approach to study¬
ing action selection. A new simulated environment, more realistic and complex than
current alternatives, has been developed in a principled manner with the underly¬
ing theory and motivating principles explained. The thorough and extensive testing
procedures used to validate the simulated environment were described. Finally, prac¬
tical issues concerning how to use the simulated environment to test action selection
mechanisms were discussed, and the effects of some of the assumptions made in its
design were considered. In particular, it was argued that the results from the simulated
environment are fallible and should only be used as indicators of shortcomings with a
mechanism or of a real difference in performance between two mechanisms.
The simulated environment presented here contains error-prone models ofperception,
navigation andmotor control; 14 different sub-problems; 14 different types of feature; 6
internal, 6 indeterminate andmany external stimuli; and 35 different low-level actions
to select between.
The simulated environment presents a demanding and rigorous test of action selec¬
tion. It does have limitations, which have been discussed at length, but these do not
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preclude its usefulness as a tool for investigating action selection mechanisms. Its
usefulness will be demonstrated in the second part of the thesis in which the inade¬
quacies of several action selection mechanisms are uncovered with its help. There are
two reasons that make this simulated environment a valuable and probing instrument
for the examination of action selection mechanisms: (i) great care was taken to limit
the number of explicit and implicit assumptions that were made, and the implications
of those assumptions that had to be made were carefully considered. The simulated
environment is a principled and painstaking embodiment of the action selection prob¬
lem for animals, rather than an overly-simplified abstraction of it. (ii) the simulated
environment provides a means for verification and testing in a field where it has not
existed before. Previously, the only means of analysing the performance of models or
theories of action selection (such as Lorenz's "psycho-hydraulic model") has involved
'thought experiments' or limited mathematical analyses. This simulated environment
allows a more challenging, thorough and penetrating means of validation.
6.1 FurtherWork
Some ways in which the work in this part of the thesis could be extended are as follows:
1. The SE could be rewritten to work with a continuous representation of space
rather than the current grid-based system.
2. The SE could be made more realistic in other ways. For example, more sub-
problems could be included andmore realistic models of the low-level mechanics
of perception, navigation and motor control could be added.
3. The SE could be adapted to model the specific action selection problems for indi¬
vidual types of animal, in addition to the generalised model here. For instance, a
computer simulation of the action selection problem for the herring gull could be
implemented. This could make use of the fairly extensive information describing
the contingencies of the herring gull's environment that is available in sources
such as [Baerends & Drent, 76], [Baerends & Drent, 82] and [Sibly & McCleery,
85],
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4. In the sense that actions are defined in this thesis (they are not mutually exclu¬
sive by definition, in contrast with the actions of McFarland & Sibly [1975]), the
assumption of the behavioural final common path (that all actions are mutually
exclusive) is not always true for all animals (e.g. some animals can eat and walk
simultaneously). For most animals many actions are incompatible but some can
be executed simultaneously. This could be reflected in the SE.
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Part II





Part I of this thesis has dealt with the simulated environment. This second part now
looks at different action selection mechanisms (ASMs). Several existing ASMs are
described, some of which were implemented and tested in the SE. For those that were
implemented and tested, their performance in the SE is described, and the underlying
reasons behind any gross inadequacies in their performance are discussed. Following
on from the experiences of shortcomings with different mechanisms, a list of essential
requirements for any successful mechanism is presented. Finally, an ASM is described
which has been designed in the light of the failures and successes of other mechanisms,
and which is shown to perform better in the SE than all the others that were tested.
The theoretical underpinnings of this mechanism are explained in depth.
7.1 Scope of Testing Procedure
The testing procedure in the SE is designed to measure the ability of an ASM to pro¬
duce optimal or near-optimal selections of actions. The mechanisms are evaluated in
terms of their computational properties, rather than their abilities to reproduce animal
behaviour phenomena. Themechanisms put forward by ethologists are designed par¬
tially to account for observable phenomena in animal behaviour such as time-sharing
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(the appearance of gaps in a type of behaviour which should be dominant over a
long period of time), displacement activity (the occurrence of seemingly irrelevant
behaviours when two relevant types of behaviour such as aggression and escape are
vying for expression), and vacuum activity (the occurrence of actions which have not
been executed for a long time, even though they appear irrelevant to the current situ¬
ation). Testing these mechanisms for computational optimality is useful, but it should
be remembered that this is not the only criterion by which they should be judged.
The only learning to be considered here is that of learning the location of features in the
environment. The ASM receives navigational inputs which will change over time as
the animal encounters and remembers different features, but these inputs are not under
control of the ASM and, apart from in response to these navigational inputs, none of
the mechanisms considered change their selected actions in the light of experience. The
decision to exclude learning from the ASMs was made in order to simplify the problem
being studied. It should be noted that no tabula rasa learning system (such as Sutton
& Barto's Temporal Difference Learning system [Sutton, 88] or Watkins' Q-Learning
system [Watkins, 89] or Booker's classifier systems [Booker, 88]) would perform well
in the SE. Experiments with approaching predators or hazards do not usually allow
for learning through experience because the animal will die on the first experiment.
Although trial and error and learning from experience obviously do play a part in real-
life action selection in more advanced animals, its importance in general has perhaps
been over-emphasised. In situations where the 'right' solution can be pre-programmed
or hard-wired, then it is obviously inefficient to require it to be learnt through trial and
error. This is true even for less critical aspects of behaviour such as deciding what
actions will increase the animal's cleanliness.
Another limitation on the testing procedure used here is that there is no consideration
of decisions over much longer time-scales (e.g. those usually mediated by hormones
in animals). In the SE there are no seasons or maturational changes in the animal,
and so there is no need for the animal to make long-term decisions such as when
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to hibernate, when to enter reproductive phase or when to change from behaviour
patterns appropriate for a young animal to those appropriate for an adult.
A final point is that the amount of computation required for each decision is not
penalised here. In nature, of course, evolution will act to minimise both the time taken
to compute action selection decisions and the size of the nervous system required to
compute them.
7.2 A Taxonomy for Sub-Problems
As mentioned in Part I, the main problem for an animal (reproduction and hence
survival) leads tomany subsidiary problems, such as getting enough food and avoiding
predators, each ofwhich differ in the nature of the demands they place on the animal's
time. Before proceeding with the rest of this part of the thesis it is helpful to try
and characterise the different sub-problems and to develop a classificatory schemewith
which the sub-problems can be described. The purpose of doing this is two-fold: firstly
the descriptive terms will be useful as of themselves, and secondly the process is useful
in order to give some idea of how much
variation there can be between different sub-problems.
Figure 7.1 shows how the 'urgencies', or 'potential benefits', for six different sub-
problems might vary over time. The black circles denote occasions on which the
selected action is chosen because of the needs of the relevant sub-problem. These six
sub-problems are now described:
1. Trying to obtain enough food is the most commonly covered sub-problem in the
ethological literature. The likelihood of the animal trying to obtain food should
depend on both external stimuli (whether it sees food in the vicinity) and on
internal stimuli (whether it is short of food). It is also a recurring, continual








Figure 7.1: 'Longitudinal Profiles' for the six example sub-problems. The graphs show
the drive strengths of the sub-problems, the highest of which at each moment in time
wins the competition. The circles denote instances when the sub-problem wins the
competition and therefore determines the animal's action (after [Maes, 91a]).
need to obtain food will in general place a low-urgency demand on the animal's
time, unless the animal is particularly short of food, since the animal is not likely
to die suddenly or become injured if it does something else. Finally, food intake
is a homeostatic problem.
2. A second common sub-problem is the need to escape predators. This is usually
urgent and overriding, in that if the animal does not attend to it immediately
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then the consequences could be fatal. It is also highly dependent on external
stimuli but not at all on internal stimuli. The priority which the animal should
assign to trying to escape from a predator is highly dependent on whether the
animal senses any predators, and if so how close they are. This sub-problem is a
non-periodic, intermittent sort in that there is no pattern to how often the animal
will need to attend to it. An animal may need to escape from a predator twice
in a short interval of time and then not need to do so again for a long period
thereafter. There is no homeostatic aspect to this sub-problem.
3. A third sub-problem is that of avoiding hazards in the environment - places
where an animal will endanger itself if it goes there (e.g. cliffs, streams). When
an animal is near to one of these it is important that it does not move towards
it. The demand on the animal's actions is proscriptive ('ruling-out'), rather than
prescriptive ('specifying'), as is the case for other sub-problems. A proscriptive
sub-problem specifies that certain actions should not be chosen (e.g. do not move
towards a hazard) rather than that they should be chosen (e.g. eat food). This
sub-problem will be urgent, but does not preclude the choice of another action at
the same time. There is no homeostatic or periodic or continual aspect to it.
4. Another common sub-problem is cleaning, preening or grooming. Most animals
need to spend some time every so often to remove dirt/parasites from their fur,
clean and oil their feathers, or whatever. This will not be an urgent activity, since
it will not be crucial to the animal to pay attention to it at any particular moment
in time. It will tend to occur most frequently at moments when no other activity
is urgently required. It is continual in that the need for it will recur frequently. It
is dependent on internal stimuli but not on external ones.
5. A fifth sub-problem is that of mating. External stimuli are important in that
the animal should attach more priority to this sub-problem when a potential
mate is perceived (assuming an animal which makes occasional matings with
different mates and which forms no long-term partnerships). It is sometimes
periodic and related to internal stimuli (e.g. menstrual cycles) and sometimes
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not. This sub-problem will be prescriptive, non-continual and non-homeostatic.
It will probably be fairly urgent but the level of urgency in relation to other
sub-problems will depend on factors such as how often opportunities formating
arise and how much longer the animal can expect to live.
6. A final sub-problem is that of the animal needing to return to its den and sleep
there at night. This is obviously periodic. It will have increasing urgency as
nightfall approaches. It is non-homeostatic and prescriptive.
Six different sub-problems that compete for a 'share' of the animal's time have now
been described. Some of the descriptions are probably not completely accurate but
that is not important here. The important point is that competing demands on an ani¬
mal's time (from different sub-problems) vary in their nature, and that the differences
between them need to be understood. A vocabulary for describing sub-problems is
now proposed:
1. Homeostatic v. non-homeostatic - a homeostatic sub-problem contains an in¬
ternal variable which has a desired optimal value, or at least a desired range of
values. The behaviour of the animal will always act so as to return the value of
the variable towards the optimal value or range of values [Toates, 80, Mrosovsky,
90].
2. External stimulus dependent v. external stimulus independent - the urgency
with which certain sub-problems should 'demand' the animal's attention is de¬
pendent on the appearance of certain external cues (e.g. getting water on the
stimulus of a water source, escaping predators on the appearance of a predator).
Other sub-problems are independent of external cues (e.g. cleaning).
3. Internal stimulus dependent v. internal stimulus independent - as for above,
except that the important factor is an internal cue (e.g. body heat is too high, not
enough food in the animal's stomach).
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4. Periodic v. non-periodic - some sub-problems such as sleeping at night are
highly periodic, with the desirability of paying attention to them rising and
falling with a regular rhythm.
5. Continual v. occasional - some sub-problems need to be attended to frequently
and the need for them keeps recurring (e.g. cleaning, getting food/water). They
will need to be undertaken at least several times each day. They are often internal
stimulus dependent. Others occur more occasionally and are usually external
stimulus dependent (e.g. escaping predators, mating).
6. Degree of urgency - some external stimulus dependent sub-problems arise only
occasionally but are extremely urgent and over-ridingly important when they
do occur (e.g. escaping predators, avoiding hazards). There will be significant
consequences for the animal (in terms of future expected genetic fitness) if the
sub-problem is not allowed to influence the action the animal selects. Some sub-
problems generally have a fairly low urgency (e.g. cleaning), and tend to take over
only when none of themore urgent sub-problems are relevant. This distinction is
somewhat similar to that between squashable and resilient behaviours [Houston
& McFarland, 80].
7. Prescriptive v. proscriptive - most sub-problems require a certain set of actions
to be carried out (e.g. find food, approach it then eat it), whereas others (e.g.
avoid hazards) only require that certain actions should not be carried out.
This list is almost certainly incomplete in that there are other ways in which sub-
problems can vary, but hopefully the most consequential differences are contained
here. However complete or incomplete the list above, there is an important underlying
point: sub-problems differ in many ways, and simple mechanisms which make simple
assumptions, for instance that all sub-problems are homeostatic, will not suffice.
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7.3 Other Terminology
Following on from the terms just developed for describing sub-problems, some other
terms are now explained:
1. consummatory - a consummatory action is one which directly achieves some¬
thing (like eating food, or copulating). In general the execution of a consum¬
matory action will reduce an internal deficit or will directly improve something
about the animal's environment.
2. appetitive - an appetitive action is a preparatory one (like approaching some
fruit type food, or making a courtship display at a mate). There is no intrinsic
value in an appetitive action as of itself. It is only of value in that it tends to bring
about a situation in which a consummatory action can be performed.
3. connectionist - this term implies the use of nodes and connections, although it
does not necessarily imply that the nodes or connections are particularly similar
to biological neurons or synapses.
4. hierarchical - the definition of a hierarchy used here is taken from [Dawkins, 1976].
For two nodes A and B then A 'is boss of B if A has a direct causal influence on
B. Direct is meant to imply that A is immediately above B in the hierarchy (i.e.
its influence on B is not mediated through another node), and causal influence is
meant to imply that the state of node B is to some extent dependent on the state
of node A. For a set of nodes A, B, C, etc, A is said to be superior to B if (1) A is
boss of B, or if (2) A is boss of a node which is superior to B. Using this recursive
definition of the term superior it is now possible to define a hierarchy as a set of
nodes A, B, C, etc. which satisfy:
(i) there is no node in the set which is superior to itself, and
(ii) there is one element in the set which is superior to all others in the set.
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Figure 7.2 shows some example hierarchies. The hierarchical mechanisms dis¬
cussed here are all composed of sets of overlapping hierarchies (one for each
system) as in figure 7.2(e). They are sets of overlapping hierarchies because
there are several 'top' nodes. For simplicity though, the different mechanisms
will be referred to as hierarchies, although strictly speaking they are each sets of
overlapping hierarchies.
5. reactive - a reactive mechanism is one which responds promptly to changes in
the state of the environment and one in which the decision as to which action
to select is determined mostly by the current state of the internal and external
environment.
6. deliberative - a deliberative mechanism, on the other hand, is one in which the
decision as to which action to select is based to a larger extent on past events,
calculations or plans.
7.4 Plan of Part II
The rest of this part of the thesis is organised as follows: Chapter 8 describes many
different ASMs, together with other relevant literature. Chapter 9 describes the results
of trying to implement and test several of the ASMs in the SE, and examines the root
causes of any gross inadequacies in performance. Chapter 10 looks in greater depth at
some of the theoretical issues related to inadequacies in performance and also contains
a list of essential requirements for an ASM, developed from analysis of the faults in
the ASMs tested. Chapter 11 presents some suggestions as to how action selection
might best be computed. The proposed mechanism is a development of one of the
mechanisms described in chapter 8. Finally, chapter 12 contains some conclusions on




Figure 7.2: Example hierarchies, (a), (b) and (d) are non-overlapping hierarchies, (c)
is an overlapping hierarchy because some nodes have two bosses, and (e) is a set of
overlapping hierarchies (after [Dawkins, 76]).
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Chapter 8
Mechanisms for Action Selection
This chapter describes themost important action selection mechanisms, aswell as other
work relevant to action selection. Some of the mechanisms described here were tested
in the SE, and these are described in greater detail. The decision as to which ASMs to
implement and testwasmade partly according to how completely and unambiguously
they have been specified. Another consideration was the desire to test a representative
sample of the different ASMs. This chapter contains a brief description of work from
related fields, such as planning, and an explanation of why work from these fields
is not considered in greater depth here. The literature reviewed comes mainly from
the two disciplines of ethology and robotics, but also in part from other fields such
as AI and psychology. Some of the mechanisms are connectionist, others symbolic.
Some mechanisms are hierarchical, others not. Some of them address the whole of
the problem of action selection while others deal only with parts of the problem. The
mechanisms are presented in more or less chronological order of publication.
When looking at the descriptions of mechanisms in this section it should be kept
in mind that some of the deficits that mechanisms are criticised for in chapters 9
and 10 are: (i) an inability to properly integrate goal or motivation type information
(what the animal needs to do) with environmental or cue type information (what the
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animal can usefully do in the current situation), (ii) an inability to choose appropriately
between consummatory and appetitive alternatives, whether in the same system or in
different systems, and (iii) an inability to deal successfully with all different types of
sub-problem, as just discussed in section 7.2.
All of the ASMs use the assumption of the behavioural final common path [McFarland
& Sibly, 75], that all actions are incompatible in terms of their demands on the effectors
of the animal (the animal is not able to move its body so as to achieve any two of the
actions simultaneously). This means that at the level of actions, an ASM has to make
a decision as to which one action is most appropriate for the situation it finds itself in.
8.1 Drives
The concept of drives is associated most with Hull [e.g. 1943], but they have been
advocated by many others in many different forms. Drives have also been discussed
and criticised bymany including Bolles [1975], Hinde [1959,1960,1970] andMcFarland
[McFarland & Sibly, 1972; McFarland, 1985], who also refers to action selection with a
drives-like system as 'simple motivational competition'.
The term drive is used most commonly to denote the idea of an intervening variable.
Many stimuli will have an effect on how likely an animal is to perform a particular
type of behaviour. The term 'a particular type of behaviour' in this instance implies
any action from a system. So, for instance, performing feeding behaviour implies
choosing an action to explore for food, approach perceived or remembered food, or
eat. Stimuli relevant to the actions in the system can each act separately to bring about
the execution of the different actions, or they can act by way of an intervening variable
or centre (see figure 8.1). A drive is equivalent to the activation of such an intervening
variable and as the value of the drive increases, it will become more likely that one of
the actions of the system will be chosen. The drive for each system is a measure of the
total motivation, combined from all stimuli, for that type of behaviour.
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Figure 8.1: (a) many stimuli each passing activation to many components of a be¬
haviour. (b) an intervening variable or drive (the black box).
There has also been much use by ethologists of the term 'general drive', i.e. arousal
which is not specific to any one system but which makes the animal more likely to
engage in energetic behaviour of any sort. In this thesis the term 'drive' is restricted to
the more common meaning in the previous paragraph.
Some formulations of drives theory involve learning. Hull proposed a central equation,
for each system, of the form
drive^strength = habit ..strength x stimulus-strength
where the habit strength is the result of learning from previous experience and the
stimulus strength is some unspecified combination of internal and external (and inde¬
terminate) stimuli. Removing the influence of learning gives
drivestrength = stimulusstrength = f (internal, external and indeterminate stimidi)
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where / is some unspecified function. Many formulations have also implicitly assumed
that / is a function of internal stimuli only (e.g. the drive for feedingwould be a function
of the internal deficit only).
The only remaining unmentioned component of the drive concept is the central as¬
sumption that the most important system is calculated by comparing respective drive
strengths and choosing the system with the highest strength. The most appropriate
action for that system alone is then chosen in some unspecified manner. It is implicitly
assumed that the hard part of the problem is choosing which system to concentrate on,
and that choosing a suitable action thereafter is not difficult.
Figure 8.2 shows a list of drive strengths, one for each system, calculated from envi¬
ronmental, internal and indeterminate stimuli. In this case feeding behaviour would
be chosen because it has the highest value drive.
It is apparent that while the concept of drives is very relevant to the AS problem, it
leaves crucial questions unanswered. For instance, how should one combine different
stimuli to calculate the value of the drive variable and how should one choose themost
appropriate action once a system has been selected?
As a final note, one obvious possible shortcoming of drives has been pointed out by
many authors. For systems such as getting food and getting water it is necessary to
calculate the drive strength using both internal (e.g. food or water deficit) stimuli and
external (e.g. food or water perception) stimuli. Otherwise a phenomenon known as
dithering (see figure 8.3) can occur. Imagine an animal with equal food and water
deficits and situated between a food and a water source. If perceptual stimuli (which
increase with proximity) are not allowed to increase the relevant drive strengths then
the animal might visit the food source and decrease its food deficit slightly. Now the
drive for water dominates over that for food and so the animal moves back to the
water source, drinks a little water and finds that its food deficit is now higher again.
An oscillation occurs between the food and the water with the animal spending far
























Figure 8.2: Example drive strengths for a drives ASM, with 'get food' system winning.
By including external stimuli in the calculation of drive strengths, the animal will
become more attracted to food or water sources as it gets closer to them, and will
remain at each source for longer (beyond the time when the respective deficit is no
longer the largest). In this way it will spend more time consuming and less time
travelling between the different food and water sources.
The drives model, or an instantiation of it at least, is one of the ASMs that were imple¬
mented and tested in the SE. A more precise description of how it was implemented
and tailored to the particular problem posed by the SE is given in section 9.3.1.
8.2 Tinbergen
Tinbergen's mechanism [Tinbergen, 50 and 51] is more precisely described than the
drive model but is still rather ambiguous in places. It was intended only as a 'working
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Figure 8.3: Dithering - with equal food and water deficits, the animal may oscillate
rapidly between small bouts of drinking at the water source and small bouts of feeding
at the food source.
hypothesis' and as such is not a very detailed or exact specification. The mechanism
is hierarchical. At the highest level are very general nodes such as 'reproduce' and
'get food'. As one proceeds 'down' the tree the nodes in turn represent successively
lower-level and less abstract concepts. At the lowest level are consummatory actions
such as coition and eating. This mechanism addresses the whole of the action selection
problem as well as longer term decisions such as when to enter 'reproductive phase'.
Figure 8.4 shows a part of the hierarchy for one system. The idea is that activation
energy comes in at the top node of each system from motivations, which usually
correspond to internal stimuli, but sometimes also to external stimuli. This activation
is then allowed to pass on to lower-level nodes in turn as long as the node sending the
activation is not 'blocked'. A node is 'blocked' when its innate releasing mechanism is
not active. The innate releasing mechanisms are controlled by external stimuli and act
to unblock only those nodes which are relevant to the current situation.
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Figure 8.4: Tinbergen's 'Hierarchy of Instincts' (the bottom half shows motor control
and can be ignored). Circles = nodes or centres, downwards arrows = causal factors,
horizontal arrows = innate releasing mechanisms, and two-way arrows between cen¬
tres on the same level = mutual suppression. The bottom half of the diagram (Weiss
5 to Weiss 2) is concerned with motor control and is not relevant here. Taken from
[Tinbergen, 51].
For instance, the innate releasing mechanism for the 'fight' node of a male stickleback
might be the external stimulus of another male invading its territory. If this stimulus
exceeds a critical value then the innate releasing mechanismwill fire and the activation
in the node can pass down to lower level nodes. The stimuli impinging on each innate
releasingmechanism are combined according to a "rule of heterogeneous summation"
(i.e. a weighted sum is calculated).
























Figure 8.5: Tinbergen's 'tentative representation' of a node or centre from an interme¬
diate level in the hierarchy. Taken from [Tinbergen, 51].
threshold in order for its activation to filter on down to lower levels. As shown in
figure 8.5, a node receives activation frommany sources such asmotivational impulses
from a higher level and external stimuli. There is also intra-layer inhibition which
can decrease a node's activation. How exactly this should work is unspecified, but the
inhibitory links should be arranged so that "as a rule, the strong activation of instinctive
behaviour ofone kind prevents the functioning ofanotherpattern" [Tinbergen, 51, page
111]. It is also stated that "the threshold for the activation of the highest [furthest from
consummatory] appetitive behaviourmust be higher than that for the activation of the
low type of appetitive behaviour" [Tinbergen, 50, page 310]. It is unclear exactly what
is intended except in that there should, usually at least, be a winner-take-all competitive
process operating at each level in the hierarchy.
In the description of the mechanism there is an implicit analogy with fluid filtering
down through some contraption which possesses various removable gates. When
127
activation energy is released from a node by an innate releasing mechanism, then that
node's gate is lifted and the energy is assumed to 'flow down' to the lower levels and
be shared amongst them. When a consummatory action is able to be performed then
it is assumed to 'drain away' the fluid from that part of the hierarchy, and in particular
from associated appetitive actions which are now no longer relevant.
The levels in Tinbergen's hierarchy do not correspond exactly to gradations between
system-level nodes and action-level nodes (see figure 0.3 for explanations of terms).
Although there is some indication of this it is also stated (e.g. figure 8.4) that consum¬
matory actions are invoked by the lowest level nodes whereas appetitive actions are
invoked by successively higher level nodes, as the appetitive actions become more and
more remote from the consummatory act. As a whole the descriptions of this mecha¬
nism are vague and informal as one would expect of a "working hypothesis". A more
formal and mathematical approach would have been helpful in terms of presenting a
less ambiguous definition of the mechanism. Tinbergen's model was not implemented
and tested in the SE, mainly because of this ambiguity in its specification. Due to the
importance of hierarchical models of this type in the literature, a more generic ASM, a
hierarchical decision structure, was tested instead. The concept of a hierarchical decision
structure is explained in section 11.1.2.
8.3 Lorenz
Lorenz specified two very similar models [Lorenz, 50 and 81] for action selection, both
based on an analogy between action specific potential (the equivalent of drive strength
for a particular system) and the pressure exerted on a valve by a body of water in a
reservoir. Both models were designed mainly to account for ethological phenomena
and address only a part of action selection, i.e. how to generate a drive strength for each
system. The original model (figure 8.6)will be explained first, followed by a description
of the changes made in the second model. Lorenz's ideas are more explicitly stated
than Tinbergen's, but it is still only a "thought model", and is consequently rather
vague in places.
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Figure 8.6: Lorenz's Original 'Psycho-Hydraulic' Thought Model. The labels are
explained in the text. Taken from [Lorenz, 50].
In the diagram of the original "psycho-hydraulic model" (figure 8.6) the tendency for
a type of behaviour to be expressed (its drive strength) is equal to the force being
exerted on the valve V. This force is equal to (Sp + (k x R) — S) where k x R is the
pressure which is proportional to the volume of water in the reservoir R, Sp is the
external stimulus strength (force on the scale pan), and S is the "inhibitory function of
the higher centres". The water in the reservoir is the result of internal stimuli causing
a continuous flow of water through the tap T. The rate at which water arrives in the
trough Tr affects how full it gets and therefore also affects the number of outlets from
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the trough through which water flows. The analogy is that the stronger the combined
stimuli, the stronger the force on the valve and then the greater the volume of water
that flows out per unit time. This then results in water coming out of more holes in
the trough which corresponds to a more intense performance of the type of behaviour
(e.g. to a more severe and daring attack on a rival). As the water comes out of the
trough because the behaviour is being executed, the amount of water in the reservoir
is reduced and so the pressure on the valve becomes lower.
One characteristic to be noted is that the internal variables are assumed to produce
a constant input which is added cumulatively to the water reservoir. This implies
that the type of behaviour will be released eventually even in the complete absence
of appropriate external stimuli. There is evidence for such Vacuum activity' in many
animals. For instance, cats deprived of appropriate stimuli for a long time will stalk
'thin air'; fighting fish deprived of rivals to display atwill eventually display at totally
inappropriate objects or at nothing at all. This is the only model of action selection to
be considered in which a constant value of an internal variable can produce increasing
likelihood over time of the type of behaviour being expressed (i.e. of that system being
chosen). Action specific potential (= water from the reservoir) is only ever removed
when a consummatory action relevant to that system is executed.
Another important property of the model is that all stimuli (of whatever type) are
added together. Again there is a "law of heterogeneous summation", this time for the
stimuli activating the behaviour, rather than for the innate releasing mechanism as in
Tinbergen's model.
The second, revised version of the model [Lorenz, 81], as shown in figure 8.7, is
identical to the first except in the following ways: (i) additional readiness-releasing
(i.e. 'priming') stimuli are added to ^he effect of the endogenous (internal) stimuli, and
(ii) external stimuli are "added to the reservoir" instead of exerting a force on the valve
via the scale pan. Lorenz also suggests that an element of inertia could be added to the
opening and closing of the valve.
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Figure 8.7: Lorenz's Revised 'Psycho-Hydraulic' Model. ER = endogenous or au¬
tomatic stimuli, AR = 'unspecific readiness-releasing stimuli' and SR = 'specifically
releasing key stimuli'. Taken from [Lorenz, 81].
Tinbergen and Lorenz's theories of action selection share an assumption of some energy
or fluid which builds up and can only be 'got rid of' by execution of the right action.
This assumption has been attacked [Hinde, 59] on the grounds that (i) the assumption
is not required in order to explain the observed phenomena, and (ii) the assumption is
not realistic. Only the computational properties of the model are scrutinised here.
Lorenz'smodel was implemented as an ASM and was tested in the SE. Specific details
of the implementation are given in section 9.3.2.
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8.4 Baerends
Baerends discussed the behaviour of two animals he had studied, the digger wasp
and the herring gull, and then proposed mechanisms to account for aspects of their
behaviour. These mechanisms are shown in figures 8.8 and 8.9. These two diagrams
contain a lot of information, but a lot of the detail is not relevant to this discussion.
The mechanisms are hierarchical (from left to right in the diagrams rather than top to
bottom) with mutual inhibition between separate systems. Below the level of systems,
each node chooses, in some undescribed fashion, which of its subordinates it will
activate [Baerends, 76]. In the case of the herring gull, Baerends justified his set of
hierarchies, one for each system or "higher-level instinct" (see figure 8.10), by claiming
them to be the only way of explaining the observed patterns of behaviour. The entities
furthest to the right are actions, or fixed action patterns (fixed action patterns are rigidly-
ordered, commonly-occurring sequences of actions). The dotted lines in the diagrams
represent feedback from the environment.
As with Tinbergen's hierarchy, long-term decisions are incorporated as well as short-
term ones. The mechanisms are only for two individual cases, rather than being a
general prescription, but Baerends suggested the principles involved were generally
applicable. Some aspects of the mechanics are not completely specified. It seems as
if the effects of different internal and external stimuli are summed in all cases but this
is not made explicit. The way in which higher-level nodes influence which of their
subordinates are activated is similarly left unspecified.
Baerends calls his diagrams "functional explanations of behaviour". They are not
exact specifications of mechanisms and they do not contain many explicit or implicit
assumptions about how actions are selected. Some points that Baerends doesmake are:
(1) an ASM should be hierarchically organised, (2) higher-level nodes should affect or
control which subordinates receive activation, (3) internal and external stimuli should
affect which nodes at any level get chosen, and (4) once a node becomes active, it tends
to stay active for some time.
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Figure 8.8: Baerends' model to account for nest provisioning behaviour of the digger
wasp. As in the next diagram, actions or fixed action patterns are in the far right
column and systems and sub-systems are to the left and middle. Rp = reproductive
system, and Mt = 'maintenance' system. I, II and III are sub-systems controlling the
completion of three separate phases of nest provisioning, each of which require the
execution of several different lower-level sub-systems. Taken from [Baerends, 76].
Baerends' ideas were not implemented and tested, although the more generic hierar¬
chical decision structure, mentioned under Tinbergen above, was (section 11.1.2).
8.5 Maes
One mechanism to come from the field of artificial intelligence is that by Maes [89, 90,
91a]. This is the most complex and the most completely specified of all of the mecha¬
nisms considered. It is a distributed, recurrent, non-hierarchical network. There are a
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Figure 8.9: Baerends' model to account for incubation behaviour of the herring gull.
Actions or fixed action patterns are in the far right column. "Superimposed control
systems" of higher order are to the middle and left. N = incubation system, E = escape
system and P = preening system. The three systems mutually suppress each other.






















Figure 8.10: An example of the structure of a Baerends-like ASM. Dotted lines represent
inhibitory relationships. Taken from [Lorenz, 81].
set of nodes which represent entities somewhere below the system level (e.g. approach
food, drink water, flee from creature). The nodes are fairly simple, but are a lot more
complex than neurons. The nodes can be either consummatory or appetitive.
There are two 'waves' of input to the network - firstly from the sensors of the en¬
vironment (external stimuli) and secondly from motivations (usually derived from
internal stimuli), as shown in figure 8.11. The sensors of the environment are binary-
valued. That is to say, they measure the truth or falsity of logical statements about
the environment. The motivations can be real-valued [Maes, 91a], and connect only
to the consummatory nodes. There are also internal connections between the nodes
which are of three types: predecessor, successor and conflictor links. After activation
is passed in from the environment and the motivations then it is also spread around
inside the network via the internal connections.
The characteristics of a node are now described more fully. Each node (see figure
8.12) has a set of preconditions. These preconditions are logical conditions about the







perceptual conditions: (water-with-in-reacn. food-perceived)
motivations (hunger 95, thirst 46, curiosity 76. fear 80,
aggression 90, lazyness 32. safety 100)
Figure 8.11: Maes' non-hierarchical "Bottom-Up Mechanism for Behaviour Selection".
Taken from [Maes, 91a].
in order for it to be a valid, selectable alternative. For example, the precondition 'water
in square' must be true in order for the node 'drink' to be executable. As well as a list
of preconditions, each node also has an add list and a delete list. The add list consists
of conditions about the environment that the node is likely to make true (e.g. 'water
in square' for the node 'approach water'). The delete list consists of conditions that
are likely to be made false by the execution of the node (e.g. 'no rivals nearby' for the
node 'approach rival'). The final two components of the node are the activation level
and the code which gets run if the node is executed (in some cases equivalent to a fixed
action pattern).
The internal links in the network are specified as follows:
1. predecessor links-if (i) proposition X is false, (ii) proposition X is a precondition
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Figure 8.12: The make-up of a node in Maes' network.
of node A, and (iii) proposition X is in the add list of node B (i.e. if B can help A
to become executable), then there is an active predecessor link (excitatory) from
A to B.
2. successor links - if (i) proposition X is false, (ii) proposition X is in the add list
of node A, (iii) proposition X is a precondition of node B, and (iv) the node A
is executable (i.e. if A can help B to become executable), then there is an active
successor link (excitatory) from A to B.
3. conflictor links - if (i) proposition X is true, (ii) proposition X is a precondition
of node A, and (iii) proposition X is in the delete list of node B (i.e. if B stops
A from becoming executable), then there is an active conflictor link (inhibitory)
from A to B.
The external links providing input to the network are specified as follows:
1. from sensors of the environment - if (i) proposition X about the environment
is true, and (ii) proposition X is in the precondition list of node A (i.e. if A is at
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least partially appropriate to the current situation), then there is an active link
(excitatory) from the sensor of the proposition X to node A.
2. from goals - if (i) goal Y has an activation greater than zero, and (ii) goal Y is in
the add list of node A (i.e. if A is likely to achieve goal Y), then there is an active
link (excitatory) from the goal Y to node A.
3. from protected goals - if (i) goal Y has an activation greater than zero, and (ii)
goal Y is in the delete list of node A (i.e. if A is likely to undo goal Y, or stop it
from being achieved), then there is an active link (inhibitory) from the goal Y to
node A.
The exact procedure used to select a node to execute at each timestep is as follows (see
figure 8.13):
1. calculate the excitation coming in from the environment and the motivations.
2. spread excitation along the predecessor, successor and conflictor links.
3. check to see if any nodes are executable, and if so then choose the one with the
highest activation, execute it and finish.
4. otherwise, if no node is executable, reduce the global threshold and repeat the
cycle.
A node is executable if all of its preconditions are true and if its activation is greater
than the global threshold. If more than one node is executable after a cycle then the
one with the highest activation is chosen. When a node has been chosen and executed
then its activation is reset to zero before the next timestep. All other node activations
are normalised so that the average of activations becomes equal to the constant n (see
below).
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Figure 8.13: The procedure carried out at each timestep in Maes' mechanism.
1. the mean activation value after each timestep (used in normalisation) [tt].
2. the initial value of the global threshold [8], which is reduced by 10% after each
cycle if no executable node has an activation greater than it.
3. a constant determining the weighting of environmental sensor inputs (as opposed
to other sorts of inputs), as well as the weighting of successor links (as opposed
to other sorts of links) [</>].
4. a constant determining the weighting of goal inputs and predecessor links [7].
5. a constant determining the weighting of protected goal inputs and conflictor
links [<$].
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The different inputs to a node aremultiplied by the following: (i) environmental sensors
- (f), (ii) goals - 7, (iii) protected goals - 6, (iv) successor links - (v) predecessor links
- nothing, and (vi) conflictor links - A
There are also division rules affecting how much activation gets added or taken away
from nodes as a result of the different sorts of links in the network. Consider the
situation in figure 8.14a, in which there is a predecessor link from node B to node A,
due to a proposition X being in both the precondition list of B and the add list of A.
Node A has M elements in its add list (one of which is proposition X) and there are
N different nodes that can make X true (i.e. that receive predecessor links from B
because of proposition X). In this case the predecessor link increments the activation
of A by an amount jfjj, where a is the activation of node B.
Similar division rules are prescribed for the successor and conflictor links, and also for
the inputs to the network from outside it. For instance, when activation is fed in from a
sensor of the environment due to a proposition being true (see figure 8.14b), then node
A's activation is again incremented by <f>-^j, where in this case a = 1 (propositions
are either true or false), N is the number of nodes that have proposition X in their
precondition list, and M is the number of preconditions of node A.
The effects of internal and external stimuli (mediated through internal connections
for some nodes) are always summed. The mechanism has nodes at only one level,
which is below the system level but in some cases above that of the action level.
The only distinction between nodes is that between appetitive and consummatory.
Consummatory nodes receive direct motivational input, whereas the appetitive nodes
only receive that input indirectly through the consummatory nodes or through other
appetitive nodes closer in the sequence to the consummatory node. All nodes can
receive direct input from sensors of the state of the environment.
The central idea of Maes' model for action selection is that the different types of
links encode various relationships (e.g. consummatory / appetitive relationships be-
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Figure 8.14: The division rules applied to excitation transferred along (a) predecessor
links, and (b) inputs from the environment. In (a) the activation of A is incremented
by in (b) the activation of A is incremented by
tween nodes, conflict relationships between nodes, goal-achieving relationships be¬
tween nodes and goals, goal-counteracting relationships between nodes and goals and
situation-dependency relationships between environmental sensors and nodes), and
with this information hard-wired into themechanism, excitation can just be fed in from
the current situation and current goals and activity will, after several iterations, come
to settle in the node representing the most appropriate behaviour.
Maes' mechanism is more complex than the others. This is partly because it is specified
more precisely than the other mechanisms and so there ismore detail to consider. Maes'
ASM was one of those that were implemented and tested in the SE. It was chosen both
because of the lack of ambiguity in the description and also because it is radically
different from the other ASMs considered.
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8.6 Rosenblatt & Payton
This mechanism was conceived by two robotocists [Rosenblatt & Payton, 89]. It is a
connectionist, hierarchical, feed-forward network. It was designed partly in response
to the work of Brooks (see section 8.8.1). Rosenblatt & Payton do not give any examples
ofmechanisms to solve whole action selection problems. They only give examples of
parts of a whole ASM that are suitable for solving parts of the action selection problem
for an autonomous robot. As such it is not always easy to know how exactly they
would decide to apply their ideas to the particular problem posed by the SE, which is
designed to reproduce animal-like, rather than robot-like decision problems. In some
cases their ideas have been extrapolated in order to produce a complete ASM to deal
with the demands made by the SE. These cases are pointed out in the text.
Their suggested type of mechanism is similar in many ways to the hierarchies of
Tinbergen and Baerends except that more than one node is allowed to be active at
any one level. They do not specify any intra-layer inhibition or competition, and
indeed this would be counter to their assumption of combination of preferences, to be
explained below. The only competition is at the level of the behavioural final common
path, necessarily so, where a winner-take-all process must occur. The ideas are more
akin to Baerends' than to Tinbergen's. There are none of Tinbergen's IRMs (stimuli
only affect node activations) and no stipulation that appetitive actions are generated
by higher-level nodes than those which generate consummatory actions.
Figure 8.15 shows the makeup of a node in this sort of network. The node is a fairly
standard artificial neuron except in that the node activation can be any function of the
weighted inputs, not necessarily just a weighted sum.
Figure 8.16 gives an example of a Rosenblatt & Payton network. There is a hierarchy
of nodes which receive information from internal, indeterminate and external stimuli
and feed their activations down through the hierarchy until they arrive in the action
nodes, i.e. those at the level of the behavioural final common path. At that level a
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Aj ■ ^A(OlWij. _ OnWnj). u ihe activation level of unii j with n
weighted inputs.
Oj - fo(Aj). is the output of unit j.
Figure 8.15: A node from Rosenblatt & Payton's hierarchy. Taken from [Rosenblatt &
Payton, 89].
winner-take-all process decides which action should get executed. The way in which
different stimuli should be combined is left unspecified (because the node activation
can be any function of the weighted inputs).
The hierarchies in figure 8.10 (Baerends) and figure 8.16 (Rosenblatt & Payton) appear
to be almost identical. Inputs from stimuli have been omitted from the first diagram,
but there is no difference in their effect: they increase a node's activation in both cases
and there are no IRMs. The main difference between the two sets of ideas, which is
not apparent from the two diagrams, is that the Rosenblatt & Payton scheme allows
for combination ofpreferences (see figure 8.17). Instead of one node at every level being
selected (through a process of intra-layer inhibition or whatever), and only that one
being allowed to remain active, Rosenblatt & Payton allow all nodes to remain active in
any layer. Instead of only one node in each layer being able to excite other nodes below
it in the hierarchy, Rosenblatt & Payton allow each node to remain active and express a
degree ofpreference for each of the nodes beneath it (i.e. further down in the hierarchy).
The preferences of nodes for subordinate nodes can be positive or negative. All the
preferences for a node are combined according to some rule, which is not necessarily
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A SYSTEM
Figure 8.16: An example of the structure of a Rosenblatt & Payton-like ASM. A single
system is shown outlined by the curved dashed line. Stimuli are also shown impinging
on the mechanism.
a simple summation.
The Rosenblatt & Payton ASM is not explicit about all aspects of action selection (how
should inputs be combined? should there be differential treatment of appetitive and
consummatory alternatives?), but those aspects that are defined are fairly unambigu¬
ous. It represents a different type of hierarchy from the more conventional ones of
Tinbergen & Baerends and for this reason it was chosen as one of the ASMs to imple¬
ment and test in the SE.
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BEKAYtCR «
Figure 8.17: Combining evidence in a Rosenblatt & Payton hierarchy. Taken from
[Rosenblatt & Payton, 89].
8.7 Halperin
Halperin's mechanism [Halperin, 91, and 92] was designed, first and foremost, to
account for aggressive display behaviour in Siamese fighting fish. The mechanism
has one central component, a novel synaptic modification rule (the "neuro-connector
rule") that can account formany different conditioning phenomena. Since the synaptic
modification rule enables learning it is ignored here. Halperin also describes the
structure of the mechanism within which such learning must take place. It is this
aspect of the work which is of interest here.
The mechanism (see figure 8.18) is a hierarchical, feed-forward, connectionist network.
Only two different levels in the hierarchy ('motivational' or system, and 'behavioural'
or action) are mentioned, but other levels are not ruled out. The entities at the different
levels are similar, but only those at the behavioural (action) level connect to motor
control areas. There is a winner-take-all competitive inhibition between entities at the
action level. There is also some weaker inhibition between entities at the system level.
This does not effect a winner-take-all operation, but rather is expected to produce some









Figure 8.18: The structure of Halperin's ASM. R = releaser nodes, B = behaviour nodes.
There is positive feedback between the R and B nodes.
in the same way that Tinbergen's or Baerends' hierarchies are. It is possible for mixed
motivations to be expressed.
The R (releaser) nodes in figure 8.18 act to sum the relevant stimuli for the B (behaviour)
nodes. There is also a positive feedback loop between R and B. The B neurons in the
motivational layer provide inputs to the R neurons in the behavioural layer. These
inputs are treated as normal stimuli and summed with other stimuli in calculating the
activation of the R neurons in the behavioural layer. It is stated that the entities in
the behavioural layer will generally require both ordinary stimuli and motivational
stimuli from above (the motivational layer) in order for them to become active.
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Figure 8.19: An imaginary 'scrap-labelling' robot using an instance of Halperin's ASM.
Taken from [Halperin, 91].
Figure 8.19 shows a set of behavioural entities from an example instance of the mecha¬
nism designed to control the behaviour of a hypothetical "scrap-labelling" robot. The
robot is normally intended to perform the sequence Bl through to B4 unless S5 becomes
active, in which case B5 interrupts and takes over from whichever ofBl - B4 was being
executed.
This mechanism was not implemented and tested, partly due to the lack of precision
of some aspects of the description, at least for some of the non-learning aspects of
the mechanism. For instance, how should the partial inhibition betweenmotivational
entities be implemented? And what strength of positive feedback should there be from
a B to an R node?
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8.8 Other Related Work
All the mechanisms to be considered in this thesis have now been described. This
section now looks at other work which is more loosely related to mechanisms for
action selection and discusses any insights to be gained from the work.
8.8.1. Brooks
One noticeable omission from the previous list of ASMs is the subsurnption architecture.
This was proposed by Brooks [86, and 87b] as an approach to computing action se¬
lection and motor control, and perhaps perception to some degree as well, in robots.
As mentioned briefly in chapter 1, Brooks believes that intelligence should not involve
central planners or overriding control processes. Instead, intelligence should be com¬
prised of many distributed processes which are only able to act coherently together.
Each separate process, or competence module, a set of finite state machines in his case,
should receive its own, unprocessed copy of whatever parts of the sensory input it is
interested in, rather than receiving an interpretation of the environment made by some
other module. Each competence module works independently of every other one and
continuously generates output signals as a function of input signals unless inhibited or
subsumed by another module.
An example of the subsumption architecture is shown in figure 8.20. The different
types of interaction that are allowed between modules are shown in figure 8.21.
Each competence module (task-achieving entity) is a collection of finite state machines.
All the lowest-level competence modules achieve fairly simple tasks such as avoiding
obstacles, and are designed independently of each other or of higher-level modules.
The higher-level modules can send signals to effectors, but can also inhibit or subsume
the activity of other lower-level modules. To subsume the output of a target module
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Figure 8.20: An example of the subsumption architecture. A circle with an S at the top








Figure 8.21: A module can affect another in several different ways: (i) it can provide
an input signal to it, (ii) it can reset its state, (iii) it can subsume one of its outputs or
(iv) it can inhibit one of its outputs. Taken from [Brooks, 86].
means to replace its output with another value. That is, to inhibit the output of the
target module and at the same time to overlay another signal in its place.
The reason that this formulation is not included in the list of ASMs is that it is not
strictly an action selection mechanism, but rather an architecture or computational sub¬
strate which can be used as a means of instantiating many different ASMs, or indeed
as a means of instantiating different techniques formotor control. To put it in terms of
Marr's levels of analysis [Marr, 82], the subsumption architecture is neither a compu¬
tational description of the problem of action selection, nor an algorithmic description
of how to select actions, but rather it is an implementational technique, which can be
used to implement any number of different algorithms. The subsumption architecture
does not contain a description of how to deal with important aspects of the action
selection problem such as how stimuli should be combined, or how different systems
or actions should be arbitrated between (or even if they should).
The subsumption architecture has proved to be a successful technique for implement¬
ing the control of robots, as it was intended to be. However, some of the advantages of
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the technique, for instance the ease withwhich new competence modules cart be added
to the existing ones without too much reconfiguration, are more relevant to the task of
building robots than the task of selecting actions. In short, it is an implementational
scheme rather than an algorithm or mechanism for selecting actions.
8.8.2. Ludlow
Ludlow [80] presented a simple neural network that is capable of performing a winner-
take-all operation between alternative systems. It only tackles a small part of the AS
problem, that of how to choose the system or action with the largest activation in a
neurobiologically plausible manner. It doesn't consider different levels, or how to
combine stimuli, or how to calculate the 'importance variable' (drive strength) for each
system or action - only how to perform the winner-take-all, or 'maximum selecting'
operation once all the variables have been calculated.
The mechanism (see figure 8.22) works in the following way: if one of two neurons
initially receives more input than the other then it fires and inhibits the other which
eventually ceases to fire (assuming the weights on the inhibitory links are greater than
or equal to 1.0). If the inhibited neuron later starts to receive more input from stimuli
than the currently firing one then it will overcome its inhibition and start to inhibit the
currently dominant neuron. After several cycles the second neuron will have taken
over and become dominant over the first, which will be fully inhibited and will have
ceased to fire. If the inhibitory links have weights which are greater than 1.0 then the
system will always tend to a state in which only one of the two neurons is active, if it
is not in that state already. Weights which are significantly greater than 1.0 will cause
persistence since an active neuron will be able to remain active even when its inputs
are slightly less than the dominated neuron.




Figure 8.22: Ludlow's "Decision Maker". B1 and B2 mutually inhibit each other (after
[Ludlow, 80]).
8.8.3. Beer
Beer has looked in detail at the locomotory and feeding behaviour of an artificial insect
[Beer, 90; Beer, Chiel & Sterling, 90; Beer & Chiel, 91]. The insect was modelled in the
computer and tests were carried out in a simple simulated environment. The work
is mainly concerned with motor control, but does touch briefly upon the subject of
action selection. Figure 8.23 shows the action selection mechanism for the artificial
cockroach. There are several notable features: (i) there is no hierarchy, although there
are dominance relations mediated by inhibitory connections, and (ii) the motivational
stimulus of 'feeding arousal' (i.e. internal food deficit) excites both consummatory and
appetitive alternatives directly. This is in contrast to Maes' ASM, in whichmotivational
stimuli only excite consummatory nodes directly, and Tinbergen's hierarchy, in which
motivational stimuli impinge directly only upon the higher-level nodes, which are
responsible for the less immediate appetitive actions.
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8.8.4. Planning
Planning is a more traditional way of thinking about the problem of action selection,
especially among researchers in the field of artificial intelligence. The essence of the
difference between typical planning systems and the ASMs already described is that
planning systems are deliberative, whereas the mechanisms here are reactive. In general,
planning systems work by comparing the current situation to some goal, and then
constructing a plan, a sequence of actions, that will take the animal from its current
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state to the goal state. The idea is that the agent then follows that plan blindly to its
end, after which it will have arrived at its goal state, and can look around again to
decide upon another goal and another plan. In contrast, the systems just described
in sections 8.1-8.7, while they do possess goals (e.g. 'reduce food deficit', 'escape
from a predator'), sense their internal and external environment continuously, and
recalculate their chosen action continuously instead of following a plan which may
have been formulated sometime in the past.
Planning systems are more deliberative partly because the sorts of problems that they
have been tested on are more predictable and deterministic. For instance, some of the
problems that have been, or are being, tackled by planning systems are: (i) how to
make cups of coffee, (ii) how to navigate from A to B around known obstacles, (iii) how
to assemble components in the right order, and (iv) how to rearrange stacks of blocks
(by moving one block at a time from one stack to another).
Classical planning, with its pre-planned sequences of actions and its assumptions
about the predictability and stability of the outside world, has been heavily criticised
by many authors [e.g. Agre & Chapman, 87, Agre 90, Maes, 90a, Beer, 90]. The main
criticisms are as follows:
1. Since (i) the animal will not have perfect knowledge of the world, and (ii) changes
to the world will occur which have not been brought about by the animal, then
any plan is likely to need reformulating frequently because the world will not
behave as predicted (for instance, an unexpected hazard will occur between the
animal and the food source it is heading towards, or the fruit food source that
has been approached will not be in the right part of it ripening-decaying cycle
and so there will be no food there). A realistic environment is not completely
deterministic or stable from the point of view of the animal, and so fixed plans
do not usually work well.
154
2. Plans need to be interruptible, to take account of urgent situations or beneficial
opportunities (e.g. while heading towards a water source, the animal sees a
predator, or encounters a high value food source).
3. Many aspects of planning are by nature combinatorially explosive and compu¬
tationally intractable in complex environments. For instance, the number of
possible states is enormous (of the order of lO100 for the SE).
4. Planning systems are centralised and non-distributed. They assume a central
location in the systemwhich interprets all of the perception of the animal and uses
the result to produce a plan. This leads to a central bottleneck and a consequent
lack of robustness.
Somemore recent approaches to planning [e.g. Firby, 87] have taken into account some
of the criticisms of planning and are more reactive. Firby takes the "extreme position
of using no prediction of future states at all", and his system recalculates its plan after
every timestep, instead of following an old one blindly.
8.8.5. Learning Systems
Another related field of research is the study of how best to learn what actions to
select in different situations from trial and error experience in an initially unknown
environment. Systems such as those proposed by Sutton & Barto [e.g. Sutton, 88],
Watkins [1989], and Booker [1988] are tabula rasa ('blank slate') mechanisms with
no predispositions towards certain actions in certain situations. By trying random
actions in different situations and taking note of the degrees of success of those actions,
the animal can gradually build up a mapping between situations and appropriate
actions. The issues of interest in this field are, for example, how to assign credit to
appropriate actions, how to assign credit to all actions in a necessary sequence (not just
the consummatory action) and how to set the balance between exploitation (using the
knowledge already obtained) and exploration (to obtain more knowledge).
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There are three main reasons why learning systems have not been implemented and
evaluated in the SE:
1. tabula rasa systems with no hard-wired innate tendencies would fare very badly
in this SE. In many cases it is unlikely that the animal would be able to survive
the necessary tests to discover that, for instance, it does not pay to try and mate
with predators or to approach dangerous place features. Even in less critical
situations, an animal which instinctively knows to eat cereal type food will have
a distinct advantage over one which has to discover it.
2. In an SE of this complexity, the possible number ofsituations is enormous (the size
of the state space is of the order of lO100, even with fairly coarse quantisations of
continuous variables). The number of possible mappings between situations and
actions that has to be explored is enormous, and is not feasible in an individual
animal's lifetime.
3. In order to get interesting results in the time available it was necessary to restrict
the subject of investigation to the hard-wired inflexible aspects ofaction selection,
rather than trying to study learning as well.
One valuable concept in this field [Sutton, 88], is that of temporal discounting. In this
scheme, the likely reward R of any action, or sequence of actions, is multiplied by a
temporal discount factor a\ where a is less than 1.0 and t is the number of timesteps that
will probably be required to obtain the reward. So, if a strategy will obtain a reward
(increase in expected genetic fitness) of 0.5, but it will take 10 timesteps to achieve it,
then the discounted reward is equal to (0.5 x a10). By comparing discounted rewards,
action sequences which achieve smaller rewards, but in a shorter time-scale, can be
preferred over those which achieve larger rewards over a much longer time.
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8.8.6. Neurophysiology of ASMs for Simple Animals
The physiology of some simple animals is fairly well understood and the way in
which action selection is implemented can be explained. For instance some bacteria
[Koshland, 1979] have only a very few actions such as ingest food, split in two to
reproduce, move forwards and tumble to orientate in a new random direction. They
have sensors for changes in the intensity of beneficial and detrimental chemicals and
changes in temperature. They control their movement towards or away from these
by altering their likelihood of tumbling according to whether the concentration of the
relevant chemicals (or the temperature gradient) is increasing or decreasing as they
move forwards.
Molluscs such as Pleurobranchaea and Aplysia have very simple nervous systems and
behaviour, both of which have been extensively studied [e.g. Davis et al 74, Davis,
79, Kovac & Davis, 80, Kandel, 79]. There appears to be fairly strict dominance rela¬
tionships between different behaviours, not dependent on the values ofmotivational
stimuli such as food deficit, as shown for Pleurobranchaea in figure 8.24.
Although the explanation of how real physiological systems accomplish action selec¬
tion in these simple animals is interesting, the understanding of these processes in
molluscs is not at all complete, and for higher animals is a lot more rudimentary. The
actual physiology of real animals does not help greatly in constraining or increasing
our understanding of action selection mechanisms. At present, the lessons that have
been learnt from 'bottom-up' approaches of this sort do not givemuch insight into how
to construct action selection mechanisms for more complex problem environments.
8.9 Summary of Differences Between Mechanisms
Some of the important differences between the seven ASMs described in sections 8.1-
8.7 are shown in table 8.1.
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Halperin > > partial unstated partial competition summed constant effect real- valued
R&P > > X > X arbitrary constant effect real- valued
Maes > X X X via predecessor &successor links summed constant effect binary- valued
Baerends > > > X selectionby higherlev l nodesi hierarchy unstated constant effect real- valued
Lorenz X X > X unstated summed increasing effect real- valued
Tinbergen > > > X IRMsand competition onbasisf activation arbitrary constant effect real- valued
Drives X X > X unstated unstated constant effect unstated
Network? Hierarchy? System-Level Competition? Combinationof Preferences? Methodof Arbitration BetweenOptions inSameystem Combination ofStimuli Effectof Unvarying Internal Stimulus Sensorsof External Environment
Table 8.1: Structural differences between ASMs and differences in how they deal with





Figure 8.24: Dominance relationships between behaviours for Pleurobranchaea. Taken




Due to time constraints only a subset of the ASMs considered in the previous section
were implemented and tested in the SE. The drives model was implemented first
because it was the simplest. Lorenz, Maes and Rosenblatt & Payton, and a hierarchical
decision structure (see section 11.1.2) were also chosen to give a good variation in types
ofmechanism (e.g. symbolic v. connectionist and hierarchical v. non-hierarchical).
This chapter describes how these different mechanisms were tested and presents the
results obtained. Where the SE exposed obvious deficiencies in the performances of
mechanisms then the underlying causes of the deficiencies were investigated, and
remedied where this did not involve too substantial a change to the original proposed
form of the mechanism. However, in cases where the deficit in performance was due
to a problem with a central and intrinsic aspect of the ASM then no modification was
made.
9.1 How Each Mechanism was Tested
9.1.1. Test Procedure
The procedure for evaluating each mechanism in the SE was as follows:
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1. implementation: the descriptions of the mechanisms were used to specify the
implementation of them. Any ambiguities or gaps in the specifications were
noted and resolved sensibly.
2. preliminary testing: the performance of each ASM was observed directly in
the SE, using the graphical displays showing (i) the animal in the SE, (ii) what
the animal perceives of the SE, (iii) the animal's internal variables and (iv) the
animal's 'map' of the environment. Any obvious deficiencies (e.g. nevermoving,
never performing consummatory actions, never performing complete sequences,
not avoiding hazards, not avoiding predators) were noted.
3. adjustments to improve performance: any gross deficiencies in the performances
of the mechanisms were analysed using the tools described in section 3.6 and their
root causes identified. In most cases the problems could be overcome by small
changes to the mechanism, by changes in the representation of the input or by
changes in the parameter values of the mechanism. Occasionally though, fixing
a shortcoming required a change to the central structure or dynamics of the
mechanism. If the change required was fairly minor then it was carried out. If,
however, a fairly radical change to the fundamental structure or workings of the
mechanism was required (e.g. to introduce hierarchical aspects to Maes' ASM)
then this was not carried out.
4. fine-tuning by parameter adjustment: if it had proved possible to remove all
gross shortcomings in the performance of a mechanism by simple changes, then
the next step involved fine-tuning the mechanism by altering the parameter
values so as to try and maximise the average genetic fitness produced. Approxi¬
mately equal time was spent on this fine-tuning for all ASMs.
5. obtaining a result: once the parameter values of the ASM had been finalised then
its performance was measured in the SE by carrying out about 1650 tests, each
with a different, random initial set-up of the SE (see chapter 4). The performance
is the non-inclusive genetic fitness measure, i.e. the number of times that the
animal manages to mate before it dies (see section 2.3). The average over the 1650
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or so tests was taken as the measure of the performance of the ASM.
6. checking for bias in the SE: tests were also carried out in three other SEs which
had been altered in different ways. The different SEs were:
(i) the nature of the model of perception was changed by altering the effect
of the time of day on the effectiveness of perception, by increasing the
obscuring effect of intervening vegetation, and by changing the effect of
different actions on the efficacy of perception.
(ii) the nature of the model of navigation was changed by increasing a2 (the
variance of the estimate of how far the animal moves each timestep) by a
factor of 3.0, and by reducing the size of the 'map'.
(iii) the nature of the model of motor control was changed by increasing the
likelihood of executing an action incorrectly, and by changing the effects of
different actions on the conspicuousness of the animal, and on the animal's
body temperature and food and water levels.
The purpose of carrying out the tests again in these different SEs was to check
for any bias in the results because of the particular models of the processes of
perception, navigation and motor control in the SE (i.e. to check that an ASM
gets a better result because it is able to select actions more appropriately, rather
than because it is better suited to the individual characterisations of the processes
of perception, navigation and motor control incorporated in the SE).
9.1.2. Ensuring Equal Treatment of Each ASM
There are two types of result generated by these tests in the SE. Firstly, there is the
detection of gross inadequacies in the performance of an ASM, which are then traced
back to infelicities in the ASMs design. Secondly, there are performancemeasurements
for different ASMs which can be compared with each other. In general, instances of the
first sort of result are fairly hard proofs that the design of the ASM is sub-optimal for
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action selection. Results of the second sort (comparisons between ASM performances)
are less secure, as discussed in section 5.3. Part of the reason for this is that it proved
impossible to use genetic algorithms to optimise the parameters in each mechanism.
In order to ensure the fairest possible comparisons between ASMs, even though these
comparisons will never constitute more than fairly weak evidence anyway, the follow¬
ing steps were taken during testing: (i) as explained above, each ASM wasmodified as
necessary so that small design faults were not allowed to give the impression that the
whole mechanism was imperfect, (ii) on the other hand, no ASM was changed beyond
recognition. Therefore what was finally measured in the SE always kept the essen¬
tial features of the original specification, (iii) approximately equal time was given to
'parameter-tweaking' for each ASM, so that differences in performance were unlikely
to be solely due to differential amounts of fine-tuning of the ASM. (iv) equation 4.2
(section 4.3) was used when necessary to calculate the statistical degree of certainty of
a real difference in performance in the SE for two ASMs.
9.2 Factors Affecting the Desirability of Different Alternatives
The function of an action selection mechanism is to select, at each moment in time,
an action for the animal which maximises (or at least comes close to maximising) its
future expected genetic fitness (section 2.3). It was argued in section 5.5 that, for several
non-trivial reasons, it is impossible to calculate the exact future expected genetic fitness
for each action in each state of a realistically complex environment, but yet despite this
each mechanism has to select between actions somehow.
In all of themechanisms there are variables that correspond to the desirability of actions,
sub-systems or systems. For instance, the drives ASM has one variable (drive strength)
per system and in Baerends' ASM there is one variable (node activation) for each action,
sub-system or system. There is an implicit assumption for each ASM that the values
of the variables for each option are in some way approximately proportional to the
fitness of carrying out that option. But in practice it is impossible to calculate exact
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values of the future expected genetic fitness and so the different ASMs necessarily use
different methods for constructing approximations to the fitness of different alternatives.
The drive strengths, node activations or other variables that represent the tendencies
for an alternative to be chosen should rise or fall in accordance with several more
immediate and available factors or indicators of the future expected genetic fitness.
These factors, which are enumerated and discussed below, should be represented in
some way, either implicitly or explicitly, in the decision-making mechanism. This is
not to say that somewhere in every animal's brain there will always be explicit neural
signals corresponding to such factors, but rather that these factors need to be taken
into account in some way in an action selection mechanism that is computationally
optimal.
9.2.1. Expected Short-Term Change in Health
What is the expected increase or decrease in the animal's health if this action is or is
not carried out now? For instance, if the animal's health is currently reduced because
of lack of water then drinking water will have an immediately beneficial effect. Being
attacked by a predator, or encountering a hazard may also result in an immediate,
detrimental change to the animal's health.
9.2.2. Expected Long-Term Change in Health
What is the expected long-term increase or decrease in the animal's health if this action
is carried out now? For instance, exploring will probably increase health in the long
term because the animal will find out more about food and water sources and will
be less likely to suffer from health decrements from lack of food and water. Also,
moving back towards the den is likely to reduce the variance of the animal's estimate
of where it is, make it less likely to get lost, make it more likely to be able to find its
den again before nightfall, and thus reduce the chance of it dying due to encounters
with predators or hazards at night.
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9.2.3. Expected Short-Term Risk of Death
As the animal's health gets closer to zero then it becomes more and more likely that
the animal will die soon (see figure 9.1). Small perturbations in health (e.g. from
a temporary drop in body temperature because of a drop in external temperature)
become increasingly likely to kill the animal. For this reason the animal will, if its
health is very low, prefer to choose a smaller, but more immediate increase in health
over a greater, butmore delayed increase. On the other hand, if its health is less critical
then it may choose the latter option.
In addition, imagine the case where the animal's health is reduced due to both lack
of food and lack of water, with lack of food causing the larger decrement. Imagine
also that the animal can increase its health by a larger amount per timestep by eating
food than by drinking water. In this situation it may still be beneficial to the animal
to choose drinking before eating, if the time left before the animal dies due to lack of
water alone is less than the time left until the animal dies due to lack of food alone (see
figure 9.2). To put it another way, if water will 'run out' quicker than food then the
animal may prefer to try and get water rather than food, even though this will result
in a smaller immediate increment in health.
This factor has a lot in common with the concept of 'risk-space' and the idea that the
behaviour of the animal may be arranged so as to maximise its distance from lethal
boundaries [McFarland & Houston, 81].
9.2.4. Direct Effects on Genetic Fitness
The previous three factors are all important because they impinge upon the animal's
ability to survive, but survival is only important in so far as it allows the animal
to reproduce in the future. Actions such as courting and mating have no effect on




Figure 9.1: Graph showing the probability of death over different intervals of time from
the current moment in time, for different values of the animal's health at the current
moment in time. The animal was using the drives ASM to select its actions. It can be
seen that the probability of death does not decrease linearly with increasing animal
health. Note that averaging errors mean that (i) the probability of death is not always
shown as 0.0 for a time interval of 0.0, and (ii) the probability of death is not always
shown as 1.0 when the animal's health is equal to 0.0. In addition, the small number
of results for values of animal health greater than 0.9 (it is unusual for the animal to



























Figure 9.2: Hypothetical situation in which obtaining water should be chosen in pref¬
erence to obtaining food, even though the food deficit is larger and the animal can
reduce more of it in a single timestep. T1 and T2 are the times it will take for the
animal to die from that deficit alone if no rectifying behaviour is undertaken. II and
12 are the respective increases in health that can be gained from the execution of one
timestep of consummatory behaviour.
9.2.5. Taking Advantage of Opportunities
How tune-critical are the benefits of a particular action? For instance, if the animal is
likely to derive a smaller increase in health from pouncing on (i.e. eating) some prey,
than from cleaning itself, then itmay still be preferable to catch the prey simply because
the opportunity to do so does not arise very frequently, whereas the animal can groom
or preen itself whenever it wants to. In general, if when the animal performs action A
followed by action B it gets benefits from both, but when it performs action B followed
by action A it only gets benefit from action B, then it may pay the animal to perform
A followed by B, even if the benefit from B is greater than that from A.
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9.2.6. Continuing Expenditure of Time Required to Obtain Benefit
If an option does not directly give rise to an immediate or delayed benefit itself, but
only when one or more other options follow it, then how much extra time must be
expended on the remaining options in order to realise the benefit? For instance, an
appetitive actionmust be followed by a consummatory one in order for it to have been
worthwhile. In general, if option A performed by itself yields a benefit R (no matter
whether that benefit is delayed or immediate) then it is more valuable than an action
B, which is part of a sequence BCD that yields the same benefit R after all of B, C and
D have been performed.
9.3 Implementational Issues and Performance Results
This section now presents the results of testing several ASMs in the SE described in Part
I. For each ASM, the details of its implementation are listed, followed by descriptions of
any serious inadequacies in its ability to select appropriate actions, and resolutions to
these inadequacies where possible, as well as performance results for the final version
of each ASM.
9.3.1. Performance of Drives ASM
First Implementation
The first drives mechanism to be implemented was the most naive one; i.e. the one
in which the drive for 'get water', for instance, was derived using only the internal
stimulus 'water deficit'. In general, no external stimuliwere used to calculate the drives
strengths for systems unless there were no relevant internal or indeterminate stimuli.




drivestrength = 0.95 x water.deficit
where water .deficit is the distance below the satiation level for water. If the
animal's health is low (less than 0.25) then an extra 0.1 is added to the drive
strength. The total drive strength is not allowed to exceed 0.95.
escape predatorls - if the predatorl is perceived with a high degree of certainty
and is less than 3 squares away then
drivestrength = 0.99,
otherwise if the predatorl is a bit further away or the perception of the predatorl
is a bit less certain to be correct then
drivestrength = 0.40 x predatorl stimulus.
Finally, if no predatorl is perceived, or one is perceived fairly uncertainly and at
a distance, then
drivestrength = 0.00
avoid hazards - if the dangerous place is perceived with a high degree of certainty
and is in an adjacent square then
drivestrength = 0.98
Otherwise if the dangerous place is a bit further away or the perception of the
dangerous place is a bit less certain to be correct then
drivestrength = dangerous .placestimulus
Finally, if no dangerous place is perceived, or one is perceived fairly uncertainly





5. sleep in den at night -
drivestrength = 0.95 x night-proximity
where night.proximity is a measure of how close it is to nightfall. This indetermi¬
nate stimulus has a value of 1.0 during the night, which drops to 0.0 at sunrise,
remains close to zero through the day, and then increases towards 1.0 as sunset
approaches.
6. scan for predators -
drivestrength = 0.90 x timesincescanned
where timesincescanned varies in the range 0.0 (animal chose a look action in the
last timestep) to 1.0 (animal hasn't chosen a look action in the last 6 timesteps).
There can also be a further increment to the drive strength of up to 0.5 if the
animal has perceived a predator recently, and more recently than the last look
action. The total drive strength is constrained to a maximum of 0.96.
As explained in section 9.1, the equations and numerical values used here were set by
hand and then improved by trial and error. Similar equations were used to calculate
all of the other drive strengths in this initial implementation. As described in section
8.1, the system with the highest drive strength wins the competition and an action is
chosen that best suits the needs of that system alone. Some examples of the rules that
were used to decide the most appropriate action for a system were as follows:
1. get water - if there is a reasonable stimulus value for water in the same square
then choose the action DRINK. Otherwise, if there is a fairly high stimulus for
perceived water, and that stimulus is greater than the one for remembered water,
then choose a MOVE action so as to approach the perceived water. Otherwise, if
there is a fairly high stimulus for remembered water, and that stimulus is greater
than the one for perceived water, then choose a MOVE action so as to approach
the remembered water. Finally, if the animal cannot perceive or remember any
decent water sources then explore (choose a semi-random direction to move in).
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2. escape predatorls - if the perception of the predator is fairly uncertain (there
is a high probability of it being 'imaginary') and the perceived predator is not
very close then look in that direction. Otherwise, if the perception is more
certain or the predator is perceived to be fairly close, then if the animal is in its
den just rest (it is invulnerable to attack there), otherwise if it is in fairly dense
protective vegetation then 'freeze' (remain completely motionless) to try and
avoid detection. Otherwise, if the animal is not in good cover but can perceive
cover then it should move towards it. If no proper protection can be perceived
then the animal should just run in the opposite direction from the predator.
3. avoid hazards -move in the opposite direction from the dangerous place, unless
it is in the same square in which case move in a random direction.
4. reproduce - if a courted mate is perceived in the same square then mate with
it. Otherwise if a receptive mate is perceived in the same square then perform a
courtship display towards it. If no receptive or courted mate is perceived in the
same square but a receptive mate is perceived fairly strongly in another square
then approach it. Finally, if there are no reasonably strong perceptions ofmates
in other squares then explore.
5. sleep in den at night - if in the den then sleep, otherwise if the den is perceived
then approach it. If the den cannot be perceived then approach the remembered
position of the den.
6. scan for predators - if there is a significant perception of either type of predator
in any direction then look in that direction, otherwise just look around generally
(choose the action LOOK^\ROUND).
The first, basic implementation of the drives ASM has now been described. When
tested in the SE it performed fairly well, although one expected fault was apparent. As
discussed in section 8.1, systems such as 'get food' and 'get water' should include some
contribution from external stimuli in the calculation of their drive strengths. In this
naive calculation in the first implementation there was no opportunism - the animal
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just travelled over a good food or water source unless that happened to be thewinning
system anyway because of the respective internal deficit. Some sort of dithering was
also observed, and there was a noticeable tendency towards lack of completion of
action sequences because the drive strength did not increase as the animal got closer to
the consummatory action in an appetitive-consummatory sequence (e.g. as the animal
approached a mate, courted it and then copulated with it).
Second Implementation
To remedy these faults, the drive strengths for the systems 'get food', getwater', 'warm
up', 'cool down' and 'reproduce' were changed to incorporate external stimuli. These
changes gave rise to the second implementation. Two examples systems from it are:
1. get water-
drivestrength = (0.95 x (water.deficit + (waterAeficit x xvaterstimulus)))
where waterstimulus is the maximum of the stimulus for perceived water and
remembered water. There is still a 0.1 increment for low health and a maximum
of 0.95. Note that the drive strength cannot be proportional to (waterAeficit +
waterstimulus) alone since this would be greater than zero even if there was
no deficit (if the animal was satiated). Also, the drive strength could not be
proportional to (waterjieficit x waterstimulus) alone since this will be zero when
waterstimulus is zero, even if the animal is almost dead due to lack of water.
2. reproduce -
drivestrength = 0.30 + (0.62 x matestimulus)
where matestimulus is 1.0 with a courted mate in the same square, close to 1.0
with a receptive mate in the same square and somewhat less for receptive mates
in other squares.
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This second version of the drives mechanism was implemented and observed in the
SE. The problems with dithering and lack of contiguous action sequences no longer
occurred. There were no obvious major deficits in the performance of the ASM.
McFarland [1985, pp 461] hypothesised that simple motivational competition (drives)
might not be satisfactory because low-priority systems such as grooming could never
win the competition. This did not prove to be a problem here because the functions that
calculated the drive strengths were adjusted so that each system won the competition
with approximately the desired frequency.
When this second and final version was evaluated in the four different versions of the
SE then the average results (x) were 6.44, 3.29, 6.41 and 8.78, with an average over the
four of 6.23. The standard deviations (s) of the individual measurements, in the tests
in each of the four versions of the SE, were 6.42,3.89,6.55 and 8.17; and for the average
result over all four versions was 6.26. The expected standard deviations of the sample
averages (ss = (s/y/n)) were 0.16, 0.09, 0.16 and 0.20; and for the average result over
all four versions was 0.15.
9.3.2. Performance of Lorenz's ASM
As described in section 8.3, Lorenz's model is somewhat similar to the drives model
in that an drive strength is calculated for each system, although in this case the action
specific potential (as the equivalent of drive strength is called by Lorenz) is equivalent
to the resultant force on the valve in figure 8.6, obtained from summing the force from
the scale pan (external stimuli) and the force from the head of water in the reservoir
(internal stimuli). An identical procedure to the drives model was used for selecting an
action for the winning system, it was only themethod of calculating the drive strength,
or action specific potential that was different.
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First Implementation
The initial, naive implementation was as follows: all internal stimuli exerted their
influence by controlling the flow of water through a tap into the reservoir, all external
stimuli exerted their influence as weights which could be put on and taken off from the
scale pan, and all indeterminate stimuli were assigned to either taps into the reservoir
or weights on the scale pan as appropriate. Therefore the influence from an internal
stimulus (water from the tap) remained behind even if the internal stimulus value
returned to zero, whereas the influence of an external stimulus (weight on the scale
pan) only existed as long as the external stimulus did. The reservoirs were emptied
only when a consummatory action for the system was performed. Some example
systems are:
1. get food -
new-reservoir.force = old-reservoir-force + (2.2 x food-deficit)
at every timestep, where food-deficit is the maximum of the deficits for fat, carbo¬
hydrate and protein. And
scale-pan-force = ( (10.0 x perceivedfoodJnsamesquarestimulus) +
(5.0 x perceivedfood.elsewherestimulus) +
(3.0 x rememberedfoodstimulus))
as well as a small increment to the reservoir force if the animal's health is low.
The reservoir for this system is emptied when the animal performs any one of
the three consummatory actions for eating food.
2. avoid irrelevant animals -
reservoirforce = 0.0
scalespan force = ((260.0 x perceived Irrelevant-animal-insamesquarestimulus)
+(240.0 x perceivedJrrelevant.animal.elsewherestimulus))
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Since there is no internal stimulus relevant to this system, there is no reservoir
and there is no need to empty it.
3. reproduce - if there is a courted mate in the same square then
reservoirforce = reservoirforce + 0.65
scale-panforce = 100.0
or if there is a receptive mate in the same square then
scale.pan force = 90.0
or if a mate can be perceived outside the animal's square then
scalecpan force = 50.0 x perceived jnatestimulus
The reservoir is emptied when the animal performs the action MATE (copulate).
4. reduce variance -
reservoirforce = reservoirforce + (4.0 x variance)
scale .pan force = 0.0
The reservoir is emptied when the animal enters its den (which resets its variance
to zero).
There were some problems with this initial implementation: (i) some systems, such
as 'reproduce', acquired large reservoir levels when the consummatory action could
not be performed for a long time. They came to dominate over everything else, even
urgent needs such as to avoid predators, (ii) there was no persistence, in fact there was
active dithering, since whenever a single instance of a consummatory action such as
EAT-CF was performed then the reservoir was emptied and the animal switched to
another system. (iii) when external influencesmeant that the urgency of a sub-problem
decreased of its own accord, without the occurrence of a consummatory action (e.g.
when the external temperature returned towards normal and so the internal body
temperature of the animal improved without any behaviouralmeasures on the part of
the animal), then the reservoir was not emptied and so the animal continued to try and
do something about the problem.
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Second Implementation
These three problems were dealt with by making the following three changes to the
naive implementation: (i) ceilings were imposed on the reservoirs so that they could
not increase beyond a certain maximum height, (ii) in some cases, reservoir levels
were just reduced, rather than being reset to zero, when a consummatory action was
performed. This is equivalent to implementing the idea of a 'sticky valve' (i.e. in¬
ertia in the movement of the valve, as proposed for Lorenz's revised model [Lorenz,
81]). (iii) reservoir levels were allowed to be reset to zero or reduced by events other
than consummatory actions on the part of the animal. The following additions were
therefore made to the example systems:
1. get food - the reservoir level was reduced by 30.0 every time the animal eats,
rather than being reset to zero, and a maximum level or ceiling of 200.0 was
imposed on the reservoir. When the animal was satiated with food then this
condition also led to the reservoir level being reset to zero.
2. avoid irrelevant animals - no changes were made to this system.
3. reproduce - a ceiling of 200.0 was introduced for this system.
4. reduce variance -when the variance of the animal's estimated position decreased
to less than 0.005 then this event also led to the reservoir level being reset to zero.
With this second version of Lorenz's model there were still some noticeable problems:
(i) reservoir levels for systems such as 'reproduce', 'get food', and 'clean' increased
throughout the night to give artificially high levels at the end of the night, (ii) it seemed
impossible to tune the increases (due to internal variables and external stimuli) and
decreases (due to consummatory actions and other events) in the reservoir levels so
that the height of the reservoirs maintained a good correspondencewith the respective
deficits. After some time the deficit would be high and the reservoir level (and the
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corresponding tendency for the behaviour) low, or vice-versa. This occurred partly
because the ease of obtaining food, water, etc is different for different instances of the SE
(with semi-random distributions of features), and also because the ease of obtaining
food and water changes at different times in the life of an individual (because as it
explores it finds different sources of food and water and will thereafter be able to find
food and water more easily).
Third Implementation
The first of the two problems mentioned above was solved by freezing all reservoir
levels overnight (when the animal should be sleeping in its den). The second problem
is not solvable without radically changing the whole nature of the mechanism (i.e. by
making a direct link between the offset of an internal variable from its optimum value
and the reservoir level, rather than the specified indirect link through the control of
rate of flow through the tap) and so this was left unattended to.
The average performances (x) of this final, third version of the Lorenz ASM, when
tested in the four versions of the SE, were 2.39, 1.40, 2.48 and 4.58, with an average
over the four of 2.71. The standard deviations (s) of the individuals, in the tests in
each of the four versions of the SE, were 2.34,1.51, 2.38 and 4.82; and for the average
result over all four versions was 2.76. The expected standard deviations of the sample
averages (s£ = (.s/^/n)) were 0.06, 0.04, 0.06 and 0.12; and for the average result over
all four versions was 0.07.
The central idea of Lorenz'smodel, that unvarying levels ofmotivational stimuli should
lead, over time, to an increasing tendency of that behaviour being expressed, is not
supported by the results in this thesis. Although the phenomenon of vacuum activity
seems to give evidence for this, or something similar, in the behaviour of some real
animals, it does not appear to be optimal in a computational sense. The best Lorenz
ASM performs less well than the best drives ASM, which is similar except in that it is
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totally reactive (i.e. it only takes account of present levels of internal, indeterminate
and external stimuli). The left hand side of equation 4.2 (section 4.3) is
when comparing the performances of the drives and Lorenz ASMs. This is greater
than 3.291 and so the probability of a real difference in the performance of the Lorenz
and drives ASMs in the SE is greater than 99.9%.
Lorenz's central idea means that the tendency for a type of behaviour is dependent to
a large extent on the past history of motivational stimuli for that type of behaviour.
Using a similar argument to that posited by Dawkins & Carlisle [1976], when discussing
parental investment, it is argued here that it is in principle sub-optimal to take any
account of how long it is since the animal last engaged in this type of behaviour, or
how long the animal has had this level of deficit, when calculating the desirability
of engaging in behaviour that will reduce the deficit. The amount of time already
invested in trying to reduce a deficit, or the amount of time that the deficit has been
outstanding is not directly relevant. The only factors that are important in calculating
the desirability or drive strength for a type ofbehaviour are those relating to the current
internal and external state and future events. What has happened in the past should
be of no relevance, except in as much as it allows the animal to learn how to act more
efficiently in the future. An example of how the reliance on past levels of motivational
stimuli can lead to anomalous reservoir levels (tendencies for behaviour) is shown in
figure 9.3, in which the two levels of action specific potential should be equivalent, but
are not.
This is equal to
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Figure 9.3: Two hypothetical graphs showing how Lorenz's model can lead to very
different levels ofaction specific potential for the same current offset from a homeostatic
set-point. In (a) the offset has been low in the recent past; in (b) the offset has been
high. In neither case has there has been any consummatory action in the time interval
shown.
The best performance for the Lorenz-type ASMs came when the reservoir levels for
the homeostatic-type systems were kept roughly synchronised with the offsets (the
distances from the optimal values) of the respective internal variables. But, as noted
above, it proved difficult tomaintain a correspondence between the two. This is hardly
surprising considering that the offset of a homeostatic variable controls only the rate
of inflow to the reservoir, and not the actual level itself.
In addition to the problems encountered here, somewhat similar problems have been
experienced when trying to use Lorenz's model to account for observed animal be¬
haviour:
... But tomake Lorenz'smodel work for awider range of behaviour, a series
of increasingly complicated adumbrations become necessary. Some valves
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must leak, some input taps must be connected to floats in the reservoir
which progressively shut off the flow of motivation as the reservoir fills,
negative pressure on the pan must be possible, and so on. Worse yet,
feeding behaviour, the archetypal exemplar of the appetitive model, just
does not seem to fit Lorenz's hypothesis. Motivation— hunger in this case
— is controlled internally, so that overt feeding behaviour need never be
performed. Something, perhaps the stretch receptors, must be imagined
to be controlling another valve, releasing the accumulated motivational
waters without any associated behavioural output. So, too, it is for "thirst"
[Gould, 82],
Themain criticism of Lorenz'smodel that is made here is that the size of motivational-
type inputs is not tied directly enough to the current state of the environment. It should
be noted that this deficit will not be specific to just this test of action selection, but will
occur more generally. Also, this phenomenon is bound to occur because of a central
plank of Lorenz's theory: the decision that certain stimuli should have a cumulatively
increasing effect on the tendency for expression ofbehaviour, rather than a constant one.
The occurrence of this phenomenon is not due to a peculiarity of this implementation
of Lorenz's theory.
Although the Lorenzmodel of action selection did not prove particularly efficient at se¬
lecting actions appropriately, and often produced behaviour whichwas notparticularly
relevant to the current situation, there was a positive side in that the ASM did produce
very coordinated, highly goal-directed activity. There was a high degree of contiguity
of action sequences and the resultant behaviour seemed more 'single-minded' and
purposive than that for any other type of ASM.
9.3.3. Performance of Maes' ASM
Maes' ASM, described in section 8.5, is a non-hierarchical, distributed networkwith two
'waves of input' from perceptions andmotivations. There is an iteration of a spreading
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activation process until one node is executable and also has an activation which is
greater than the global threshold. Information about which nodes achieve or undo the
different goals, which propositions about the external environment need to be true in
order for a node to be relevant, and the position of nodes in consummatory/appetitive
sequences, are all encoded in the different types of connections of the network.
The structure of the network that was used in the tests is shown in figure 9.4. Slightly
different arrangements of connectionswere used on occasion, but the arrangementwas
always equal to, or very similar to, that in the figure. This arrangement of connections
was produced because the nodes were given the precondition lists, add lists and delete
lists shown in tables 9.1-9.3. For every one of the implementations many different
combinations of global parameters were used to check that settings of these did not
affect the observed deficits in performance. In no case was it possible to find settings
of the global parameter values that removed the observed deficits.
First Implementation
For the first implementation the division rules used were exactly as specified in [Maes,
89] and described in section 8.5.
Binary sensors of the environment such as 'food in square' or 'water perceived' were set
to ON when the value of the perceived entity exceeded a certain threshold. Otherwise
they were set to OFF. Goals were real-valued.
Therewas an obvious problemwith this initial implementation. Because of the division
by the number ofoutputs from the sender node of a similar type (N in figure 8.14), there
was a prejudice against nodes which received input from sensors which also excited
other nodes. Nodes such as 'approach perceived cover' and 'clean' received very little
activation and were never chosen. Nodes such as 'drink' and 'avoid dangerous place'
received a lot of activation and were chosen frequently. This principle of division by
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Node Precondition List
Eat Cereal Food (Cereal Food in Square)
Eat Fruit Food (Fruit Food in Square)
Pounce (Eat Prey) (Prey in Square), (Den Not in Square)
Approach P. Food (Perceived Food)
Approach R. Food (Remembered Food)
Drink Water (Water in Square)
Approach P. Water (Perceived Water)
Approach R. Water (Remembered Water)
Rest (Shade or Shelter in Square)
Approach P. Shelter (Perceived Shelter)
Approach P. Shade (Perceived Shade)
Look towards PI (PI Perceived Weakly)
Freeze (PI or P2 Perceived), (Shelter in Square)
Run away from PI (PI Perceived)
Look towards P2 (P2 Perceived Weakly)
Run away from P2 (P2 Perceived)
Avoid Dangerous Place (Dangerous Place Perceived)
Avoid Irrelevant Animal (Irrelevant Animal Perceived)
Approach P. Mate (Perceived Receptive Mate)
Court (Receptive Mate in Square), (Den Not in Square)
Mate (Copulate) (Courted Mate in Square), (Den Not in Square)
Sleep (Den in Square), (Sunset or Night)
Approach P. Den (Perceived Den)
Approach R. Den (Remembered Den)
Clean (Den Not in Square)
Avoid Edge (Edge Perceived)
Explore None
Look Around None
Approach P. Cover (Perceived Shelter)
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Node Add List
Eat Cereal Food (Food OK), (Health Not Too Low)
Eat Fruit Food (Food OK), (Health Not Too Low)
Pounce (Eat Prey) (Food OK), (Health Not Too Low)
Approach P. Food (Cereal Food in Square), (Fruit Food in Square), (Prey in Square)
Approach R. Food (Perceived Food)
Drink Water (Water OK), (Health Not Too Low)
Approach P. Water (Water in Square)
Approach R. Water (Perceived Water)
Rest (Not Too Hot), (Not Too Cold)
Approach P. Shelter (Shelter in Square), (Shade or Shelter in Square)
Approach P. Shade (Shade or Shelter in Square)
Look towards PI (Recently Scanned), (No Predator Since Last Scan)
Freeze (No Predatorls Perceived), (No Predator2s Perceived)
Run away from PI (No Predatorls Perceived)
Look towards P2 (Recently Scanned), (No Predator Since Last Scan)
Run away from P2 (No Predator2s Perceived)
Avoid Dangerous Place (No Dangerous Places Perceived)
Avoid Irrelevant Animal (No Irrelevant Animals Perceived)
Approach P. Mate (Receptive Mate in Square)
Court (Courted Mate in Square)
Mate (Copulate) (Just Mated)
Sleep (Sleeping in Den)
Approach P. Den (Den in Square), (Variance OK)
Approach R. Den (Perceived Shelter), (Perceived Shade), (Den in Square), (Variance OK)
Clean (Clean), (Health Not Too Low)
Avoid Edge (No Edges Perceived)
Explore (Perceived Food), (Perceived Water), (Remembered Food),
(Remembered Water), (Perceived Shelter), (Perceived Shade),
(Perceived Receptive Mate), (Den Not in Square)
Look Around (Recently Scanned), (No Predator Since Last Scan)
Approach P. Cover (Close to Cover)
Table 9.2: Add list elements for each node in Maes' ASM.
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Node Delete List
Eat Cereal Food None
Eat Fruit Food None
Pounce (Eat Prey) None
Approach P. Food None
Approach R. Food (Den in Square)
Drink Water None
Approach P. Water None
Approach R. Water (Den in Square)
Rest None
Approach P. Shelter None
Approach P. Shade None
Look towards PI None
Freeze None
Run away from PI None
Look towards P2 None
Run away from P2 None
Avoid Dangerous Place None
Avoid Irrelevant Animal None




Approach P. Den (Den Not in Square)
Approach R. Den (Den Not in Square)
Clean None
Avoid Edge None
Explore (Den in Square)
Look Around None
Approach P. Cover None
Table 9.3: Delete list elements for each node in Maes' ASM.
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Figure 9.4: The implementation of Maes' ASM to solve the action selection problem
posed by the SE. Solid lines denote goal or predecessor connections, dashed lines
denote sensor or successor connections, and dotted lines denote protected goal or
conflictor connections. 'P' stands for 'perceived' in sensor or node names, and 'R' for
'remembered'. 'APP' stands for 'approach' and 'SQ' for 'square'.
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Figure 9.5: Unbalanced competition between nodes because of division by the number
of outputs. CI and C2 receive inputs of (0.5<^ + O.57) whereas C3 receives input
of (<f> + 7) in every cycle, though there is no reason to prefer C3. Goal and sensor
activations are shown in parentheses beside them, and the weights on the connections
are shown next to the connections.
the number of outputs (or to bemore exact, by the number of other nodes also receiving
input from the sender node because of the proposition involved) was abandoned. This
was because (i) if a goal can be achieved by several different nodes then each node
should receive a full complement of excitation if it is to be able to compete effectively
against other nodes (the alternative is to prejudice against nodes for which the goal
that they achieve can also be achieved by one or more different nodes), as shown in
figure 9.5, and (ii) if a sensor is relevant to many nodes then that should not make a
difference to the amount of excitation each node receives from it (the alternative is that
nodes which receive inputs from 'widely-used' sensors are penalised against).
Maes states that the division by the number of outputs is necessary because "we want
modules that achieve the same goal or modules that use the same precondition to
compete with one another to become active" [Maes, 89]. This argument is spurious.
The modules will still compete with each other whether or not the excitation they
receive is divided by the number of outputs. If the excitation from a sensor or goal is
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divided up amongst the recipient nodes then these nodeswill notbe able to compete on
equal terms against other nodes which are the only ones capable of fulfilling the goal
they achieve, or on equal terms against nodes which do not share their preconditions
with other nodes.
Second Implementation
To create the second version of Maes' ASM the division by the number of outputs on
the sender side was removed. And so, for example, the new division rules for the two
cases in figure 8.14a and 8.14b were equal to and (<f> x •) respectively. With these
new division rules in place a second problem came to light, this time with the division
by the number of inputs (or to be more exact, the division by the size of the receiving
node's precondition list for environmental sensor or successor inputs, the size of the
receiving node's add list for goal or predecessor inputs, or the size of the receiving
node's delete list for protected goal or conflictor inputs). Because of this division there
was a prejudice against nodes with many inputs of a particular type, since all of the
inputs to those nodes had to be large in value in order for the nodes to accumulate as
much activation as a node with only one input, which had a large value (see figure 9.6).
For instance, the nodes Took around' and 'drink' (which both receive two goal inputs,
one of which is always fairly small, the other of which is sometimes quite large) are
penalised because the total input they receive from goals is equal to the average rather
than the sum of the inputs. This is not obviously a problem for inputs from sensors
of the environment or successor links, but it is a problem for inputs from goals and
inputs along predecessor links.
Third Implementation
In order to remove the problemwith the division by the number ofgoal-type inputs, and
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Figure 9.6: Unbalanced competition caused by division by the number of inputs. Cl
receives input of (1.0 x 7) in every cycle, C2 receives input of (0.6 x 7) in every cycle,
even though it can achieve goal G3 as well as goal G2.
less activation, in the third implementation the division by the size of the receiving
node's add list (for goals and predecessors) and by the size of the delete list (for
protected goals and conflictors) was removed. This change was not made to inputs
from the environment or along successor links though. And so, to give two examples,
the excitations passed along links from goals were nowmade equal to (7G), and those
along successor links to where G is the strength of the goal, M is the number
of inputs of that type, a is the activation of the sending node, and d> and 7 are global
parameters (see section 8.5).
This implementation was still problematic because nodes such as 'approach perceived
food', which received many predecessor inputs, always dominated the competition.
This problem was due to the change in the division rules made after the last imple¬
mentation. Since there is no division by the number of predecessor inputs, nodes with
many of these inputs are no longer penalised against but instead, in some cases at least,
come to dominate the competition (ie. they nearly always get selected, even when they
are not sensible choices).
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Figure 9.7: Two possible ways of propagating motivational inputs to appetitive nodes
(a) via the consummatory node and then in a chain to successively less immediate
appetitive actions, or (b) directly.
This problem with division by the number of predecessor or conflictor-type inputs, that
both division by the number of inputs as well as the lack of such division produces un¬
satisfactory results, is a complex one and is due to theway inwhichmotivational inputs
are propagated through the network in Maes' ASM. Instead of amotivational variable
exciting all of the appetitive and consummatory alternatives in the system (figure 9.7b
and Beer's ASM in figure 8.23), in Maes' ASM the motivational variable excites only
the consummatory node, and that consummatory node then passes activation back to
the appetitive nodes if it isn't executable (figure 9.7a).
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The difficulty with Maes' scheme for propagating motivational inputs arises when
deciding whether or not to divide by the number of predecessor inputs to a node.
Consider the part of the network shown in figure 9.8, in which the goal or motiva¬
tional variable 'food okay' (i.e. internal food deficit) is propagated to the three nodes
EAT_CEREAL_FOOD, EAT_FRUITJFOOD and POUNCE (eat prey). When these three
are unexecutable then they each pass activation through predecessor links to the node
'approach food'. In this case it is proper for activation from the three inputs to 'ap¬
proach food' to be divided by the number of inputs, three, since the three eat nodes all
subserve the same goal (i.e. they all act in response to the same motivational variable).
On the other hand, the goals 'food okay', 'water okay' and 'justmated' (reproduce) are
all propagated through consummatory and appetitive nodes to the 'furthest removed'
appetitive node 'explore' (because no food, mate or water can be perceived). In this
case it is not proper for activation from the different inputs to 'explore' to be divided by
the number of them, since the nodes providing input to explore try to achieve different
goals.
In short, as shown in figure 9.9, because the various predecessor inputs to a node can
be all from nodes in the same system (trying to achieve the same goal), or can be from
several systems (trying to achieve several different goals), there is no division rule for
predecessor links that works for all situations. Division by numbers of predecessor
inputs causes problems for nodes like 'explore', and the lack of such division causes
problems for nodes like 'approach perceived food'. This difficulty with the division
rules stems from the decision to feed motivational stimuli only to consummatory nodes
and indirectly from there to appetitive nodes, rather than directly to both consumma¬
tory and appetitive nodes, as is done in other mechanisms (see figures 8.8, 8.9 and
8.23).
Fourth Implementation
There is no principled way c f resolving this dilemma, but a tradeoff can be implemented






Figure 9.8: Primary goal and predecessor connections to the 'get food', 'get water' and
'reproduce' systems. 'Approach perceived food' receives three predecessor connec¬
tions from nodes in the same system. 'Explore' receives five predecessor connections
from nodes in three different systems.
division. So, each predecessor input is calculated according to the formula
1/ a \I = —fa H )
2 M'
and each conflictor input is calculated according to the formula
1,6 a 6
,-2{aT + Mj)
The above arguments do not apply to goal or protected goal inputs and so in these
cases the lack of any division is maintained. It should be noted that the dilemma over
division by input on predecessor links is not an attribute of the computational nature of
the problem of action selection, but rather is an attribute of the way in which Maes has
tried to solve it. The more usual way of passing goal information direct to appetitive
nodes does not suffer from this problem.
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Figure 9.9: Two examples showing the dilemma when deciding whether or not to
divide by the number of predecessor inputs to an appetitive node. Because there is no
way of knowing whether or not the inputs derive from the same goal or not, there is
no way of knowing whether there should be division by the number of inputs or not.
Using the new division rules for predecessor links, the fourth implementation was
tested. The performance of the ASM was still poor, and there were problems over
and above those caused by the unsatisfactory trade-off for the predecessor inputs. In
particular, themain problem was that consummatory nodes seemed to get chosen only
very infrequently. When the goal they could help to achieve had a high strength and
when all their preconditionswere true then they still lost out, onmost occasions at least,
to appetitive nodes in other systems. So, for instance, on occasions when 'approach
water' and 'eat cereal food' were both executable (when all of their preconditions were
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true), and goal strengths for 'food okay' and 'water okay' were of similar value then
'approachwater' (the less optimal choice) was selected. The optimal selection is always
to choose a consummatory node over an appetitive one, all other things being equal.
This is because the benefits from consummatory behaviour are more immediate and
more certain. Appetitive behaviour by definition does not contribute to fitness unless
and until consummatory behaviour follows it.
The reason for this undesirable predominance of appetitive over consummatory nodes
is illustrated by figure 9.10. In this simple example case there are two goals Gl and G2,
each of strength g, and each ofwhich can be achieved only by one consummatory node
(C1 and C2 respectively). For each consummatory node there is one appetitive node
which can bring about the truth of its single precondition. If all nodes start offwith zero
activation then it can be shown,by calculating node activations for successive iterations
of the spreading activation process, that A1 will come to obtain more activation than
C2 after at most 5 cycles. A1 will definitely obtain more activation than C2 and A2
after 5 cycles, whatever the values of G, 7 and 4>, and will overtake C2 and A2 after
fewer cycles for certain values of G, 7 and 4>. This is because there is a positive feedback
loop between C1 and Al (CI is not executable), but not between C2 and A2 (C2 is
executable and so there is no active predecessor link).
This phenomenon of exponentially-increasing positive feedback between an unex-
ecutable consummatory and an executable appetitive node means that executable
appetitive nodes are often preferred over executable consummatory nodes in many
situations when more than a few cycles are required to obtain a solution.
It was decided that it would not be sensible to continue making further alterations
to Maes' ASM since this would entail a radical change in the architecture and basic
concepts, with the removal or drastic alteration of the different types of connections
and major changes in the way information is passed to and between nodes. When the
best implementation of Maes' ASM was evaluated in the four different versions of the







Figure 9.10: Two identical hypothetical systems, both with one consummatory and
one appetitive node. Sensor and goal activations for the current state are shown in
parentheses beside them, and connection weights are shown next to the connections.
Dashed lines indicate inactive links because of the current state (false sensors input no
activation, predecessor links only pass activation if the sender node has at least one
false precondition).
four of 0.25. The standard deviations (s) of the individuals, in the tests in each of the
four versions of the SE, were 0.41, 0.49, 0.44 and 0.66; and for the average result over
all four versions was 0.50. The expected standard deviations of the sample averages
(s:g = (s/y/n)) were 0.01, 0.01, 0.01 and 0.02; and for the average result over all four
versions was 0.01.
The left hand side of equation 4.2 is equal to
|(2.71 - 0.25)[
/ 10.4 | 0.31V 6600 ' 6600
61.1
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when comparing the average results of Maes model and Lorenz's model, and so the
probability of a real difference in the performances in the SE is greater than 99%.
Similarly, it can be shown that there is a very large probability of a real difference
between the performances for Maes' ASM and the drives ASM.
There are several numerical parameters that had to be set by hand in Maes' ASM
(for instance the global parameters described in section 8.5). There were also some
rather arbitrary decisions that had to be made when determining the precondition
list, add list and delete list for each node. A lot of experimentation was carried out
with different parameter values and different lists for nodes (and also with different
sets of nodes), but even so there was a danger that the problems encountered could
be properties of the particular implementation of the model, rather than properties of
the model itself. To counteract this, care was taken to determine the root causes of
the deficits in performance, and to show that the deficits were a consequence ofmajor
decisions in the design of the model, rather than a consequence of implementational
decisions made during the testing. It is argued that the major criticisms made here
(that a satisfactory set of division rules does not exist, and that themechanism does not
exhibit balanced competition between consummatory and appetitive alternatives in
different systems) are criticisms of phenomena that are firmly linked to a fundamental
aspect of the mechanism; namely the decision to pass goal-type stimuli to appetitive
nodes by way of consummatory nodes.
There are some other possible problems with Maes' ASM, which may have become
apparent if not for the masking effects of the basic design faults just outlined. These
are:
1. There is a loss of information because binary sensors of the external environment
are assumed, whereasmany properties of a realistic environment are continuous
(e.g. the amount of water at a water source, the degree of protection offered by
different instances of vegetation, etc).
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2. Similarly, there is a loss of information because different nodes are assumed to
either achieve a goal or do not. There are no ways of expressing the fact that
the action/behaviour generated by a node can achieve a goal to some degree, or
with some probability. This is also the case with negating goals— Maes assumes
that nodes either counteract a goal or do not. There is no way of encoding the
fact that, for instance, strenuous actions such as MATE tend to increase body
temperature (i.e. help to achieve the goal 'keep warm' to some degree) and also
tend to increase the rate at which food and water are used up (and hence help to
partially undo the goals 'food okay' and 'water okay').
3. Persistence - the necessary mechanisms to ensure persistence are not all present
in this ASM. Although predecessor and successor connections tend to promote
contiguous sequences of behaviour (e.g. explore for food, approach food, then
eat it), there is nothing to favour continued eating at a food source after the animal
has already eaten there once. In fact, the animal is less likely to continue eating in
the next timestep since the internal deficit will have decreased and the activation
of the winning node is reset to zero, whereas all other nodes retain some of the
activation they finished with in the previous timestep.
4. The decision to add activation when preconditions are true unfairly penalises
those nodes with no preconditions (such as 'explore' or Took around'). Tinber-
gen made a distinction in his mechanism between stimuli which increase the
activation of the node, and stimuli which impinge upon the innate releasing
mechanism (thus tending to 'unblock' the node, but not to make it more likely to
get selected).
5. In line with Lorenz, Maes assumes that excitation from stimuli should always be
summed when calculating node activation levels. This is not always the case in
real animals. Some animals seem to respond in proportion to the product, rather
than the sum, of two different stimuli. This is discussed further in section 10.4.
In summary, the lack of suitable division rules and the unbalanced competition between
consummatory and appetitive alternatives combine to produce some serious deficits in
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the performance of this ASM. These problems were discussed in detail and shown to be
problems that are not specific just to this SE. They will occur in general whenever there
are multiple goals, consummatory and appetitive alternatives, and many candidate
actions to choose among. This mechanism has been reported by Maes [1989a] to work
well at planning-type problems, but it does not seem appropriate for animal-like action
selection problems such as that posed by the SE.
9.3.4. Performance of Rosenblatt & Payton's ASM
First Implementation
This ASM, a hierarchy with expression of preferences and unrestricted flow of in¬
formation, was described in section 8.6. It is strictly feed-forward with no recurrent
connections and no inhibitory or excitatory connections to other nodes at the same
level. The implementations of this ASM (especially the third) are described rather
more briefly than those for other ASMs because this ASM is covered in more detail in
chapter 11.
The function which calculates each node activation from the preferences for it is un¬
specified by Rosenblatt & Payton, [1989] (see figure 8.15). For this first implementation
it was constrained to be a simple sum of the preferences for the node. Exceptions to this
occurred with cue stimuli, i.e. stimuli which signal the appropriateness or otherwise
of an action (e.g. EAT_FRUIT_FOOD is only appropriate if the stimulus 'fruit food in
square' is greater than zero). In these cases the preference is multiplied with the cue
stimulus input before being combined with other preferences so that there will be no
activation passed to the node unless it is both relevant to the current situation and
there is a need for it.
Four example systems from the first implementation are now described.
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an ordinary node
an ordinary sensor /
stimulus (internal, external
or indeterminate)
iff! NB! ;Sf PE :E; SW !W: a multi-directional
node
inputs to the node are
combined additively







(because of the extra time
expenditure required)
an uncertainty penalty
(because of the uncertainty
of ever getting a benefit)
Figure 9.11: Key to Rosenblatt & Payton ASM figures. When a node is shown with
neither a shaded triangle nor a shaded rectangle above it then the node has a more
complicated rule for combining preferences.
Figure 9.12 shows the 'get food' system. The internal stimuli 'food minus' and Tow
health' impinge on the top-level node 'get food'. In this simple implementation the four
alternative sub-systems 'eat food', 'approach perceived food', 'approach remembered
food' and 'explore for food' are all activated equally (there is also a small amount of
excitation to 'don't use up food'). For each of the three eat actions, there is a separate
cue-type stimulus, which is multiplied with a propagated motivational stimulus so
that the eat actions only receive activation if the relevant type of food is present. So,
for instance, the activation passed to EATJFRU IT-FOOD equals
(excitation from 'eat food') x (stimulusfrom 'fruit food in same square')
'Perceived food', 'remembered food' and 'random direction' are all stimuli with eight
different components, one for each direction the animal can move in. Each component
of each stimulus is multiplied with the relevant motivational-type input (i.e. an input
from a node that is higher up in the hierarchy). To give an example, the activation of
'move north' is equal to
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Figure 9.12: 'get food' system from the first implementation of Rosenblatt's & Payton's
mechanism. The numbers next to connections are weights. Connections from other
systems are not shown. An explanation of the meaning of some of the symbols in the
diagram can be found in figure 9.11.
[{Ei x Sx) + {E2 x S2) + (E3 x S3) + inputs from other systems]
where Ex = the excitation from 'approach perceived food', ,5") = the stimulus value of
'fruit food to north', E2 = the excitation from 'approach remembered food', S2 = the
stimulus value of 'remembered food to north', E3 = the excitation from 'explore', and
S3 = the stimulus value of 'random direction to north'. The (E x S) pairs are summed
because that is the rule for combination of preferences in this first implementation.
An example of the flow of activation in this system is shown in figure 9.13.
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Figure 9.13: An example of the flow of activation through the 'get food' system. The
effects of other systems (e.g. on the MOVE nodes) are not shown. An explanation of
the meaning of some of the symbols in the diagram can be found in figure 9.11.
Figure 9.14 shows the 'keep clean' system. The system has two inputs from Tow health'
and 'dirtiness' (i.e. 1.0— the value of the internal variable 'cleanliness'). The animal
can not clean itself in its den, and so there is a need for an appetitive action to leave
its den if necessary. The multi-directional stimulus 'all directions' is equal to 1.0 in all
directions.
Figure 9.15 shows the 'avoid predatorls' system. There are five different alterna¬
tive sub-systems, although these cannot be categorised as consummatory or appetitive
(except for 'approach shelter' and 'freeze in shelter'). There is a large, constant,motiva¬
tional input of 3.9. Again, though, this will not affect the activations of any action-level
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Figure 9.14: 'keep clean' system from the first implementation of Rosenblatt's & Pay-
ton's mechanism. Connections from other systems are not shown. An explanation of
the meaning of some of the symbols in the diagram can be found in figure 9.11.
nodes unless a predatorl is perceived. 'Max PI' is the maximum value, over the 8
different directions, of the perceptions of predatorls. 'Max PI (adj)' is 0.0 if 'Max PI'
is less than 0.30, otherwise it is equal to 'Max PI'. This is required to stop the animal
choosing the action FREEZE too frequently when it is in dense vegetation (which pro¬
duces a large value of 'shelter in square' and also reduces the efficacy of perception,
producing many incorrect, low-valued perceptions of predatorls). 'Opp PI' is zero
in the direction of the predatorls and adjacent directions, 1.0 in the exact opposite
direction and then slightly less than 1.0 in the directions adjacent to the opposite one.
The final example system (figure 9.16) is the 'vigilance', or 'detect predators' system.
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Figure 9.15: 'avoid predatorls' system from the first implementation of Rosenblatt's &
Payton's mechanism. Connections from other systems are not shown. An explanation
of the meaning of some of the symbols in the diagram can be found in figure 9.11.
This has two motivational inputs to the system-level node, one proportional to the
time since the last look-type action, and the other which is high if a predator has been
perceived since the last look-type action was performed. The action LOOK_AROUND
is not dependent on any external stimulus. It will always lose out to an action to look
directly at a predator, if a predator is perceived. The two stimuli 'PI (adj)' and 'P2
(adj)' are transformed multi-directional perceptual inputs which have been altered so
that they are equal to 1.0 if the same component of 'PI' is greater than 0.2, and are
multiplied by ^ otherwise. This is because the animal needs to look in the direction
of uncertain perceptions of predators.
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Figure 9.16: 'vigilance' or 'scan for predators' system from the first implementation of
Rosenblatt's & Payton's mechanism. Connections from other systems are not shown.
An explanation of the meaning of some of the symbols in the diagram can be found in
figure 9.11.
This first, naive implementation of the Rosenblatt & Payton mechanism was tested
in the SE and one particular problem was found. The MOVE actions, which receive
more preferences than any other action nodes, always win the competition, and so the
animal spends all of its time moving in one direction or another and actions such as
EAT_FRUIT_FOOD or DRINK or MATE never get chosen.
One reason for this is that preferences from appetitive sub-systems (which are usually
to MOVE actions) are similar in size to those from consummatory sub-systems, which
ignores the fact that consummatory actions are obviously more preferable, since they
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lead to achievement of the goal (which should imply an increase in future expected
genetic fitness) more immediately, and more certainly. In order to rectify this problem,
Sutton & Barto's idea of temporal discount factors (see section 8.8.5) was used in an
amended form to yield a second implementation.
Second Implementation
In addition to penalising those options which achieve their reward over a longer time-
scale, an additional penalty was introduced here for those options which were less
certain to lead to an eventual reward. Therefore two types of inhibitory inputs were
introduced: (i) temporal penalties which inhibit in proportion to the length of time to
likely achievement of the goal (e.g. 'explore for food' might have a 0.5 temporal penalty
because it is not likely to lead to actual ingestion of food until after a fairly long period
of time), and (ii) uncertainty penalties which are inversely related to the likelihoods of the
options eventually contributing to achievement of the goal. For example, 'approach
remembered water' might have a 0.3 uncertainty penalty because there is a fairly high
probability that even if the animal decides to head towards a rememberedwater source
it will be interrupted en route, for instance by an encounter with a predator or mate.
In that case it would probably not continue to approach the remembered water source
and so the original action was wasted.
These two types of penalties are largest for those appetitive nodes which are furthest
removed from the consummatory node. Further discussion of the differentmeans that
could have been used to alter the mechanism to favour consummatory over appetitive
options, and why this particular method was chosen, is given in section 11.1.4.
To give an example of the penalties used in two systems, the different appetitive options
in the 'get food ' system had temporal and uncertainty penalties as shown in figure
9.17a, and in the 'avoid predatorls' system the penalties were as shown in figure 9.17b.
The other two example systems, 'avoid hazards' and 'detect predators' do not have
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Figure 9.17: Temporal (T) and uncertainty (U) penalties applied to appetitive nodes
in the 'get food' and 'avoid predatorIs' systems in the second implementation of the
Rosenblatt & Payton mechanism. An explanation of the meaning of some of the
symbols in the diagram can be found in figure 9.11.
consummatory and appetitive options and consequently there were no temporal or
uncertainty penalties. With the penalties added the Rosenblatt & Payton mechanism
was tested a second time. This time the MOVE actions were made less dominant
by imposing severe penalties on the appetitive options. However, the problem did
not entirely go away because there were still several unaffected inputs to the move
actions, from non-appetitive sub-system nodes. Another problem that emerged was
that, because of the penalties on them, appetitive options were not able to accrue
enough activation on their own accord. So, for instance, even if the animal was very
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short of food then it would not approach a clearly perceived food source because of
the two severe penalties on 'approach perceived food'. The animal needs to prefer an
eating action over an approach food action if the two have similar stimulus values, but
at the same time still needs to attach a fairly high importance to appetitive options like
'approach perceived food' or 'explore for food' if the animal is very short of food and
there is no food immediately at hand, or none perceived or remembered sufficiently
strongly.
Third Implementation
The solution to these two problems was to make the penalties on appetitive options
less severe (e.g. figure 9.18) and at the same time to change the combination of inputs
rule from a simple sum to that shown below
Aj = + + +
where and T'~ are the positive and negative preferences from node i for node j, N+
andN ~ are the numbers of such preferences for node j, and a and /3 are constants. With
fairly small values of a and (3 this prevented the MOVE actions from being selected on
every occasion, and also allowed appetitive sub-systems to exert a large influence on
the chosen action when appropriate.
The computational reasons why a simple sum is not satisfactory are explained more
fully in section 11.1.3. Other parts of chapter 11 also contain detailed consideration of
other aspects of this ASM.
With the more moderate penalties and the new rule for combining preferences, this
third implementation performed very competently, with average results (x) in the four
different versions of the SE of 8.09, 3.61, 8.16 and 13.38, with an average over the
four of 8.31. The standard deviations (s) of the individuals, in the tests in each of the
four versions of the SE, were 7.06, 3.63, 6.66 and 9.16; and for the average result over
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Figure 9.18: Less severe temporal and uncertainty penalties applied to appetitive
nodes in the 'get food' and 'avoid predatorls' systems in the third implementation of
the Rosenblatt & Payton mechanism. An explanation of the meaning of some of the
symbols in the diagram can be found in figure 9.11.
all four versions was 6.63. The expected standard deviations of the sample averages
(s£ = (s/y/n)) were 0.17, 0.09, 0.16 and 0.23; and for the average result over all four
versions was 0.16.
It can be seen that amodified Rosenblatt & Paytonmechanism (including the improve¬
ments to the original design) is able to performmore competently than any of the other
ASMs tested here. Equation 4.2 (section 4.3) can be used to show that there is a greater
than 99% probability of a real difference between the performance of this ASM and the
performances of the drives ASM (the next best one), since
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which is greater than 3.291. Equation 4.2 can similarly be used to state with a high
degree of certainty that the modified Rosenblatt & Payton mechanism performs better




Some theory was touched upon in the last chapter in the course of unravelling the
causes of certain deficits in the different ASMs. For example, the need for persistence,
the need to prefer consummatory over appetitive alternatives, and problems with
passingmotivational stimuli to appetitive nodes indirectly through the consummatory
nodes were all mentioned.
The first four sections of this chapter present some additional theoretical points which,
together with those in the previous chapter, provide a framework for the analysis
and criticism of the different mechanisms. This theory will be useful for explaining
more subtle differences between the performances of different ASMs. Following on
from these theoretical discussions, the fifth section of this chapter consists of a list of
considerations that should be taken into account in the design of any future ASMs.
The sixth section enumerates the shortcomings of each of the ASMs that were tested in
the SE, and the final section summarises all of the testing results.
10.1 Dealing with All Types of Sub-Problem
The variation in possible types of sub-problem was discussed in section 7.2, and a
terminology to describe themwas proposed. It is important that, for instance, ASMs are
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not designed solely to deal with homeostatic, internal stimulus dependent, prescriptive
sub-problems such as 'get food' (the most common sub-problem considered in the
ethological literature). Lorenz's model of action selection or behavioural choice is
oriented towards these sorts of sub-problems, and is rather inappropriate for sub-
problems such as 'avoid hazards'. A satisfactory mechanism needs to be able to
handle all different types of sub-problem appropriately.
10.2 Compromise Candidates
One of the advantages ofRosenblatt & Payton'smechanism (see section 8.6) is that their
mechanism is able to consider preferences of more than one system simultaneously.
Most ASMs allow only one system to be active (and express preferences) at any one
time, whether through intra-layer inhibition or some other means (see section 11.1.4).
All but one of the systems is 'shut down' and no longer takes part in the selection
process. Rosenblatt & Payton's idea of combining evidence from all systems when
choosing an action allows, in some cases, better choices to be made.
For instance, proscriptive sub-problems such as 'avoiding hazards' should place a
demand on the animal's actions that it does not approach the hazard, rather than
positively prescribing any particular action. It is obviously preferable to combine this
demand with a preference to head towards food, if the two don't clash, rather than to
head diametrically away from the hazard because the only system being considered is
that of 'avoid hazard' (see figure 10.1).
More generally, a compromise candidate, which might be beneficial to two or more
systems to an intermediate degree, may be preferable to any of the candidates which
are most beneficial for one system alone.
Although computational constraints, described in section 11.1.3, mean that pure com¬
bination of preferences is not always straightforward, it should still be incorporated in
modified form because of the ability to choose compromise candidates that it provides.
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Figure 10.1: Choosing a compromise candidate by combining preferences from pre¬
scriptive and prescriptive systems (chosen action is MOVE_SOUTH if the needs of
only one system can be considered at one time, and is MOVE_WEST if combination of
preferences is allowed). Larger circles denote greater levels of excitation or inhibition.
10.3 Proper Treatment of Information
Many researchers into the workings of the brain have stressed the importance of
considering the treatment of information. Neural networks today are often analysed
partly in terms ofwhether theymanipulate the information provided as input to them
in a principled manner. The main aspect of the treatment of information that is of
importance here is that of preservation of information. In order to be able to make
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optimal decisions, an ASM must not throw away any relevant information. This need
to preserve relevant information leads to two considerations:
1. characterising the internal and external state — some ASMs (e.g. Maes' one)
include binary-valued sensors of the environment. These virtual sensors return 1
or 0 according to the truth or falsity of logical propositions about the environment
(such as 'perceived food stimulus >0.3'). The use of suchbinary or integer sensors
results in a loss of relevant information because themechanism cannot distinguish
between, for example, a food stimulus of value 0.35 and a food stimulus of value
0.95. As a general rule, sensors of internal and indeterminate variables and the
external environment should be real-valued.
2. maintaining preferences of all systems —many of the mechanisms considered
here select one system as the most appropriate and then select one action based
only on the needs of that system. As discussed above, this is sub-optimal because
it does not allow for combination of preferences and selection of compromise
candidates. Looked at from another point of view, selecting just one system
is not a good idea because it leads to a loss of potentially useful information (i.e.
the loss of the preferences of all of the 'switched off' systems). The principle
of preservation of information requires that the preferences of all systems are
propagated through to actions until a decision has to be made at the level of the
behavioural final common path.
10.4 Combination of Stimuli
How should the various stimuli relevant to a system, sub-system or action be com¬
bined? Should the stimulus magnitudes be added in order to calculate the activation
or 'degree of preference' for that node? Or should they be multiplied? Arguments put
forward in [McFarland, 85] suggest that whereas some stimuli combine in an additive
fashion (figure 10.2a), others combine in a multiplicative fashion (figure 10.2b). But
it is possible, and perhaps likely, that more complex functions are sensible in certain
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situations. Consider, for example, the calculation of the 'get food' drive strength in
the drives ASM. The degree of preference, or degree of benefit to the animal, of choos¬
ing the system 'get food' depends on both internal stimuli (food deficit) and external
stimuli (perception of food). It would seem that both simple additive and simple
multiplicative rules are inadequate in this case. The simple additive rule
Pget-Jood = IFD T FS
where Pget^ood = preference for system 'get food', IFF) = internal food deficit and FS
= perceived food stimulus, is unsatisfactory because it can be greater than zero when
the animal is satiated with food (IFD = zero). The simple multiplicative combination
rule
Pget^Jood = IFD x FS
is also unsatisfactory because the product is equal to zero if FS — zero, even if IFD is
rather high. If the animal is nearly starving then it should still try and get food (e.g.
by exploring) even if it cannot perceive food at the currentmoment.
The exact combination of stimuli that should be employed in this case is not the issue.
What is important here is that an ASM should be able to accommodate different rules for
combination of stimuli, and should not presuppose strict summation ormultiplication.
10.5 Requirements for an Action Selection Mechanism
Several theoretical issues relevant to action selection / behavioural choice have now
been discussed in chapter 9 and the previous sections of this chapter. This section now
lists specific points that should be taken into account in the design of future ASMs.
These points can alternatively be thought of as a set of benchmark criteria, each of
which is failed by one or more of the ASMs tested here. These criteria can also be used
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Figure 10.2: (a) additive effects of two stimuli, (b) multiplicative effects of two stimuli.
Taken from [McFarland, 85].
1. Dealing with all types of sub-problem: the need to be able to handle all of the
various types of sub-problem successfully (see sections 7.2 and 10.1).
2. Persistence: the need to have a tendency to persist with a consummatory action
beyond the time that the deficit it is reducing is strictly the most important,
because of the 'cost' of changing to another system. The cost is the amount of
time it will take to obtain a situation in which the consummatory action for that
other system can be performed, as described in section 9.3.1.
3. Activations proportional to current offsets: in homeostatic systems, the need for
the node activations or drive strengths to be in proportion to the current offsets
from the optimal set-points (see section 9.3.2).
4. Consummatory over appetitive actions in the same system: the need to have a
tendency to prefer consummatory over appetitive actions in the same system, if
both are equally relevant to the current external situation (see sections 9.3.3 and
9.3.4)
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5. Consummatory over appetitive actions in the other systems: the need to have a
tendency to prefer a consummatory action in one system over appetitive actions
in other systems, all other things being equal (see sections 9.3.3 and 9.3.4)
6. Balanced competition: the need for there to be no discrimination against nodes
which help to achieve more than one goal, or against nodes which receive input
frommany different stimuli, or against nodes which receive input from only one
stimulus or from none at all (see section 9.3.3 and 9.3.4).
7. Contiguous action sequences: for a similar reason to that underlying the need
for persistence (i.e. the cost of changing), there is a need to have a tendency
towards continuing the current sequence once started, rather than beginning a
new sequence for a different system (see section 9.3.2).
8. Interrupts if necessary: the need to be able to interrupt a sequence of actions for
a relatively low-priority system (e.g. 'get food') if another more urgent system
(e.g. 'avoid predators') places a high-priority demand on the use of the animal's
actions (see section 9.3.2).
9. Opportunism: the need to incorporate external stimulus ('availability') infor¬
mation, as well as deficit or motivational information, when calculating the
desirability of different alternatives (see section 9.2.5). This should allow the
animal to interrupt other activities to take advantage of infrequently-available
opportunities (for instance, a receptive mate in the same square) if they should
suddenly arise.
10. No system-level winner-take-all: because of the needs for preservation of in¬
formation and choice of compromise candidates, a mechanism should not 'shut
down' all but one system (see sections 10.2 and 10.3).
11. Combination of preferences: the need to be able to integratemultiple non-binary
preferences from higher-level nodes when deciding the responses of lower-level
nodes (see sections 10.2 and 10.3).
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12. Compromise candidates: the need to be able to choose actions that, while not
the best choice for any one sub-problem alone, are best when all sub-problems
are considered simultaneously (see sections 10.2 and 10.3).
13. Real-valued sensors: the need to extract the full amount of information from the
environment and internal state (see section 10.3).
14. Flexible combination of stimuli: the need to allow arbitrary functions for com¬
bining stimulus values (see section 10.4).
10.6 Summary of Findings on Each ASM
This section summarises the positive and negative aspects of each of the four ASMs
tested in the SE.
Two potential concerns over these results are that (i) the deficits are not applicable in
general, but are specific to this test of action selection, and (ii) the deficits would not
occur if the ASMs had been implemented more competently (the deficits could be a
property of this particular implementation of the ASM rather than of the ASM as a
whole). To guard against these concerns, care was taken in each case to ensure that:
(i) the reasons behind each deficit in performance were determined, rather than just
accepting them at face value, (ii) the reasons were generally applicable to problems
of action selection, rather just this one, (iii) a lot of time was spent experimenting
with different equations, parameter values, preconditions, etc., and (iv) the reasons or
causes underlying the deficits were due to central features of the ASM, rather than
minor details which could be changed easily. These safeguards, taken together, ensure
that the deficits that are described here are applicable to action selection in general,
and arise as an inevitable consequence of central tenets of the ASM in question.
216
10.6.1. Drives
The drives model is the simplest considered here, partly because it only addresses half
of the problem, i.e. how to select a system. The naive initial implementation had no
means of incorporating opportunism and, as predicted, therefore suffered from some
dithering and a lack of an ability to take advantage of opportunities.
The final implementation did not suffer from these faults, but did lack the ability to
combine preferences, and thus to choose compromise candidates. This is because of
the system-level winner-take-all process which is central to the drives model.
10.6.2. Lorenz
The Lorenz scheme for action selection performed fairly badly, although the time-
dependent internal variables did produce a notable 'goal-directedness' (that is, a ten¬
dency to concentrate on one system, or type ofbehaviour, for a length of time). Changes
to the basic model were required to create ceilings on some reservoir levels, to change
the relationship between consummatory actions and emptying of reservoirs, and to
stop increases in reservoir levels at night when the animal is sleeping. But even with
these changes the Lorenz ASM still performed fairly badly, in part because it proved
impossible to calibrate both the increases in reservoir levels over time, as well as the
decreases due to consummatory actions, so that the reservoir levels stayed in tunewith
the actual offsets from the homeostatic set-points. The reservoir levels for systems such
as 'get water' would, with the right parameter settings, rise and fall appropriately at
the beginning. However, the parameters could not be set so as tomaintain a correspon¬
dence over different parts of the animal's lifespan (it will find water more easily as it
learns the location of good water sources), and over awide range of different instances
of the SE (with different random distributions of water sources for instance).
With respect to the list of requirements in section 10.5, Lorenz's model has nothing
to promote persistence of consummatory actions, does not deal well with all types
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of sub-problem, and has a winner-take-all operation at the system level that means it
cannot cannot combine multiple preferences or choose compromise candidates. There
is also an assumption that stimuli are summed.
10.6.3. Maes
The ASM that fared worst at this particular test of action selection was Maes' spread¬
ing activation network. This may be partly due to the fact that it was specified more
precisely than any other mechanisms and so there was less room for favourable inter¬
pretations. But most of the shortcomings were due to several design faults, the main
one being the decision to propagate motivational inputs to appetitive alternatives by
way of consummatory alternatives. The problems caused by this decision become
apparent when it is shown to be impossible to choose division rules that produce bal¬
anced competition between all sorts of nodes in all circumstances. With respect to the
points in section 10.5, Maes' mechanism is good at producing interrupts when neces¬
sary and taking advantage of opportunities. However, it is not good at persistence
(because the activation of thewinning node is reset to zero and because there is nothing
in the mechanism to take account of switching costs), and it is not good at preferring
consummatory actions in one system over appetitive ones in another (partly due to
the exponentially-increasing positive feedback between unexecutable consummatory
nodes and executable appetitive nodes). While there is no system-level winner-take-all,
there is also no combination of preferences and thus no means of selecting compromise
candidates. Also, Maes'mechanism has binary-valued sensors of the environment and
presupposes summation of stimuli.
Maes' ASM does not (as claimed in [Maes, 91a]) work well for animal-like action selec¬
tion problems, with many competing goals/systems and many executable candidate
nodes which have to be chosen amongst at each timestep.
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10.6.4. Rosenblatt & Payton
The most basic and naive implementation of Rosenblatt & Payton's ideas, with sum¬
mation of inputs and with no means of preferring consummatory over appetitive
alternatives, fared rather badly at the test posed by the SE, but the final implementa¬
tion, with a more sophisticated rule for combination of stimuli and with temporal and
uncertainty penalties did best of all out of the four ASMs tested. It satisfies all of the re¬
quirements of section 10.5,with slight question marks only over the lack of tendency in
the mechanism to promote persistence and contiguous action sequences. These points
and several others are discussed in the next chapter, in which the extended Rosenblatt
& Payton model is analysed extensively and is proposed as the best sort of method of
calculating action selection.
10.7 Summary of Testing
Some of the important differences between how different mechanisms tackle the prob¬
lem of action selection were shown in table 8.1. Table 10.1 below is similar to table
8.1 , but instead compares each ASM that was tested against the list of requirements
of section 10.5. Some of the -y/'s and x's in the table are somewhat debatable, but the
table as a whole gives an indication of the differences between the mechanisms and the
inadequacies that were discovered in them. The hierarchical decision structure (HDS)
ASM in the results has not been introduced so far. It is an embodiment of the rigid
switching type of hierarchy favoured by Tinbergen and Baerends, and is described in
section 11.1.2, where it is contrasted with the type of hierarchy favoured by Rosenblatt
& Payton.
The performance results for all mechanisms in all versions of the SE are summarised
in table 10.2 and shown graphically in figure 10.3. The naive implementation of the
Rosenblatt & Payton ASM does not feature in either the table or the figure because
its performance (genetic fitness) was always zero. This was because there was no
tendency to prefer consummatory over appetitive options. It should be kept in mind
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Drives Lorenz HDS Maes NalVe R&P Extended R&P
All types of
sub-problem?
X X X X v x/
Persistence? ? x/ ? X ? ?
Activations oc
current offsets?








V ? x/ X X x/
Balanced
competition?
? ? x/ X V x/
Contiguous
action sequences?
? x/ ? x/ ? ?
Interrupts if
necessary?
v/ x/ V x/ x/ x/
Opportunism? V X x/ ? V x/
No system-level
winner-take-all?
X X X V V x/
Combination of
preferences?
X X X X V x/
Compromise
candidates?
X X X X x/ x/
Real-valued
sensors?




? X x/ X x/ x/
Table 10.1: A table showing which of the six mechanisms tested in the SE satisfy the
various criteria of section 10.5. '?'s signify that the answer is not very clear from the
specification of the mechanism or the testing results.
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Standard SE SEvl. SE v2. SE v3. Average
Drives
av. performance (x) 6.44 3.29 6.41 8.78 6.23
std. dev. (s) 6.42 3.89 6.55 8.17 6.26
num. tests (n) 1645 1721 1627 1607 total no. = 6600
std. dev. of x (sj) 0.16 0.09 0.16 0.20 0.15
Lorenz
av. performance (x) 2.39 1.40 2.48 4.58 2.71
std. dev. (s) 2.34 1.51 2.38 4.82 2.76
num. tests (n) 1654 1653 1625 1668 total no. = 6600
std. dev. of x (sx) 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.12 0.07
HDS
av. performance (x) 6.69 3.48 6.48 7.79 6.11
std. dev. (s) 6.24 3.77 6.39 7.43 5.96
num. tests (n) 1641 1679 1693 1587 total no. = 6600
std. dev. of x (ss) 0.15 0.09 0.16 0.19 0.15
Maes
av. performance (x) 0.16 0.22 0.18 0.43 0.25
std. dev. (s) 0.41 0.49 0.44 0.66 0.50
num. tests (n) 1692 1625 1672 1611 total no. = 6600
std. dev. of x (ss) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01
Extended R&P
av. performance (x) 8.09 3.61 8.16 13.38 8.31
std. dev. (s) 7.06 3.63 6.66 9.16 6.63
num. tests (n) 1649 1693 1653 1605 total no. = 6600
std. dev. of x (sj) 0.17 0.09 0.16 0.23 0.16
Table 10.2: The average genetic fitnesses for the final implementations of the five ASMs
tested in the four versions of the SE described in section 9.1.1. For each ASM, each
test in a version of the SE consists of n runs, which have a mean performance of x and
a standard deviation of s. The expected standard deviation of x (i.e. %) is equal to
(s/y/n).
that there are several rather arbitrary components to the testing process which gives
rise to the exact performance measures. Therefore the existence of a small difference
between the performance of two ASMs is a rather indefinite indicator that one is better
than the other. This is in contrast to the hard and fast results concerning gross deficits














Figure 10.3: A graph showing the performance measurements (genetic fitnesses) of
the final implementations of the ASMs that were tested in the SE. Std stands for the
normal SE, I stands for the first altered version of the SE, II stands for the second
altered version of the SE and III stands for third altered version of the SE.
222
Chapter 11
How Best to Compute Action
Selection
In chapter 9 several ASMs were tested and the extended Rosenblatt & Payton ASM
was seen to perform better than the others. This ASM is a development of Rosenblatt
& Payton's basic ideas, to which temporal and uncertainty penalties were added by
the author, and for which a more specific rule for combination of preferences was
produced. This ASM (with the extensions) has no serious deficits and satisfies all of
the criteria of section 10.5 (albeit with a couple of question marks over persistence
and contiguous action sequences). In this chapter the extended Rosenblatt & Payton
ASM is proposed as a sensible approach to action selection, and is analysed in more
detail. The proposals are rather preliminary; only a broad outline of the suggested
optimal sort of mechanism is given here, together with some suggestions for future
investigation. The suggestions are intended as a well-founded platform for further
development, rather than the last word in how action selection should be computed.
However, each of the different design decisions that have been made for this extended
Rosenblatt & Payton mechanism are considered and argued for at length.
The structure of this chapter is as follows: (i) the theory and design decisions behind
the suggested optimal ASM are examined in detail, (ii) some examples of the operation
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of this type of ASM are given, and (iii) some suggestions are given as to how these
preliminary ideas may be extended and improved upon. Appendix A also contains
diagrams showing the implementation of each system of this ASM for the problem
posed by the SE.
11.1 Theory Behind the New Mechanism
This section now looks at some of the more important theoretical design decisions that
have been made for the extended Rosenblatt & Payton mechanism. Some of these
points have been covered to some extent already, and are now covered again but in
greater depth.
11.1.1 Hierarchy or No Hierarchy?
The term hierarchy was defined in section 7.3. There are three reasons to prefer a
hierarchical over a non-hierarchical mechanism:
1. The action selection problem for real animals may well be intrinsically hierar¬
chical (as the diagrams of Baerends suggest in figures 8.8 and 8.9), and it would
seem likely that the best solutions to the problem should reflect this.
2. Non-hierarchical mechanisms do not allow combination of preferences from
higher-level layers to lower-level ones.
3. All of the non-hierarchical mechanisms tested here (drives, Lorenz, and Maes)
performed less well in the SE than the free flow hierarchy of the extended Rosen¬
blatt & Payton mechanism.
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11.1.2 Hierarchical Decision Structure or Free-Flow Hierarchy?
If it is accepted that a hierarchical mechanism is preferable, then what sort of hierarchy
should it be? This section distinguishes between two types of hierarchy — the hier¬
archical decision structure and the free-flow hierarchy— and goes on to explain why the
latter is more desirable, even though most traditional hierarchies belong to the former
category.
Hierarchical Decision Structures
The defining characteristic of hierarchical decision structures is that there is a winner-
take-all operation at every level, from the system level down. A decision is made at
each level (by whatever process) as to which system or sub-system or action is most
appropriate, and only that particular node is allowed to remain active and to pass
activation down the hierarchy. Another name for this sort of mechanism is a rigid
switching mechanism.
Two examples of this sort of hierarchy are from Tinbergen and Baerends (see sections
8.2 and 8.4). In Tinbergen's model there is some unspecified form of intra-layer in¬
hibition so that "centres of the same level mutually suppress each other's activities".
In Baerends' models (figures 8.8 and 8.9) system-level nodes inhibit each other so that
only one survives and nodes at lower levels control the activity they send out so that
only one of their subordinates receives activation.
Free-Flow Hierarchies
A free-flow hierarchy (such as Rosenblatt & Payton's ASM) does not implement a
switching process at every level, but rather places no restrictions on the flow of infor¬
mation or activation through the hierarchy. An exception to this is at the level of the
behavioural final common path, where a winner-take-all process must occur to decide
which of the actions will be executed.
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An analogy can be made between the two hierarchical schemas for action selection
considered here and the decision-making of a group of ministers or government of¬
ficials. Imagine that each official is responsible for a particular aspect of policy, such
as education, foreign affairs, unemployment or the economy. Imagine further that the
group are meeting to decide upon the future political strategy of their nation, and that
each official is constrained to evaluate the various strategy options from the standpoint
of their individual department only. The prime minister or president presides over
the council and makes the ultimate decision as to which of the alternative options gets
chosen.
Decision-making with a hierarchical decision structure is equivalent to the prime min¬
ister or president listening to each of the various officials in turn and then selecting
the one department for which the decision is most crucial. The future policy is then
chosen to be that which is most beneficial to the particular department.
By contrast, decision-making with a free-flow hierarchy is analogous to the prime
minister or president listening to each official outline the pros and cons of each action
for their particular aspect of government, and then coming to a decision which takes
into account the views of all officials simultaneously. So, for instance, the official in
charge of unemployment might express a strong disapproval of option A because of
the number of people who would be put out ofwork, but be ambivalent as to which of
the other options is chosen. The official for foreign affairs could mildly favour option
B because it would ease diplomatic relations with another country, but express no
preference or dislike for other options. And the various optionsmight each be favoured
to differing degrees by the official concerned with the economy, in accordance with the
likely effects on the national finances. The preferences of each official for each policy
option can be combined to calculate which option is most beneficial when all aspects
are taken into consideration.
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Reasons for Preferring Free-Flow Hierarchies
Free-flow hierarchies are preferable for action selection because they enable combina¬
tion of preferences and compromise candidates. For instance, in figure 10.1, with a
free-flow hierarchy the animal can choose the action 'move west' to approach the food
and move away from the hazard, whereas with a hierarchical decision structure the
animal will choose the action 'move south'. Also, there is no loss of information in a
free-flow hierarchy since there are no restrictions as to how many nodes can remain
active.
In addition to these obvious differences, Maes [91a] and others have criticised tradi¬
tional hierarchical-type mechanisms for their lack of robustness and the top-down,
preprogrammed sort of control that they exert. In a hierarchical decision structure
the initial decision as to which system to choose is vitally important. If this decision
is made incorrectly then the whole performance can collapse. This leads to a lack of
robustness. A free-flow hierarchy does not make any decisions until the lowest level
and so there is amuchmore distributed type of processing involved, with a consequent
higher degree of robustness.
Hierarchical decision structures have also been criticised because of the 'sensory bottle¬
neck' that occurs. In order to make correct initial decisions in a hierarchical decision
structure, the top level has to receive and process all, ormost of the sensory information
relevant to the lower layers, leading to the sensory bottleneck (see figure 11.1).
For any system of an action selection mechanism there are several relevant internal,
indeterminate and external stimuli. Some of these stimuli may be relevant to a whole
system or sub-system (e.g. 'perception of partially built nest' to the nest building
system), whereas others will be relevant to only one specific action (e.g. 'perception
of egg outside nest' to egg retrieval). The desirability of, or tendency for, carrying out
any specific action will usually depend on several stimuli, some of which (e.g. external
stimuli) are relevant only to that action, and some ofwhich (e.g. internal, motivational
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stimuli) have more widespread relevance, and are relevant to many other actions as
well [e.g. Hinde, 1953]. In a hierarchical decision structure the desirability of each
system needs to be calculated, so that the systems can be properly selected between.
This desirability ('drive strength') for each system will be equal to the maximum
of the desirabilities of each of the actions of the system, and should be calculated
using 'releasing stimuli' relevant to the actions in that system (such as the presence of
water for the 'get water' system) as well as motivational stimuli (e.g. water deficit).
This issue was discussed in section 9.3.1, where it was noted that in order to produce
opportunism, persistence and contiguous action sequences, the drive strengths needed
to be calculated as a function of both cue and motivational stimuli. As an example,
the 'get food' drive strength needed to be a function of both the internal food deficit
and the external food stimulus (which will be strongest if there is food in the animal's
square, weaker if there is food that is perceived or remembered, and zero otherwise).
The desirability of choosing a particular system, sub-system, or action is a function
of both the need for that sort of behaviour, and the appropriateness of that sort of
behaviour in the current situation (for instance, the 'get water' system is less useful
if there is no water in the animal's square, no water perceived, and only a very weak
memory of a water source). Therefore, the system-level nodes must each receive all,
or at least most, of the relevant stimuli for all of the actions in their system, which
produces the sensory bottleneck mentioned above. Since there is no selection between
higher-level nodes in a free-flow hierarchy, it does not matter that the system or sub¬
system node activations are not exactly proportional to the desirabilities of selecting
that system or sub-system, as long as the activations of the action nodes are correctly
calculated.
It is apparent from the arguments above that there are several computational reasons
for preferring free-flow hierarchies. Two other types of supporting argument are now
given.
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Figure 11.1: 'Sensory bottleneck'— different stimuli are relevant to different subsets of
the whole system. In a free-flow hierarchy, these stimuli can impinge on the relevant
nodes (as shown in (a)). In a hierarchical decision structure, higher-level nodes need
information about the stimuli to nodes that they are superior to, in order for the higher-
level nodes to be selected between appropriately (as shown in (b)).
Animal Behaviour Observations Supporting Free-Flow Hierarchies
Evidence from animal behaviour is now presented in support of the claim that the
degree of preference for respective alternatives is maintained throughout each system,
rather than the winning system shutting down all the others. These three examples
come from pages 243-245 of [Lorenz, 81].
1: The simultaneous firing of antagonistic muscles due to simultaneous excitation of
conflicting systems:
Additive superposition is found even in cases inwhich the two independent
motivations activate antagonistic muscles. ... A conflict between motiva¬
tions in Anatidae, one demanding a forward extension of the neck, the other
a retraction, which can occur in a goose wanting to eat grain offered in a
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human hand and not quite daring to do so, produces a violent trembling of
the neck. ... The "trembling neck" of the goose probably is effected by con¬
flicting innervation of the antagonistic muscles, but we cannot be certain
about this.
2 : The simultaneous operation of opposing sets of fins due to the strong activation of
conflicting systems:
In disputed territory, certain cichlids (Etroplus maculatus) position them¬
selves opposite another, threatening across the border separating their ter¬
ritories. As in every threat, aggressive motivation is contending with that
for escape. Whenever one of the adversaries moves a short distance for¬
ward into enemy territory, it appears as if he were swimming into a current,
the speed of which rapidly increases as one proceeds upstream. This ef¬
fect is produced by the action of the pectoral fins, which are sculling in
reverse, and doing so more and more intensely the farther the fish moves
into the other's territory. The tail fin is under the control of aggressivity and
the pectorals under that of escape, and the observer cannot help feeling -
ridiculously - that the pectorals are more afraid than the tail, because they
are nearer to the enemy.
3 : The facial expressions of a dog can simultaneously display the intensity of two
separate, conflictingmotivations, fear and aggression (figure 11.2).
These three examples all serve to illustrate the point that the activation levels of different
nodes in a hierarchy are likely to be maintained, as in a free-flow hierarchy, rather than
only one at each level surviving, as in the winner-take-all operation of a Tinbergen-like
hierarchical decision structure. As well as the three examples stated above, Lorenz







Figure 11.2: Facial expressions of a dog showing differing degrees of fear and aggres¬
sion. Readiness to flee increases from top to bottom, aggression increases from left to
right. Taken from [Lorenz, 81].
In nature, behaviour activated by a single motivation is found at least as
rarely as hybrids differing in only one gene. A higher animal in its natural
habitat must always be ready to undertake a great number of different and
- as often as not - mutually exclusive actions, and what it finally does is
almost always a compromise made among several necessities.
SE Test Results Supporting Free-Flow Hierarchies
In order to make a stronger test of the hypothesis that free flow hierarchies are better
for action selection than hierarchical decision structures, a hierarchical decision struc¬
ture was implemented and tested in the SE so that the performance results could be
compared with those for the extended Rosenblatt & Payton ASM (section 9.3.4). The
hierarchical decision structure (HOS) whichwas used was not a direct implementation
of either Tinbergen's or Baerends' ideas, both of which are somewhat imprecise and
unclear, but instead was an implementation of the generic concept.
The HDS that was tested was not obtained using the same motivational inputs as
the extended Rosenblatt & Payton ASM, because this had been optimised to take
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account of combinations of preferences. Instead, the system-level node activations
were calculated as in the drives model, which had already been proven to work well
for selection between systems. The connections to lower-level nodes (all nodes except
system-level nodes) were the same as in the extended Rosenblatt & Payton ASM.
The same nodes, connections and weights were retained, including the temporal and
uncertainty penalties. In order to make sure that preferences were not combined from
sub-system nodes in the same system onto action nodes, the combination rule for each
node was changed from
A_ = ^max,(^) + aEri(^)j + ^min,(P,.-) + (3 ^(Pr)
to
Aj = maXi(P^)
where Pf and Pf are the positive and negative preferences from node i for node j, N+
and are the numbers of such preferences for node j, and a and (3 are constants. That
is to say, the activation of each node was calculated as the maximum of the positive
inputs to each node (or the maximum ofmultiplied pairs where there were associated
pairs of external and motivational stimuli). Neither combination of preferences, nor
negative preferences, were allowed. So, for instance, the activation of the 'move fast
north' node was calculated as
Aj = max ( ('run away from pi square' x 'opp pi [north]') +
('leave current square because ofpi' x 'all directions [north]') +
('run away from p2 square' x 'opp p2 [north]') +
('leave current square because ofp2' x 'all directions [north]') )
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The results of testing the HDS in the four different versions of the SE then the average
results (x) were 6.69, 3.48, 6.48 and 7.79, with an average over the four of 6.11. The
standard deviations (5) of the individual measurements, in the tests in each of the
four versions of the SE, were 6.24, 3.77, 6.39 and 7.43; and for the average result over
all four versions was 5.96. The expected standard deviations of the sample averages
(ss = (s/y/n.)) were 0.15, 0.09, 0.16 and 0.19; and for the average result over all four
versions was 0.15.
which is greater than 3.291.
The issue of what sort of hierarchy to choose has been discussed at length, and several
reasons for preferring free-flow hierarchies have been explained. Computational ar¬
guments, ethological arguments and the results of tests in the SE all support this same
conclusion.
11.1.3 How to Combine Preferences
It was mentioned in sections 9.3.4 that simple summation of preferences for a node, i.e.
where
is not optimal in most cases. The reasons for this are now explained and consideration
is given as to how preferences should be combined.
The concept of combination of preferences relies on the idea that the relative values
of node activations bear some relationship to the future expected genetic fitness, or
'utility', of those nodes. So, for instance, the activation level of the 'avoid predatorls'

















Figure 11.3: A graph comparing the performance measurements (genetic fitnesses) of
a hierarchical decision structure (HDS) ASM and a free flow hierarchy ASM (i.e. the
extended Rosenblatt & Payton (E. R&P) ASM). Std stands for the normal SE, I stands
for the first altered version of the SE, II stands for the second altered version of the SE
and III stands for third altered version of the SE.
system-level node is proportional to the increase, or lack of decrease, in future expected
genetic fitness that can be obtained by trying to avoid predatorls (by whatever means).
As another example, the activation of the 'look around' action node is proportional to
the increase, or lack of decrease, in future expected genetic fitness that can be obtained
by performing the action LOOKLAROUND.
Assuming that system-level nodes have appropriate activation levels then lower-level
nodeswill also have appropriate activation levels as long as activation is passed down
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to them correctly and as long as the different inputs to the nodes are combined correctly.
But if preferences are combined incorrectly then the lower-level activations will no
longer be in proportion to the utility of the nodes and the whole mechanism will then
start to produce sub-optimal action selections.
There are two sorts of situation in which strict summation is the wrong way to combine
preferences, and these explain why the performance of the first, naive implementation
of Rosenblatt & Payton ASM was so poor (section 9.3.4).
1. Recombining Preferences Originating from the Same System
Imagine the case in figure 11.4. Here the action node 'move west' is receiving
preferences from 'approach perceived food', 'approach remembered food' and
indirectly from 'explore for food', but these three inputs are all originally triggered
by the same motivational stimulus. The utility of proceeding in a particular
direction in order to approach perceived food, approach remembered food and
explore simultaneously is not equal to the sum of the utilities of each individually.
If the animal encounters the perceived food first then it will very possibly become
satiated and should not continue to approach the remembered food or explore
afterwards.
The problem is somewhat similar to that experienced in Maes' network (figure
9.9), in which satisfactory division rules for inputs to appetitive nodes cannot
be devised because the inputs can arise from several goals or from one. In a
free-flow hierarchy there is no problem with feeding motivational information
from the system-level node to consummatory and appetitive nodes at the next
lowest level, but there is a problem when passing preferences further down the
hierarchy, as shown in figure 11.5. The dilemma this time is that it is not possible
to know whether the preferences being combined come from the same system or
different systems. The problems in this case are somewhat less severe, because
fairly competent action selection can still take place with limited combination of
preferences orwith none at all, whereas the proper transfer of goal- ormotivation-
type information is critical.
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Move Actions
Figure 11.4: Preferences from the same system onto the same action node.
MOVEJWEST receives excitation from 'approach perceived food', 'approach remem¬
bered food' and 'explore for food'. An explanation of the meaning of some of the
symbols in the diagram can be found in figure 9.11.
2. Combining Preferences from Appetitive Nodes
Consider the situation in figure 11.6. Here the action 'move north-east' receives
preferences from the nodes 'approach receptive mate', 'approach perceived wa¬
ter' and 'approach shade'. The three preferences all originate from different
systems in this case, but the utility is still not equal to the sum of the preferences
from the three nodes. An appetitive alternative has utility because it brings about
a situation in which a consummatory action can be performed. But because of the
constant possibility of interruption of any appetitive/consummatory sequence
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(a) (b)
Figure 11.5: The dilemma when combining preferences: in (a) the preferences come
from the same system, in (b) they come from different systems.
(by the need to avoid predators or some other urgent demand) the utility of per¬
forming three appetitive actions simultaneously is much less than the sum of the
utilities of performing them each individually. This is because the probability of
performing the joint appetitive action and then eventually continuing to perform
consummatory actions for all three systems is fairly remote. For instance, by the
time the animal has approached, courted and copulated with the mate, and has
then approached and drunk the water (assuming it gets to do so) then the proba¬
bility of its still being uninterrupted and able to approach the shade is fairly low.
In any case, its body temperature may have improved of its own accord by then,
making it no longer necessary to approach shade. In general, the longer the likely
gap between an appetitive and consummatory action, the less likely that the one
will lead to the other (because of the dynamic, rather unstable and unpredictable
nature of the environment), and so the lower the expected value of performing
the appetitive action. For this reason, an action which receives preferences from
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Figure 11.6: Preferences from appetitive nodes in different systems to the same action
node. MOVE_NORTH_EAST receives preferences from 'approach perceived water',
'approach perceived mate' and 'approach perceived shade'. An explanation of the
meaning of some of the symbols in the diagram can be found in figure 9.11.
several appetitive nodes should have a utility which is significantly less than the
sum of all the individual preferences for it.
For these two reasons a simple summation of preferences is not adequate. For the
extended Rosenblatt & Payton ASM a tradeoffwas implemented which drew a balance
between a simple sum of the inputs and the use of the maximum-valued input, i.e:
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where and P,J are the positive and negative preferences from node i for node j,
N+ and N~ are the numbers of such preferences for node j, and a and 0 are constants.
With values of a = and 0 = (jVli)3 this produced reasonable results, as described
in section 9.3.4. It may prove to be possible to develop a more principled scheme for
dealing with the two difficulties just enumerated, but this was not attempted in this
work.
11.1.4 Selecting Between Consummatory and Appetitive Alternatives
In the basic and naive Rosenblatt & Payton hierarchy there was no differential weight¬
ing towards consummatory over appetitive alternatives. Thus, if both 'approach re¬
membered water' and 'eat food' are relevant to the current situation (the animal can
remember water and there is food in its square), then the animal is equally likely to
choose either alternative (assuming equal-valued stimuli) despite the fact that the lat¬
ter requires lower expenditure of time to achieve that reward, and also gives a more
immediate, and therefore more definite, reward. When the Rosenblatt & Payton ASM,
complete with the combination of preferences rule just described, but with no differ¬
entialweightings, was tested in the SE then the resulting genetic fitness was invariably
zero because the animal hardly ever chose consummatory actions such as MATE over
appetitive actions such as the MOVE ones.
There needs to be a tendency for consummatory over appetitive options, and also for
more immediately rewarding over less immediately rewarding appetitive options (e.g.
for 'approach perceived food' over 'explore for food'). As mentioned in section 10.5,
there are two main concerns that need to be taken into account when deciding how to
build in the tendency towards actions that maximise the expected benefit per unit of
time expended:
239
Figure 11.7: Arbitration between alternatives in the same system using intra-layer
inhibitory connections to less immediate alternatives. If 'C' is active it inhibits all other
nodes in its system, if 'Al' is active it inhibits 'A2' and 'A3', and so on.
1. if any two alternatives in the same system are both applicable to the current
situation then the consummatory option, or the appetitive one 'closest' to it, must
tend to dominate over less immediately and less certainly rewarding options.
2. if any two alternatives in two different systems are competing then, other things
being equal, the one closest to the consummatory alternative in its own system
should be chosen.
One solution to the proper production of sequences is that shown in figure 11.7, in
which, if it is applicable to the current situation, any node suppresses all of those nodes
that are further from the consummatory one. This scheme is not used here because,
although it satisfies (1) above, it does not satisfy (2) (see figure 11.8).
The scheme used for the extended Rosenblatt & Payton ASM, as explained in section
9.3.4, is a development of Sutton & Barto's idea of temporal discount factors (see section
8.8.5). It is a scheme of differential inhibition of consummatory and appetitive nodes













Figure 11.8: Intra-layer inhibitory connections do not produce balanced competition
between alternatives in different systems. 'C' in system 2 is not preferred to 'A2' in
system 1.
real benefit being obtained. Figure 11.9 shows the scheme, and that it does indeed
provide a solution to both (1) and (2) above.
It should be noted that the scheme in figure 11.9 adheres to the same general policy
of free flow of information as the basic Rosenblatt & Payton hierarchy. Appetitive
options are penalised because they are less certain to lead to a benefit to the animal
(the sequence may be interrupted by more urgent needs such as the need to avoid
predators), and also because they require the animal to use more of its time in order
to gain the benefit. Therefore appetitive options in general are less beneficial to the
future expected genetic fitness than consummatory actions; they are less 'worthwhile'.
By biasing against appetitive nodes, rather than shutting them down, there is still
flexibility and the opportunity to express preferences from appetitive nodes, albeit
with a weaker influence. On occasion a consummatory actionwill not be selected even
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inapplicable inapplicable applicable inapplicable
applicable inapplicable applicable inapplicable
Figure 11.9: Inhibition from penalty nodes enables balanced competition between
alternatives in the same system and alternatives in separate systems. All other things
being equal, 'C' in system 2 would be preferred to both 'A2' in system 2 and 'A2' in
system 1.
if it is applicable to the current situation. For instance, the animal may approach a
large water source which is nearby to a large food source rather than drink from the
small water source which it is at.
11.2 Examples
This section now takes a few of the systems in the ASM and demonstrates how acti¬
vation might flow into them from the different types of stimuli (internal, external and
indeterminate), and then how activation might be passed down through the nodes in
the hierarchy to accumulate in the action-level nodes. The first three examples show
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the passages of activation in three individual systems and the fourth example shows
the passage of activation through three systems simultaneously and how they interact.
'stay close to cover' -
Figure 11.10 shows an example of how activation in this system can be propagated
through the hierarchy in order to pass the right amounts ofexcitation to the appropriate
action nodes. Note how simple summation of inputs would cause too much activation
to be passed to the 'move east' and 'move south' nodes.
'avoid predatorls' -
Figure 11.11 shows activation passing through the 'avoid predatorls' system. This
system is urgent, and so passes large activations to the action nodes when the relevant
stimuli are present.
'get food' -
Figure 11.12 shows activation passing through the 'get food' system. The temporal
and uncertainty penalties restrict the influence of the appetitive nodes, but allow them
to beat consummatory nodes if necessary. In this example, the perception of a large-
valued food source to the west has produced a greater activation in MOVE_WEST
than the perception of a small-valued cereal food source in the animal's square has in
EAT_CEREAL_FOOD.
'reproduce', 'sleep in den' and 'keep clean' -
To give some idea of the dynamics of the whole mechanism working together, three
systems are shown simultaneously in figure 11.13. The system 'keep clean' is able
to cause the action CLEAN to be selected because there are no strong stimuli for the
'reproduce' system and no great need for the 'sleep in den' system.
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Figure 11.10: An example of the passage of activation through the 'stay close to cover'
system. The possible effects of other systems on the action node activations are not
considered. An explanation of themeaning of some of the symbols in the diagram can
be found in figure 9.11.
11.3 Discussion
The theory and the most important design decisions behind the extended Rosenblatt
& Payton ASM have been explained at length here. The mechanism is fairly simple:
a free-flow hierarchy with a more complicated rule for combination of preferences
and with inhibitory connections to enable temporal and uncertainty penalties. This
framework is fairly basic but is theoreticallywell-founded and is still able to outperform
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Figure 11.11: An example of the passage of activation through the 'avoid predatorls'
system. The possible effects of other systems on the action node activations are not
considered. An explanation of themeaning of some of the symbols in the diagram can
be found in figure 9.11.
This mechanism has been derived in part from ideas from both robotics and ethology.
Its design though has been motivated more by the desire to optimise computational
performance than the need to account for animal behaviour phenomena. There is
no discussion here as to whether phenomena such as displacement activity can be
observed in the behaviour produced by the extended Rosenblatt & Payton ASM in the
SE. Similarly, the design of the novel ASM has not been influenced by the desire to
produce a biologically realistic model, with brain-like neurons and synapses.
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Figure 11.12: An example of the passage of activation through the 'get food' system.
The possible effects of other systems on the action node activations are not considered.
An explanation of the meaning of some of the symbols in the diagram can be found in
figure 9.11.
There are no major inadequacies in the performance of this ASM and it satisfies all
of the criteria of section 10.5, with a couple of partial exceptions as explained below.
However, this is only a preliminary, unfinished study and there are several aspects of
the extended Rosenblatt & Payton model which are worthy of further investigation:
1. persistence - as noted in section 10.6.4, this ASM could perhaps benefit from
some increased tendency towards persistence and contiguous action sequences.
The fact that distance inversely affects the size of a stimulus tends to enforce
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Figure 11.13: An example of the passage of activation through the 'reproduce', 'sleep in
den' and 'keep clean' systems. The possible effects of other systems on the action node
activations are not considered. An explanation of the meaning of some of the symbols
in the diagram can be found in figure 9.11. The calculation of the activation of the
node 'leave this square' is unusual: the input from 'keep clean' is added to the penalty
inputs before beingmultiplied by the input from 'den in square'. The connections from
the five multi-directional external stimuli to the MOVE actions have been omitted to
avoid cluttering up the diagram.
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persistence to some extent, in that a resource (e.g. food, water, amate) which is at
hand will have a larger stimulus value than one which is further away (assuming
that the resources have equal intrinsic values). Beyond the indirect influence
of stimulus values which decrease with distance though, there is nothing in the
ASM to promote persistence. It may prove to be the case that changing the
mechanism somehow to increase persistence will give rise to better performance.
2. contiguous action sequences - this is a similar issue to persistence. Again, the
decreasing value of stimuli with distance tends to promote contiguous action
sequences, at least in those appetitive-consummatory sequences which involve
exploring and approaching before the consummatory act. The mechanism may
benefit from explicit additions to promote the continuation of sequences once
started.
3. combination of preferences - the present method of combining preferences is
something of a fudge. Further study may lead to more principled ways of
combining preferences, perhaps with functions that are tailored to the individual
nodes rather than general-purpose rules.
4. temporal and uncertainty penalties - the values of these are at present somewhat
arbitrary. It may be possible, with further study, to develop a more principled
way of determining how large these penalties should be in each case.
In addition to these four points, there are probably other features that can be added
to the ASM to improve its performance. The list of criteria in section 10.5 is almost
certainly incomplete. Better understanding of the computational nature of the action
selection problem will probably lead to further ways of improving the ASM proposed
here.
One alternative to both hierarchical decision structures and free-flow hierarchies is
Halperin's concept of partial competition (see section 8.7), in which there is a weak
competitive inhibition between nodes at the same level, rather than a winner-take-all
248
inhibitory competition or no inhibition at all. Halperin's mechanism has not been tested
here, but it is possible that there would be problems with it due to loss or distortion of
information, and the arguments about the sensory bottleneck would apply in this case
as well.
When discussing the performance and validity of her own mechanism [Maes, 91a],
Maes talked about the need for amechanism to be distributed and robust and to be both
reactive and "motivation-oriented". The extended Rosenblatt & Payton mechanism
proposed in this section is also distributed and robust. There are no overridingly
crucial components in the extended Rosenblatt & Payton ASM and the only connections
between systems are those to shared action and sub-system nodes. There will need
to be some sort of machinery to implement the winner-take-all process between the
different actions, but this is required of any sort of mechanism. Likewise, there are
no global controlling structures and each system is to a large extent independent. The
mechanism is also reactive: it can respond immediately and flexibly to changes in the
environment. It does not follow any plans formulated in the past, and it takes input
from stimuli describing only the current state of the internal and external environment.
At the same time it is goal-driven: large disturbances in internal variables or other
urgent situations will tend to lead to what appears from the outside to be purposive
behaviour. The behaviour will tend to be organised so as to reduce the offset of a
homeostatic variable or to remedy the urgent situation.
Even ifany of the basic aspects of thisASM prove to be abad idea, which seems unlikely,
there are still things that can be learned from the way in which the mechanism was
derived. The theoretical arguments presented here to motivate the design of the ASM
are useful in their own right. It is also hoped that the overall methodology used here
will prove instructive to others wanting to postulate different ASMs. The process
of providing a solid theoretical basis for the mechanism, specifying the mechanism
unambiguously, implementing and testing it in some sort of rigorous and complex
simulation, and taking account of any shortcomings that are exposed therein is a
sensible way of producing a viable and theoretically interesting mechanism.
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Dawkins [1976] puts forwards hierarchies as a "candidate principle for ethology". He
suggests that hierarchies are to be preferred because they are "big enough for the
job" and because they provide "a way of making complexity manageable" [Dawkins,
76, pp 48], The arguments put forward here for preferring free-flow hierarchies of a
particular sort are in general more specific than those used by Dawkins, but it is also
worth noting that the extended Rosenblatt & Payton-type hierarchy is the only type
of structural organisation considered here that seems able to deal sensibly with all of
the many facets of the complex problem of action selection. It is flexible enough to be
able to handle internal, indeterminate and external stimuli, as well as consummatory
and appetitive alternatives within a system and alternatives that differ in other ways.
It is also able to produce appropriate behaviour for homeostatic and non-homeostatic
systems, urgent and non-urgent systems, and prescriptive and proscriptive systems.
It allows for arbitrary combination of stimuli and combination of preferences. The
problem of action selection is a complex and intricate one, but something along the




Conclusions to Part II
This second part of the thesis has covered the use of the simulated environment for
testing and evaluating action selection mechanisms. Several action selection mecha¬
nisms were tested, and predicted and unpredicted difficulties were identified. Theories
were presented to explain why these shortcomings in performance occurred and also
to explain more subtle differences in performance between the tested action selection
mechanisms. In section 10.5 a list was drawn up, the elements of which can be thought
of in two ways; they can be thought of as both shortcomings in existing action selection
mechanisms and as essential criteria to be taken into account in the design of future
action selection mechanisms. Section 10.6 briefly enumerates the deficiencies thatwere
uncovered while testing the different mechanisms (drives, Lorenz, Maes, and Rosen¬
blatt & Payton) in the simulated environment. In chapter 11, a particular approach to
action selection, that of Rosenblatt & Payton [1989], with various extensions by the au¬
thor, was analysed more fully, and was suggested as the best approach for computing
action selection.
One reason why there are so many computational inadequacies with the different
mechanisms is that there has in the past been a lack ofmeans of testing or validation for
models of action selection / behavioural choice. Models have been proposed to some
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extent in a vacuum,with the onlymeans ofproving or falsifying them lying in 'thought
experiments'. Since people have a limited capacity to conceptualise the interactions
between complex systems (in this case between a complex simulated environment
and a complex action selection mechanism), many faults with mechanisms have gone
undetected. To give two instances from this thesis: the difficulties with division
rules in Maes' spreading activation network and the problems with straightforward
combination (simple summation) of stimuli in the Rosenblatt & Payton mechanism
were unsuspected beforehand andwere only detected through the use of the simulated
environment.
As well as providing some insights into the inadequacies of different schemes for
selecting actions, the work in this second half of the thesis has also contributed to an
understanding of the computational nature of the problem of action selection. Some of
the contributionswere: (i) understandinghow the abstract need tomaximise the future
expected genetic fitness can be translated into more concrete and immediate criteria
(section 9.2), (ii) understanding that the different sub-problems (such as avoiding
hazards, getting food, not getting lost, reproduction) differ in many ways, and what
some of these differences are (section 7.2), (iii) understanding the need for positive
and negative preferences to be combined, and the difficulties involved in doing this
(sections 11.1.2 and 11.1.3), and (iv) understanding that different alternatives (e.g.
consummatory and appetitive), in the same system and in different systems, need to
be arbitrated between in a balanced way (see sections 9.3.3 and 11.1.4).
Understanding the problem is a large part of finding the answer and due consideration
has been given here to the exact nature of the problem of action selection for animals.
12.1 FurtherWork
Some suggestions for further work follow:
252
1. More action selection mechanisms (e.g. Halperin's mechanism as described in
section 8.7) should be implemented and tested in the simulated environment
described here.
2. The mechanism described in chapter 11 could be used for decision-making in
other areas inwhich decisions have to be made while taking into accountmultiple
goals of varying importance. Only the application to action selection for animals
has been discussed here.
3. The suggested method for computing action selection presented here has only
been tested in this simulated environment. It would be interesting to see how it
performs in other simulated environments and in controlling the behaviour of a
robot with real sensor input and real motor effectors.
4. In addition to trying to produce optimal action selection mechanisms, the simu¬
lated environment could be used to try and investigate the utility or 'purpose' of




The two parts to the thesis have included four important contributions to the study of
action selection:
1. explanation and description of a complex and fairly realistic simulated environ¬
ment which models the problem of action selection or behavioural choice facing
animals in the wild.
2. evaluation and analysis of several different action selection mechanisms using
this simulated environment, and the discovery of inadequacies in the mecha¬
nisms.
3. enumeration and explanation of fourteen theoretical requirements needing to be
incorporated into a capable action selection mechanism.
4. explanation and analysis of the ideas behind a mechanism which, it is suggested,
provides a means for computing action selection in an optimal or near-optimal
manner.
The initial idea of using a simulated environment has been shown to be successful
by the results obtained. In particular, some of the problems with Maes' mechanism
and the drawback to simple combination of preferences in Rosenblatt & Payton's
mechanism are not at all obvious andwould not have been detected without the explicit
implementation and testing made possible by the use of the simulated environment.
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The process of implementation and subsequent observation of performance, even in an
imperfect and to some extents simplified simulated environment, is invaluable because
it brings to the fore any ambiguities in the specification and any gross deficits in the
performance of the mechanism which might not be predictable from introspection
alone. Part of the reason for the quite significant errors found in some mechanisms
is that no rigorous and realistically complex simulated environment, or any other
comparable means of evaluation, has been available to test models or mechanisms in
the past. The simulated environment described here has been shown to be a valid and
useful investigatory and exploratory tool.
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Appendix A:
Details of the Implementation of the
Extended Rosenblatt & Payton
Mechanism
This appendix describes the extended Rosenblatt & Payton mechanism in detail, as
it was implemented to tackle the action selection problem embodied in the SE. The
stimuli, nodes and connections of every system of the ASM are shown in a set of
diagrams (figures A.l - A.15), one for each system.
Shaded ellipses in the diagrams denote stimuli, some of which are multi-directional
(i.e. have a component for each compass direction). Shaded rectangles denote nodes.
Every connection has a strength or weight of 1.0 unless otherwise indicated.
Some symbols that are used in the figures are explained in figure 9.11. Strict summation
of the inputs to a node is indicated by a solid rectangle, and strict multiplication by a
solid triangular shape. For nodes which receive more than one input, but which have
no rectangle or triangle, then the activation is in most cases calculated according to the
rule described in section 11.1.3. The combination rules for these nodes are all given at
the end of this appendix.
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Figure A.l: Diagram showing implementation of 'keep clean' system. For further
explanation see text and figure 9.11.
For all stimuli with names like 'DP' or 'Edges' then the name implies perception of the
named type of feature. 'P' stands for perceived ('P. Food' is perceived food) and 'R'
stands for remembered.
Notes
1. keep clean: the animal is not allowed to clean/preen/groom itself when it is in
its den.
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Figure A.2: Diagram showing implementation of 'get food' system. For further expla¬
nation see text and figure 9.11.
2. get food: the animal is not allowed to perform the action POUNCE while in its
den. Various strenuous actions which will increase the animal's food deficit are
inhibited to a small degree.
3. get water: Various strenuous actions which will increase the animal's water
deficit are inhibited to a small degree.
4. keep cool: the two inputs to the system-level node are as follows: (i) intJemp jplus
is a measure of how much the animal's actual body temperature is too high
(i.e. the positive offset, if there is one, from the homeostatic set-point), and (ii)
ext-temp-plus is a measure of how much the animal's body temperature would
be too high if it were performing a very strenuous action out in the open (i.e.
258
Figure A.3: Diagram showing implementation of 'get water' system. For further
explanation see text and figure 9.11.
the potential worst-case scenario given the current temperature in the environ¬
ment). If the system-level node receives a lot of excitation then there will be
a mild inhibition of those strenuous actions which would increase the animal's
temperature.
5. keep warm: the two inputs to the system-level node are as follows: (i)
int-temp jninus is a measure of how much the animal's actual body tempera¬
ture is too low (i.e. the negative offset, if there is one, from the homeostatic
set-point), and (ii) ext-tempjninus is a measure of how much the animal's body
temperature would be too low if it were performing a non-energetic action out
in the open (i.e. the potential worst-case scenario given the current temperature
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Figure A.4: Diagram showing implementation of 'keep cool' system. For further
explanation see text and figure 9.11.
in the environment). If the system-level node receives a lot of excitation then
there will be a mild excitation of those strenuous actions which would increase
the animal's temperature.
6. avoid DPs: this system is not totally proscriptive because of the very fallible
perception of the animal. A dangerous place / hazard may be present in an
adjacent square to the animal and the animal may well not perceive it. Because
of the noisy and error-prone perception and the very severe injuries that can be
caused by hazards, it is better for the animal to stay away from hazards and not
to approach them too closely. In this diagram (figure A.6) the different stimuli
are:
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Figure A.5: Diagram showing implementation of 'keep warm' system. For further
explanation see text and figure 9.11.
'Opp DP' - zero in the direction of the hazard and adjacent directions, 1.0 in
the exact opposite direction and then slightly less than 1.0 in the directions
adjacent to the opposite one.
'DP(l)' - perception of hazards / dangerous places in adjacent squares.
'DP(2Y - perception of hazards / dangerous places in squares that are two
away from the animal's square.
7. avoid irrs : this system is again not totally prescriptive because of the very
fallible perception of the animal. An irrelevant animal may be present in an
adjacent square to the animal and the animalmaywell not perceive it. Because of
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Figure A.6: Diagram showing implementation of 'avoid DPs' system. For further
explanation see text and figure 9.11.
the noisy and error-prone perception and the severe injuries that can be caused
by irrelevant animals, it is better for the animal to stay away from them and not
to approach them too closely. In this diagram (figure A.7) the different stimuli
are:
'Opp Irr' - zero in the direction of the irrelevant animal and adjacent direc¬
tions, 1.0 in the exact opposite direction and then slightly less than 1.0 in the
directions adjacent to the opposite one.
'DP(l)' - perception of irrelevant animals in adjacent squares.








Leave This )nn'l Approach
Square In (11 Square
Move Actions Move Fast Actions
Figure A.7: Diagram showing implementation of 'avoid irrs' system. For further
explanation see text and figure 9.11.
8. avoid Pis: the different stimuli in this system are:
'Max PI' - the maximum value, over the 8 different directions, of the per¬
ceptions of predatorIs.
'Max PI (adj)' - 0.0 if 'Max PI' is less than 0.30, otherwise equal to 'Max
PI'. This is required to stop the animal choosing the action FREEZE too
frequently when it is in dense vegetation (which produces a large value of
'shelter in square' and also reduces the efficacy of perception, producing
many incorrect, low-valued perceptions of predator Is).
'OppPI'-zero in the direction of thepredatorls and adjacent directions, 1.0
in the exact opposite direction and then slightly less than 1.0 in the directions
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Figure A.8: Diagram showing implementation of 'avoid Pis' system. For further
explanation see text and figure 9.11.
adjacent to the opposite one.
9. avoid P2s: the different stimuli in this system are:
'Max P2' - the maximum value, over the 8 different directions, of the per¬
ceptions of predator2s.
'Max P2 (ad.))' - 0.0 if 'Max P2' is less than 0.30, otherwise equal to 'Max
P2'. This is required to stop the animal choosing the action FREEZE too
frequently when it is in dense vegetation (which produces a large value of
'shelter in square' and reduces the efficacy of perception, producing many
incorrect, low-valued perceptions of predator2s).
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Figure A.9: Diagram showing implementation of 'avoid P2s' system. For further
explanation see text and figure 9.11.
'Opp P2' - zero in the direction of the predator2s and adjacent directions, 1.0
in the exact opposite direction and then slightly less than 1.0 in the directions
adjacent to the opposite one.
10. reproduce: the animal is not able to perform the actions COURT or MATE when
it is in its den.
11. sleep in den: this system is crucial to the animal. If it does not manage to get to
its den before nightfall, and stay there all night, then it stands a very large chance
of dying during the night (see figure 4.10). This explains why the two stimuli to
the system-level node have such large values. The two stimuli are combined in
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Figure A.10: Diagram showing implementation of 'reproduce' system. For further
explanation see text and figure 9.11.
a slightly non-standard way, as described in the next section.
12. keep variance low: or 'do not get lost'. This is also a very important system
because the animal is unlikely to be able to find its way back to its den before
nightfall unless its estimated position with respect to the den is reasonably accu¬
rate. When the variance is quite high this system inhibits exploring, which tends
to increase variance.
13. scan for predators: or 'vigilance'. The two stimuli 'PI (adj)' and 'P2 (adj)' are
transformed multi-directional perceptual inputs which have been altered so that
they are equal to 1.0 if the same component of 'PI' is greater than 0.2, and are
multiplied by ^ otherwise. This is because the animal needs to look in the
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Figure A.ll: Diagram showing implementation of 'sleep in den' system. For further
explanation see text and figure 9.11.
direction of uncertain perceptions of predators.
14. stay close to cover: if the animal cannot perceive adequate cover then it is
sensible for it to head back towards the den instead, where it will find cover
eventually, if it does not encounter some on the way.
Combination of Inputs
The activations for nodes which receive many inputs (and where the inputs are not















Figure A.12: Diagram showing implementation of 'keep variance low' system. For
further explanation see text and figure 9.11.
Aj — Si -F (<5\ x S2)
where Aj is the activation of the system-level node 'sleep in den', S1 is the indeterminate
stimulus 'proximity of night' and S2 is the indeterminate stimulus 'distance from den'










Figure A.13: Diagram showing implementation of 'avoid edges' system. For further
explanation see text and figure 9.11.
where Aj is the activation of 'approach shelter' in the 'avoid predatorIs' and 'avoid
predator2s' systems, M is the (constant) motivational stimulus from 'avoid Pis' or
'avoid P2s', T is the (constant) negative penalty due to the fact that this is an appetitive
action, and E is the external stimulus from 'max PI' or 'max P2'.
Aj = (M x E) + T + U
where Aj is the activation of 'leave current square' in the 'keep clean' system, M is the














Figure A.14: Diagram showing implementation of 'scan for predators' system. For
further explanation see text and figure 9.11.
fact that this is an appetitive action, and E is the external stimulus from 'den in square'
(the animal is not able to clean itself while in its den).
" I t+T j + 4
where Aj is the activation of 'explore', Plf P2 and P3 are positive preferences for the
node from the 'get food', 'get water' and 'reproduce', and P4 is a negative preference
from the 'keep variance low' system.
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Figure A.15: Diagram showing implementation of 'stay close to cover' system. For
further explanation see text and figure 9.11.
Aj =
max,-(P,-),-=1,„3 + | E,-=i(-Pj)
1 + 9
where Aj is the activation of action node 'rest', Px is a positive preference obtained
by multiplying a motivational stimulus from the 'keep cool' system with the external
stimulus 'shelter in sq', P2 is a positive preference obtained by multiplying a motiva¬
tional stimulus from the 'keep warm' system with the external stimulus 'shade in sq',
and P3 is a positive preference obtained by multiplying a motivational stimulus from
the 'keep variance low' system with the external stimulus 'den in sq'.
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max,-(Pj)j=1[2 + \ ELi(^)
! + i
where A} is the activation ofaction node 'freeze', Pi is a positive preference obtained by
multiplying a motivational stimulus from the 'avoid predatorls' system with both the
external stimulus 'shelter in sq' and the external stimulus 'max pi (adjusted)' and P2 is
a positive preference obtained by multiplying a motivational stimulus from the 'avoid
predator2s' system with both the external stimulus 'shelter in sq' and the external
stimulus 'max p2 (adjusted)'.
where Aj is the activation of action node 'court', P:+ is a positive preference obtained
by multiplying a motivational stimulus from the 'reproduce' system with both the
external stimulus 'receptive mate in sq' and the external stimulus 'den not in sq', and
P2+ is a positive preference from the 'keep warm' system. Pf, P2~ and P3~ are negative
preferences from the 'get food', 'get water' and 'keep cool' systems.
where Aj is the activation of action node 'mate', P+ is a positive preference obtained
by multiplying a motivational stimulus from the 'reproduce' system with the external
stimuli 'courted mate in sq' and 'den not in sq' and P2+ is a positive preference from
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the 'keep warm' system. P1 , P2 and P3 are negative preferences from the 'get food',
'get water' and 'keep cool' systems.
where Aj is the activation of one of the directionalMOVE action nodes, each of P,+ - P23
are obtained bymultiplying an input from higher in the hierarchy (e.g. from 'approach
perceived food') with the relevant component of a multi-directional external stimulus
(e.g. 'perceived food'), and each ofPf -Pf are obtained by multiplying an input from
higher in the hierarchy (e.g. from 'avoid edge square') with the relevant component of
a multi-directional external stimulus (e.g. 'perceived edge').
where Aj is the activation of one of the directional MOVE_FAST action nodes, each
of Pi - P4+ are obtained by multiplying an input from higher in the hierarchy (e.g.
from 'run away' from predatorl) with the relevant component of a multi-directional
external stimulus (e.g. 'opposite PI'), P5+ is a preference from the 'keep warm' system,
each ofPf - Pf are obtained by multiplying an input from higher in the hierarchy (e.g.
from 'don't approach predatorl') with the relevant component of a multi-directional
external stimulus (e.g. 'perceived predatorl'), and finally Pf, Pf, and Pf are negative
preferences from the 'keep cool', 'get food' and 'get water' systems.
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where A, is the activation of one of the directional LOOK action nodes, P\ is a positive
preference obtained bymultiplyingamotivational stimulus from the 'avoid predator1s'
system with the relevant component of the multi-directional external stimulus 'pi
(adjusted)' and P2 is a positive preference obtained by multiplying a motivational
stimulus from the 'avoid predator2s' system with the relevant component of the multi¬
directional external stimulus 'p2 (adjusted)'.
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